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ABSTRACT 
 
The suggestion that individual responsibility for ill-health, and consequent 
healthcare need, should be a factor in healthcare priority-setting is increasingly 
debated. The adoption of such a principle within UK healthcare distribution policy 
would be both socially and ethically contentious.  
 
This study examines the concept of a 'responsibility principle' within healthcare 
priority-setting and explores the contribution of the views, values and preferences of 
the public to the ongoing discussions. The ethical justification for seeking public 
participation in this type of debate is explored. 
 
Within this thesis, a range of issues are critically evaluated, including healthcare 
distribution via the 'QALY' approach, the incorporation of distributional weighting of 
health benefits and the influence of social values on healthcare provision. It is 
concluded that an enhanced public contribution could be attained by systematically 
investigating how members of the public reason and construct ethical arguments 
regarding 'responsibility' as a priority-setting principle and that such an investigation 
would demand a clear, empirically-based and ethically-sound methodological 
approach. The means by which this may be accomplished is investigated, and a 
conceptual and practical basis for eliciting and examining the ethical reasoning and 
arguments of members of the public is presented in a detailed proposal that 
represents an innovative approach to research in this area. 
 
A range of socio-ethical issues inform this study, including social value judgements, 
placing limits on what may be perceived to be socially justified entitlements, and 
questions of the citizen's role in contributing to ethically important social policy. The 
study employs a conceptual approach to these issues and identifies, evaluates and 
applies ethical arguments to the relevant topics.  
 
This study contributes to both methodological and empirical knowledge regarding 
public participation in healthcare debates and assists the interpretation of existing 
evidence of the public's views in this area.  
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This chapter introduces the study and provides an overview of its background, aims, 
objectives and methodology. The thesis contents are described in an outline of the 
individual chapters. 
 
1.1  BACKGROUND  
 
1.1.1  ORIGINS OF THE STUDY 
 
This thesis arose from two distinct but closely related aspects of my academic and 
clinical experience and interests. As a registered nurse, I have spent many years 
working within a healthcare environment in both clinical practice and professional 
development roles. As an academic, I have focused on the ethical aspects of 
healthcare practice. In various roles, I have encountered issues that have raised 
questions about how healthcare resources are allocated and how priorities are 
established.  
 
At a time of intensifying financial constraints, a prominent source of debate in both 
healthcare and academic settings, is the need to establish clear, comprehensible 
and effective principles that would enable the justifiable – and socially acceptable – 
identification of healthcare priorities. 
 
In recent years, the suggestion that individual responsibility for healthcare need 
could be considered as a factor in healthcare priority-setting, or as a healthcare 
resource-limiting principle has been increasingly discussed. 
 
It is evident that the formal integration of such a principle within UK healthcare 
distribution policy would be highly contentious and it is therefore unlikely to be 
considered without clear evidence and confirmation of societal support. However, 
the notion of 'public participation'1 – increasingly advocated as a means of involving 
the public in such important social policy – demands a clear, empirically-based and 
                                               
1
 For the purposes of this thesis, 'public' is defined as: "of, relating to, or affecting all or most of the people of a  
  country, state, etc." (merriam-webster.com). The concept of a 'member of the public' is less easily defined as it  
  potentially encompasses all citizens. However, in broad terms, for the purposes of this investigation, a member of  
  the public is defined as 'a citizen who has no direct  professional involvement with healthcare distribution activities'  
  (see Chapter 10) 
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ethically sound basis upon which the public's views may be determined.  
 
As I am uncertain whether existing approaches to evaluating 'public opinion'2 
regarding healthcare distribution offer a sufficiently firm basis for determining 
societal views on such a potentially controversial strategy, I decided to investigate, 
from a socio-ethical perspective, the concept of responsibility for healthcare need 
and its potential incorporation within UK healthcare (NHS) priority-setting. I also 
wished to explore both the role of public participation in the ongoing debate, and the 
extent to which  existing strategies for examining 'what the people think' about this 
issue are able to determine empirically-based and ethically defensible social 
objectives. 
 
1.1.2 OUTLINE OF THE STUDY 
 
This socio-ethical study examines the suggestion that responsibility for ill-health and 
consequent healthcare need should be a factor in healthcare priority-setting. Central 
to this examination is the belief that, if such a proposal were deemed feasible – in 
both practical and ethical terms – its implementation would demand a clear, 
evidence-based understanding of what members of the public think about it, and 
effective public participation would be needed to inform the debate. This study 
therefore explores the role that public participation plays in informing healthcare 
distribution policy and examines the influence of social values on how healthcare 
distribution is realised and priorities identified. 
 
The ethical justification for seeking the public's opinion is examined and it is 
contended that public participation would be enhanced by adopting a more critical 
and comprehensive approach to eliciting and examining the public's views, values 
and preferences concerning responsibility for healthcare need as a priority-setting 
(or resource-limiting) principle. Furthermore, it is argued that this could be achieved 
by examining how members of the public reason and construct arguments regarding 
this issue. This would demand a means of effectively and systematically eliciting 
and analysing members of the public's arguments i.e. their validity and underlying 
reasoning and premises, in relation to healthcare distribution, priority-setting and the 
incorporation of a 'responsibility principle'. In view of the acknowledged need for 
public participation to be based on ethically-defensible social objectives this 
                                               
2 The term 'public opinion' is applied within this study to describe a range of terms, such as 'views', 'values' and  
  'preferences' that refer to the perspective of members of the public   
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examination would need to specifically address the processes of ethical reasoning 
and arguments.  
 
A review of the relevant literature indicates that this type of investigation has not 
been undertaken in relation to members of the public's views on healthcare 
distribution and priority-setting, and this study explores a means by which this may 
be achieved. The concept of empirical ethics is examined in terms of its suitability to 
guide the elicitation and examination of the public's reasoning and arguments. A 
practical means by which this may be accomplished is then detailed in a 
comprehensive research proposal that demonstrates an empirical ethics 
methodological approach. 
As the leading organisation in matters relating to this study, the National Institute for 
Health and Care Excellence (NICE) provides insights into many of the study's key 
features. The critical examination of how NICE has addressed issues of relevance 
to this study is therefore a key component of this thesis.  
 
1.1.3 RATIONALE 
 
This study is founded on a belief that important aspects of social policy that have 
significant ethical consequences should be subject to vigorous ethical debate and 
critical ethical inquiry. This, it is contended, would provide a more substantial 
empirical basis for ethical and policy debates. 
 
The rationale for this study therefore has four distinct elements: 
 
 Evidence of increasing societal interest in a more explicitly defined and 
ethically-justified approach to healthcare priority-setting  
 The need to examine the concept of responsibility for healthcare need as a 
priority-setting principle 
 A concern that public participation in healthcare priority-setting is insufficient 
due to limitations in the existing evidence-base 
 A need to identify a means by which public opinion can be more effectively 
examined 
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1.2 CONTEXT 
 
1.2.1 CHALLENGES FACED BY HEALTHCARE PLANNERS 
 
For a publicly-funded healthcare system, such as the UK National Health Service 
(NHS), within which budgets are by necessity predetermined, the distribution of 
resources is a primary concern and a complex and challenging policy issue 
(Tsuchiya et al, 2003; Persad et al, 2009; Winkler et al, 2012). Demand for NHS 
services far exceeds the level of provision that can realistically be provided 
(Newdick, 2005) and the distribution of NHS services must therefore be achieved in 
a manner that is comprehensible, economically viable, socially acceptable and, 
given the moral  significance of healthcare, ethically defensible (Daniels and Sabin, 
2008; Mason et al, 2011). 
 
All (publicly-funded) healthcare systems must confront the challenge of providing a 
reasonable quality of healthcare to the maximum number of people via a finite 
healthcare budget (Winkler et al, 2012). Increasing demand for (and expectations 
of) healthcare, combined with the  competing claims of discrete clinical services, 
patient groups and even individual patients, is intensified by the cost of expensive 
'high tech' medicine, longer life expectancies and the growing rates of chronic 
illness (Marmot and Wilkinson, 2009; Martin et al, 2010). 
 
In the context of the present UK economic climate and anticipated levels of public 
spending (Appleby, 2008), 'hard choices' are demanded – within healthcare as 
elsewhere – and, in the absence of unlimited public funding, access to effective 
healthcare may need to be restricted or even denied (Martin et al, 2002; Ham and 
Robert, 2003; Newdick, 2005; Green and Gerard, 2009). Priority-setting is therefore 
an increasingly common, possibly essential, feature of healthcare distribution 
(Benatar, 2003; Singer, 2009; Robinson et al, 2011). Furthermore, in addition to 
estimations of economic efficiency and technical/scientific efficacy, priority-setting 
decisions must also take into account the increasingly significant role that social 
values play within healthcare distribution 
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1.2.2 HEALTHCARE DISTRIBUTION AND THE QALY APPROACH 
 
Those responsible for determining healthcare distribution policy must take into 
consideration the level of healthcare demand and balance this against available 
resources. Such resources may include tangible assets such as staff, facilities and 
equipment or, as is increasingly the case, the rather less discernible 'health benefits' 
– calculated via economic evaluation – that indicate the overall health gains 
achieved from a healthcare budget (Brazier et al, 2007). In order to contextualise 
this study and to enable arguments to be examined in light of a genuine, empirically-
based and effectual healthcare distributional paradigm. The issues are examined 
with particular reference to the distribution of health benefits via the quality-adjusted 
life year (QALY) approach (Weinstein et al, 2009). 
  
The QALY is a standardised measure of health outcome that was specifically 
developed to enable clear, impartial healthcare distribution and priority-setting 
decision-making. The aim of the standard QALY model is to maximise the number 
of QALYs gained in order to derive the most benefit from a healthcare budget and, 
for over 30 years, QALYs have enabled cost-effective priority-setting (Wailoo et al, 
2009).  
 
However, a criticism of the impartial QALY approach is that, as equal 'weight' is 
attached to all QALYs, it is insensitive to variances in people's healthcare needs or 
the specific circumstances of individual patients i.e. it is "…blind to health conditions 
and personal characteristics" (Whitehead and Ali, 2010: 14). There is also growing 
concern that such an objective approach does not fully reflect the views of the public 
regarding how healthcare should be distributed and that it conflicts with many 
people's interpretations of a reasonable approach to this process (Anand and 
Wailoo, 2000). 
 
1.2.3 QALY-WEIGHTING 
 
There is evidence of increasing public support for incorporating a degree of 
distributional bias into healthcare resource allocation and for enhancing equity 
within the QALY approach by adjusting, or 'weighting', QALYs in accordance with 
the individual characteristics or attributes of their recipients (Olsen, 2000; Wilmot 
and Ratcliffe, 2002; Wailoo et al, 2009; Lancsar et al, 2011). 
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Therefore, a range of criteria – such as the age of the patient or the initial severity of 
their illness – that could be used to justify adding or subtracting 'weight' to or from 
the QALY, to enable a more subjective approach to its distribution, have been 
proposed (Brazier et al, 2007). However, as attaching additional weight to the health 
gains of some patients carries the logical implication that lower weight should be 
given to the health gains of some others (Shah et al, 2011), QALY-weighting 
remains a potentially contentious and debatable strategy (Bobinac et al, 2012; Van 
de Wetering et al, 2013). 
 
1.2.4 RESPONSIBILITY FOR HEALTHCARE NEED 
 
One possible 'weighting criterion' provides a focus for this study. This is the 
suggestion that the health gains of those considered to be in some way responsible 
for their ill-health – and consequent healthcare need – should be weighted lower 
than those of other, 'non-culpable', individuals. In other words, lower priority should 
be given to those whose illness is in some sense 'self-inflicted' (Sharkey and Gillam, 
2010; Walker, 2010); the estimated degree of personal responsibility being 
balanced against an individual's access to healthcare treatment for that particular 
illness. For the purposes of this study, this potential weighting criterion will be 
referred to as the/a 'responsibility principle'. 
 
1.2.5 PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 
 
It is recognised that, in a publicly-funded healthcare system, distribution policy 
should reflect public views and values (Menzel, 1999; Richardson and McKie, 
2005), and that there should be greater public consultation in healthcare priority-
setting (McKie et al, 2009; Mitton et al, 2009). It is therefore essential to obtain a 
clear and informed view of what the public think about how healthcare resources are 
allocated, and how priorities are established. 
 
Although there is evidence of public support for distributional weighting of health 
benefits the evidence of public views on this and other approaches to priority-setting 
is only partial. Whilst a range of qualitative studies have investigated the public's 
views and preferences regarding how healthcare resources are distributed, the 
majority of studies of 'public opinion' on this issue employ a quantitative approach, 
the findings of which consist primarily of unsupported responses. However, many of 
these studies demand measurable outcomes or seek to expose statistical 
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differences, and therefore a quantitative approach to the issues is both sensible and 
effective. However, an argument sustained throughout this thesis is that ensuring 
effective public participation in diverse and ethically-sensitive healthcare distribution 
strategies – such as the incorporation a 'responsibility principle' – demands a more 
substantial and detailed evidence-base than that which is obtainable via quantitative 
methods.  
 
Eliciting public opinion in relation to healthcare distribution, it is contended, 
demands a more in-depth examination of what lies behind people's stated views, 
values and preferences; it requires the identification of empirically based and 
ethically defensible social objectives (Richardson and McKie, 2005) which may be 
aligned to the process of priority-setting. The identification of such objectives, it is 
contended, may be assisted by eliciting the arguments used by members of the 
public and subjecting these to systematic analysis that explores their validity and 
underlying reasoning. There is little evidence that this has previously been 
undertaken in this area and, it is argued, this represents a significant gap in the 
existing knowledge-base. 
 
This study will contribute to both methodological and empirical knowledge regarding 
public participation in healthcare debates and assist the interpretation of existing 
evidence of the public's views in this area.  
 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
This study sought to answer the following research question: 
 
How can public participation effectively inform the debate on the social 
and ethical acceptability of individual responsibility as a healthcare 
priority-setting principle? 
 
1.4 AIMS 
 
 To critically examine the role of public participation in relation to healthcare 
priority-setting on the basis of responsibility for healthcare need 
 To identify how such public participation may be enhanced 
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1.5 OBJECTIVES 
 
 To ethically evaluate the processes of healthcare distribution, priority-setting 
and the QALY approach 
 To consider the notion of responsibility for healthcare need as a priority-
setting/QALY-weighting principle 
 To examine the role of public participation in relation to the application of a 
'responsibility principle' to healthcare priority-setting 
 To examine the concepts of ethical reasoning and arguments as a means of 
enhancing public participation in healthcare priority-setting 
 To propose methods by which the examination of the public's ethical 
reasoning and arguments may be effectively accomplished 
 
1.6 METHODOLOGY 
 
The research question has been explored without attempting to adhere to one 
specific academic discipline. The category into which this study most appropriately 
fits is that of bioethics and, possibly, empirical ethics. However, there is 
considerable debate with regard to what constitutes an empirical ethics approach 
and clarification of this debate is offered in Chapter 9 of this thesis. Nevertheless, it 
is generally agreed that bioethics is (or should be) an interdisciplinary field that 
allows for a variety of academic approaches. In addition, many of the relevant 
academic sources for the study lie within the field of health economics and 
considerable use is made of sources from within this discipline.  
 
Overall, the study examines a range of socio-ethical issues, which include issues of 
societal welfare, placing limits on what may be perceived to be socially justified 
entitlements, and questions of the citizen's role in contributing to ethically important 
social policy. In accordance with my academic background, I have taken a largely 
conceptual approach to these issues and have sought to identify, evaluate and 
apply ethical arguments to topics that are relevant to the study as a whole. This 
approach is demonstrated throughout this thesis but is particularly evident in the 
penultimate chapter within which a detailed research proposal is presented.  
 
The reason for adopting this approach is that there is no existing evidence, within 
either the bioethics or health economics literature, of the central proposition of this 
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study – that the ethical reasoning and arguments of members of the public, with 
regard to the incorporation of a 'responsibility principle' into healthcare priority-
setting decision-making should be examined – having been systematically 
investigated. I therefore sought, within this study, to focus on providing a conceptual 
and practical basis for this to be achieved. 
 
I have attempted to evaluate the ethical themes and arguments raised by various 
stakeholders – where necessary applying documentary analysis to their 
identification – not solely from an ethical perspective, but also on the basis of other 
claims or attributes related to them.  
 
The study draws upon primary data sources including: Reports, Policy Documents 
and Consultation Papers. Secondary sources include academic monographs, 
journal articles and other published material. Due to the nature of the subject matter, 
additional research has included media sources such as newspapers and 
professional publications. Tertiary sources of material have included the internet. 
Where direct access to primary sources has been unobtainable, but these have 
been accessed through secondary sources, the materials are cited accordingly. 
 
1.7 THESIS STRUCTURE 
 
The thesis consists of eleven chapters and is divided into three sections: 
 
1.7.1 SECTION A: HEALTHCARE PRIORITY-SETTING 
 
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 examines the concept of healthcare 
distribution and offers a critical ethical evaluation of the QALY approach to 
distributing health benefits. 
 
Chapter 3 explores the idea that weighting the QALY in consideration of the 
characteristics of its recipients would allow for a more equitable approach to 
healthcare distribution and priority-setting. Evidence of public support for such an 
amendment to the QALY method is presented and the way in which the National 
Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) has approached weighting is 
critically evaluated. QALY-weighting is also subjected to critical ethical appraisal. 
 
Chapter 4 examines the proposal that responsibility for healthcare need should be 
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formally recognised as a priority-setting principle. Priority-setting and rationing 
healthcare are examined and the 'responsibility principle' is ethically appraised. 
 
1.7.2 SECTION B: PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT 
 
Chapter 5 addresses the concept of social values and their role within health 
distribution policy. The ways in which social values and social value judgements are 
reflected in the work of NICE, and the extent to which NICE identify social value 
judgements within an overall 'ethical framework' for their activities is critically 
evaluated.  
 
In Chapter 6, The process of 'public participation' – the means by which attempts 
are made to engage with the public on issues requiring public input – is critically 
explored. A narrative overview of the relevant literature is presented and the role of 
NICE's 'Citizens Council', an advisory body made up of members of the public, is 
considered in light of its contribution to public participation in healthcare distribution 
and priority-setting. The need for enhancement of public participation is emphasised 
and the elicitation and systematic examination of ethically-defensible public views, 
values and preferences regarding priority-setting is identified. 
 
Chapter 7 examines the concepts of ethical reasoning and arguments; exploring 
their potential contribution to enhancing understanding of public opinion and 
promoting public participation. A lack of available evidence of the public's ethical 
reasoning and arguments regarding healthcare distribution is highlighted. Two 'non-
healthcare distribution' studies of arguments are critically appraised in order to 
demonstrate differing approaches to the task. 
 
Chapter 8 presents a literature review that sought to identify studies that have 
examined public attitudes and preferences regarding healthcare distribution and/or 
priority-setting and to evaluate these with regard to the extent to which they have 
elicited and/or examined participants' ethical arguments. A lack of such examination 
is identified and the need for an effective methodological approach to this subject is 
highlighted. 
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1.7.3 SECTION C: EXAMINING REASONING AND ARGUMENTS 
 
Chapter 9 examines the concept of empirical ethics, a methodological approach 
that integrates ethics and empirical findings to reach a normative outcome, as a 
means of effectively guiding the examination of the public's reasoning and 
arguments. 
 
In Chapter 10 a detailed hypothetical proposal for a qualitative research study, 
guided by an empirical ethics methodological approach, to investigate the ethical 
reasoning and arguments of members of the public is presented. 
 
Finally, Chapter 11 presents the overall conclusions to be drawn from this thesis. 
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2 DISTRIBUTING HEALTHCARE: THE QALY 
APPROACH 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
'Healthcare distribution' – the process by which a finite healthcare budget is 
apportioned in order to meet healthcare needs – requires consideration of a wide 
range of potentially competing factors. Given the moral significance of healthcare, 
its distribution also demands critical ethical consideration.  
 
Developed via the processes of economic evaluation, the QALY (quality-adjusted 
life year) has become a widely accepted means of guiding healthcare distribution 
and was specifically developed to enable clear, impartial distribution and priority-
setting decision-making.  
 
This chapter examines the process of allocating healthcare via the distribution of 
QALYs and offers a critical ethical evaluation of the QALY approach. 
 
2.2 HEALTHCARE DISTRIBUTION 
 
Once it's established what a society should spend overall on health care, then it 
must also be decided who should have that care, and on what basis it should 
be allocated (Dworkin, 1993: 885) 
 
The effective distribution of healthcare is a challenging process. It involves making 
the best use of available resources and, where competing demands are made upon 
those resources, ensuring the most beneficial, fair and socially acceptable use of a 
limited budget. Distributional decisions must be economically viable, but they must 
also be socially and ethically justifiable; balancing the needs and interests of a 
range of stakeholders that includes healthcare providers, patients and the public.  
 
The distribution of healthcare, as a morally significant feature of social policy, 
therefore demands well-considered ethical judgements and a coherent moral 
framework (Dolan and Olsen, 2002; Newdick, 2005; Kenny and Joffres, 2008; 
Daniels and Sabin, 2008; Mason et al, 2011). The topic has been extensively 
explored within both health economics and bioethics literature (e.g. Newdick, 2005; 
Morris et al, 2007; McMillan and Hope, 2010) and the means by which priorities are 
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identified and met has been a particular source of ethical debate (Bærøe, 2009; 
McMillan et al, 2006; Ridderstolpe et al, 2003).  
 
In general, healthcare distribution must satisfy two key ethical criteria. Firstly, it 
should be effective – limited resources should be apportioned in a way that benefits 
the specific population and minimises harm (Williams et al, 2012). Secondly, 
healthcare distribution should be fair and just (Marmot, 2007). This criterion 
indicates the largely subjective aspect of the process, as perceptions of what is 'fair' 
or 'just' will vary according to individual and/or societal perspectives.  
 
Ensuring that citizens have equal access to and an equal share of healthcare 
resources could be regarded as an indication that healthcare distribution 
incorporates considerations of fairness and justice. Paradoxically however, appeals 
to fairness and justice are frequently the foundation of calls for changes to what are 
ostensibly, egalitarian approaches to healthcare distribution (see below).  
 
Additional ethical justification for a distributional strategy may be evident if the 
ethical theories upon which it is based or the ethical principles that guide its 
implementation can be clearly defined (Richardson and McKie, 2005; Persad et al, 
2009).  
 
2.3  THE QUALITY-ADJUSTED LIFE YEAR 
 
In health care, 'doing good' means improving people's life expectancy and the 
quality of their lives. Since people value both of these fundamental attributes of 
life, we need a measure of outcome which incorporates both, and which reflects 
the fact that most people are willing to sacrifice some quality of life in order to 
gain some additional life expectancy, and vice versa. This is precisely the role 
of the Quality Adjusted Life Year (Williams 1995: 222) 
 
The justifiable deployment of finite healthcare resources is a complex undertaking 
that requires a means of determining how resources should be allocated and, if 
necessary, which treatments and services should be prioritised. Decision-makers 
are assisted in this process by the use of economic evaluation methods, which 
enable the comparative analysis of interventions in order to identify the most 
economically defensible use of available resources (Jefferson et al, 2000).  
 
Cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) is a form of economic evaluation in which both 
the costs and consequences of a healthcare intervention are examined in order to 
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assess the extent to which it provides 'value for money'. CEA may be applied to 
healthcare when the costs and consequences of different interventions (that may 
vary in terms of process or clinical setting) can be measured in identical natural 
units such as life-years gained, deaths prevented or heart attacks avoided. 
Competing interventions may then be compared in terms of cost per 'unit of 
effectiveness' (life-years gained etc.). However, although CEA is useful when there 
is a natural dimension along which to measure health outcomes; to enable cost-
effectiveness analyses across different areas of healthcare – and between diverse 
clinical services such as, for example, cancer treatment and hip-replacement 
surgery – it was recognised (in the late 20th century) that a more collective measure 
was needed: 
 
To be of practical use, such a measure must be reducible to a single index, 
even though it may – indeed should – be made up of components which reflect 
the multi-dimensional nature of health (Williams and Kind, 1992: 21) 
 
Cost-utility analysis (CUA) – "a sibling of CEA" (Jefferson et al, 2000: 7) – was 
developed in response to the need for a composite measure of health outcome. By 
applying CUA, the outcomes of healthcare ('health benefits') may be assessed in 
terms of the quantity and quality of life delivered by a given treatment when 
compared to the alternatives. These outcomes, when given a numerical value that 
represents a measure of an individual's projected length of life weighted by a 
valuation of their quality of life over that period, can then be combined with the 
financial cost of the treatment to provide a commonly applicable measure – the 
quality-adjusted life year (QALY) – against which health interventions can be 
compared. 
 
Loomes and McKenzie (1989: 299) described the QALY approach to balancing 
quantity and quality of life: 
 
A basic notion which underlies the QALY concept is that, for any individual, the 
prospect of living Y years in less than full health may be 'equated' to a prospect 
of living X years in full or perfect health, when X< Y 
 
The primary objective of the QALY method is to evaluate the costs and 
consequences (benefits, potential complications etc.) of healthcare, in order that 
interventions may be prioritised (based on their cost-effectiveness) and overall 
benefits (obtained from a healthcare budget) optimised, via the process of 'QALY 
maximisation'.  
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QALYs enable the relative cost-effectiveness of competing interventions, which, in 
terms of their clinical aims and outcomes may be unrelated, to be explicitly defined, 
projected, quantified and compared in terms of 'cost per QALY'. In so doing they 
provide a clear and comprehensible means of determining which treatments, 
services and, more contentiously perhaps, individual patients, should be prioritised 
(Weinstein, et al, 2009; Neumann and Weinstein, 2010).  
 
QALYs are increasingly used to inform policy decisions regarding the appraisal of 
health technologies, the issuing of clinical guidelines and the implementation of 
public health measures: 
 
Health effects should be expressed in terms of QALYs…Given its widespread 
use, the QALY is considered to be the most appropriate generic measure of 
health benefit that reflects both mortality and HRQL [Health-related quality of 
life] effects NICE, 2008a: 33) 
 
The QALY has become the dominant measure of healthcare benefit assessment 
and has established a significant role as healthcare prioritisation measure in many 
jurisdictions (Wailoo et al, 2009). 
 
2.3.1 BACKGROUND TO THE QALY 
 
It was developed in the 1960s and early 1970s with a view to resolving the 
problem of comparing "apples and oranges" in priority setting in health care 
(Nord, 1999: 18) 
 
The development of the QALY took place at a time when healthcare was 
progressing from narrow, disease-based models, to encompass broader 
psychological, social and economic aspects of patients' lives. This led to the 
increasing recognition of the patient's role in the provision of effective healthcare 
and gave rise to the development of more comprehensive health assessment 
techniques, which were sensitive – to some extent at least – to the psychological 
and social impact of ill-health and healthcare treatment. Prior to the development of 
the QALY, 'quality of life' issues were rarely an explicit factor within healthcare 
decision-making and 'best choice' prioritisation decisions were most likely to be 
based on appraisals of symptoms and cure and perhaps that most definite of 
outcome measures: survival rates (Axtell, 1963). 
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2.3.2 THE QALY METHOD 
 
As a unit of measure the standard, unweighted QALY represents one year in full 
health. Years spent in less than full health are 'quality adjusted' (Weinstein et al, 
2009) so that one QALY equals two years of 50 per cent health; four years of 25 per 
cent health etc. (NICE, 2008a). Alan Williams, a prominent health economist who 
helped shaped the development, thinking and practice with regard to QALYs (Kind, 
2008) described its fundamental approach: 
 
… it takes a year of healthy life expectancy to be worth one, but regards a year 
of unhealthy life expectancy as worth less than one. Its precise value is lower 
the worse the quality of life of the unhealthy person (which is what the "quality 
adjusted" bit is all about (Williams, 1985, as cited by Harris, 1987: 117) 
 
The central premise is that individuals move through health states over time and 
that each health state should have a 'utility value' attached to it (a numerical score 
that reflects the desirability of living in that state)3. (Hausman, 2010). Utility values 
represent the 'quality of life' component of the QALY by locating dissimilar health 
outcomes within a single measurable frame of reference. They are produced by 
identifying the strength of people's preferences for a range of pre-determined health 
states (see below). 
 
The number of QALYs gained via a healthcare intervention is calculated by 
multiplying the utility value of a particular health state by the length of time it is 
predicted that an individual may experience that health state4. This is the basic 
'QALY calculation' (Figure.2.1) that enables the overall value of a particular 
intervention to be determined. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
3
 "Utility is a term that was developed by economists (it actually derives from the work of the early nineteenth  
  century economist and philosopher Jeremy Bentham, who developed the "utilitarian" school of thought), which  
  refers to the subjective satisfaction that people derive from consuming goods and services. In the health care    
  context, it is used to refer to the subjective level of wellbeing that people experience in different states of health"  
  (Robinson, 1993: 672) 
4 Utility values may be charted over a selected time period (for example, the anticipated life-span of a patient) to  
   produce a series of value-weighted health states 
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Calculating the number of QALYs gained is reasonably straightforward. 
The utility value of a health state is multiplied by the length of time that the 
individual is in that health state (NICE, 2008b: 27) 
 
For example: 
 
Intervention A: four years in a health state valued at 0.75 = 3 QALYs 
Intervention B: four years in a health state valued at 0.5   = 2 QALYs 
 
Additional number of QALYs generated by intervention A = 1 QALY 
 
 
Figure 2.1: The basic QALY calculation 
 
This value is subsequently combined with the economic cost of an intervention to 
determine its 'cost per QALY' (Richardson et al, 2009). The measure of effect 
therefore is 'cost per QALY gained', which is the cost of treatment divided by the 
total number of QALYs gained: 
 
For example, let's say that a hip replacement improves the utility of the average 
arthritic person from 0.8 to 0.9 (gain of 0.1). Let us say that, again on average, 
people have their hip replaced at the age of 65 years; and that their average life 
expectancy, at this age, is 15 years. They therefore gain 0.1 x 15 = 1.5 QALYs 
from the operation. If the cost of a hip replacement is £5,000 then the cost per 
QALY is: 5,000 ÷ 1.5 = £3,333 per QALY (NICE, 2008b: 27) 
 
Decision-makers are able to maximise the overall number of QALYs gained – and 
thereby increase aggregate health across the population – by comparing the 'QALY-
gains' of different health interventions (Warner and Luce, 1982; Loomes and 
McKenzie, 1989; Weinstein et al, 2009).  
 
Alternative interventions are compared via the calculation of an Incremental Cost-
effectiveness Ratio (ICER) (Figure 2.2). The results of these analyses are assessed 
against a cost-per-QALY 'threshold' above or below which an intervention may or 
may not be funded5. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
5
 The 'cost-per-QALY threshold indicates the monetary value of QALY 
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The ICER is the ratio of the difference in the mean costs of an intervention 
compared with the next best alternative (which could be no action or 
treatment) to the differences in the mean health outcomes. ICERs are 
expressed as cost (in £) per QALY gained (NICE, 2008c: 18) 
 
For example: 
  
Cost of Intervention A = £50,000 –  
Cost of Intervention B = £20,000 
                 £30,000 
              
 
Number of QALYs produced by intervention A = 10 – 
Number of QALYs produced by intervention B = 4 
                 6 QALYs 
 
 
Incremental Cost-Effectiveness Ratio (ICER) or cost per QALY gained via 
intervention A = £5,000 (£30,000 ÷ 6) 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Incremental Cost-Effectiveness ratio (ICER) 
 
QALYs therefore provide a 'common currency' that enables measureable 
comparisons between competing healthcare interventions (of whatever type) plus 
unambiguous, defensible prioritisation decision-making across all areas of 
healthcare. The QALY approach allows resources to be directed towards 
interventions that provide better QALY-value-for-money. Alan Williams expressed 
this succinctly: 
 
The general idea is that a beneficial health care activity is one that generates a 
positive amount of QALYs, and that an efficient health care activity is one 
where the cost per QALY is as low as it can be. A high priority health care 
activity is one where the cost-per-QALY is low, and a low priority activity is one 
where cost-per-QALY is high (Williams, 1985, as cited by Harris, 1987: 117) 
 
2.3.3 GENERATING UTILITY VALUES 
 
To generate utility values, a practical and reliable means of determining the strength 
of people's preferences for specific health states is required. This is achieved by 
defining a set of health states and measuring the extent to which they are valued. 
This demands careful consideration of which aspects of health, illness, 
psychological and social functioning should be included, as to value all potential 
health states would not be possible. Therefore, in order to construct representative 
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health state sets that embrace the majority of possible health states, validated 
generic health status measures, such as EQ-5D6, which enable the construction of a 
range of healthcare outcomes, are employed and studies of individual preferences 
regarding these outcomes are used to develop 'value sets' for use within the QALY 
calculation7. 
 
In total there are 243 possible health states (35) formed by combining one level from 
each of the EQ-5D dimensions. As it would be unrealistic to expect respondents to 
value all these health states directly, health economists measure preferences 
among only a small number of alternatives. To generate value sets they estimate a 
multi-attribute utility function from which the values of the remaining health states 
can be calculated (Hausman, 2010). By a process of statistical modelling, the 
results are then: 
 
…converted into a single summary index by applying a formula that essentially 
attaches values (also called weights) to each of the levels in each dimension 
(EuroQol Group, 2013b: 11) 
 
The summary index score is used to weight the QALY calculation. It indicates the 
overall utility value of a particular health state (Hausman, 2010) and is used to 
predict utilities for health states not valued directly.  
 
Utility values range from 0 (the equivalent to being dead) and 1 (best possible 
health state)8. The more preferred health states have greater utility value. To permit 
aggregation of the numbers of QALYs gained, the value range has interval scale 
properties, where the distances between the categories are identical across the 
range of categories (Bryman, 2008) so that, for example, a QALY gain from 0.2 to 
0.4 is equally valuable as a gain from 0.6 to 0.8. 
 
Preference elicitation is undertaken via both direct and indirect methods, and it has 
been observed that different methods may produce different results (Loomes and 
                                               
6
 EQ-5D is a generic, preference-based utility instrument developed by a collaborative team of European  
  researchers, which provides a descriptive profile and single index value for health status and is NICE's preferred  
  measure of health-related quality of life (HRQoL) in adults (NICE, 2008a).  It consists of five dimensions (mobility,  
  self-care, usual activities, pain/discomfort, and anxiety/depression) each of which can take one of three responses   
  recording differing levels of severity (no problems/some or moderate problems/extreme problems) (EuroQol  
  Group, 2013a) 
7
 It is acknowledged that pre-scored generic preference-based measures (such as EQ-5D) may not incorporate all  
  gains from a particular healthcare intervention. For example, as Dolan et al (2009: 372) observed: "The EQ-5D  
  does not capture the benefits of treatment experienced by the families and carers of patients".  
8 Some health states are regarded as being worse than 0 and are given a negative value 
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McKenzie, 1989; Tsuchiya et al, 2006). Direct methods that tend to be used most 
regularly for valuing health states include the visual analogue scale (VAS)9, the time 
trade-off (TTO)10 and the standard gamble (SG)11. Direct methods are often used to 
value discrete, condition-specific health states; the valuation usually being 
performed by patients themselves. Indirect methods involve the use of pre-scored 
generic preference-based summary measures such as EQ-5D.  
 
In developing the UK EQ-5D value set in 199312, approximately 3000 members of 
the UK public were asked to assign a value, i.e. assess their preference for (or 
extent to which they have 'problem' with), a subset of states constructed from the 
instrument's five dimensions (Dolan et al, 1995). Both TTO and VAS valuation 
methods were used in the elicitation process (EuroQol Group, 2013b). 
 
2.4 EVALUATION OF THE QALY APPROACH 
 
The ethical validity of the QALY approach is appraised by considering it in light of 
the broad ethical framework for healthcare distribution outlined earlier in this 
chapter: 
  
Since we are talking about comparing different goods, the choice of unit is not 
merely a scientific or economic question but an ethical one (Singer, 2009) 
 
2.4.1 EFFICACY 
 
The ethical requirement that healthcare distribution should be effective requires an 
acceptable means of determining 'efficacy'. For example, a pragmatic definition of 
                                               
9 The visual analogue scale is a form of rating scale: The top of the scale indicates the 'best imaginable health',  
   whereas the bottom of the scale indicates the 'worst imaginable health'. Individuals are asked to indicate where  
   on the scale they consider their own health state or the health state being valued to be located 
10
 Within the Time trade-off (TTO) approach, an estimated utility score for a particular health state is derived by  
   asking subjects to consider the relative amounts of time (for example, number of life-years) they would be willing  
   to sacrifice to avoid a certain poorer health state. For example, if an individual indicated that they would be willing  
   to sacrifice 5 of an estimated 20 years of remaining life in order to live in complete health this would produce a  
   TTO score of 0.75 for the particular health state being considered. Weinstein et al (2009: S7) noted the unique  
   conceptual relationship of the TTO method to QALYs: "because it is explicitly a trade-off of time with an impaired  
   health state relative to healthy time - quality-adjusted time" 
11 The SG approach is the classic method of measuring preferences in economics under conditions of uncertainty  
    (Tolley, 2009). Subjects are presented with a choice between two alternatives: a health state (for example,  
    chronic arthritis) that is certain and a gamble, with one better health outcome (for example, full health) and one  
    worse (for example, death) possible. Subjects are asked to state what probability of the better outcome would  
    make them indifferent between remaining in the current health state (chronic arthritis) for certain or going for the  
    worse option. For example, if they are indifferent between the current health state and a gamble with a 0.8  
    probability of the better outcome (but 0.2 probability of the worse outcome), 0.8 represents the utility of the  
    chronic arthritic state 
12
 Discrete national EQ-5D value sets have been developed in several countries 
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effective healthcare distribution may perceive it in terms of its operational 
functionality i.e. with regard to its ability to respond to healthcare demand within the 
confines of a limited budget. However, a more inclusive definition may require 
consideration of other determinants of effectiveness, such as, for example, how well 
the distributional process is able to balance competing demands and interests whilst 
acknowledging the disparate healthcare needs of individual patients. 
 
Distributing healthcare by means of the QALY approach enables the practical 
demands of an effective distributional process to be met as QALYs enable the 
comparative analysis of interventions in order to identify the most economically 
defensible use of available resources. However, this is not only a pragmatic or 
economic concern; it is an essential ethical consideration that is concerned with 
optimising benefit and minimising harm via the use of a limited healthcare budget. 
The maximisation of health benefits – as demonstrated by the QALY approach – is 
based on a utilitarian or consequentialist approach; the morally correct act being 
one that aims to achieve the best overall outcome for all concerned (Smart and 
Williams, 1973) and ethical principles for healthcare distribution typically take the 
need to benefit the majority or maximise health benefits as their starting point. 
Therefore, the efficacy of the QALY approach to healthcare distribution, it may be 
argued, is most clearly evaluated in terms of its ability to satisfy the second aspect 
of the broad ethical framework – that it should be both fair and just. 
 
2.4.2 EQUITY AND JUSTICE 
 
QALYs are unfair because they do not take into account who gains the QALYs 
(Hope et al, 2002: 178) 
 
Cost-utility analysis involves the aggregation of QALYs across individual healthcare 
recipients (at for example, strategic or local levels) (Cubbon, 1991) with the aim of 
maximising the number of QALYs gained and thereby optimising overall health 
benefit achieved across the population (Weinstein et al, 2009). This aids 'allocative 
efficiency'13 (Eddama and Coast, 2008) by prioritising interventions that will accrue 
the most QALYs. However, QALY maximisation is undertaken under the implicit 
assumption that: "A QALY is a QALY is a QALY no matter who gets it" (Williams, 
1992: 10) and equal weight is attached to all QALYs. Such an unrestricted approach 
                                               
13
 'Efficiency' = "The minimum cost of producing a given outcome or the maximisation of outcomes from a given  
    budget" (Maynard, 1987: 1539). 'Allocative efficiency' = "Selecting services that have the least cost per unit of  
    health outcome" (Richardson and McKie, 2005: 270) 
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is therefore impartial to the individual circumstances of patients or to whom 
healthcare resources are allocated, providing the overall benefits are of equal 
magnitude (Dolan et al, 2005; Whitehead and Ali, 2010). What matters in this 
process is the sum total of population health. Therefore In terms of how and to 
whom healthcare is distributed, providing a net QALY-gain is achieved, the standard 
QALY model is unbiased; it focuses only on the overall benefit produced – as 
determined by the number of QALYs gained – and disregards any differences 
between peoples' healthcare needs: 
 
… the age of recipients does not matter, as long as the QALY gain is the same. 
Likewise, the standard model assumes that equal QALY gains are of equal 
value regardless of how severely ill the patients are prior to treatment  
(Baker et al, 2010: 35) 
 
However, impartiality does not automatically satisfy the requirements of a fair or 
equitable system of healthcare distribution and it is acknowledged that QALY-
maximisation may sometimes be "… at the expense of fairness" (NICE, 2008c: 9). 
Furthermore, although prioritising healthcare for the majority may be undertaken in 
the interests of 'fairness'; 'justice', it may be claimed, cannot be satisfied solely by 
ensuring the greatest benefit for the greatest number of people.  
 
A frequent criticism of the QALY approach is that, in relying on objective economic 
evaluation and promoting allocative efficiency by maximising benefit, it disregards 
what might be termed 'real life' concerns regarding how healthcare resources are 
allocated (Johannesson, 2001). Its impartial objectivity gives rise to one of the 
fundamental criticisms of the QALY approach i.e. that in seeking to optimise health 
benefit it fails to acknowledge healthcare 'need' and disregards factors that might 
affect the value of health gains, such as the individual characteristics or attributes of 
patients. It could therefore be argued that the QALY approach is inequitable in that it 
disregards individuals' differing claims to healthcare (Cookson et al, 2009).   
 
In practice, the principle under which the QALY has developed impedes recognition 
of individuals' claims to healthcare based on their health-related or other personal 
attributes. Thus, what has been termed 'QALY egalitarianism' (Culyer, 1992) – 
indicated by the fact that the value of a QALY gained is the same for all – is its sole 
concession to the demands of equity and fairness, which do not otherwise feature 
within QALY reckoning:  
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The QALY approach is 'egalitarian' in the sense that, if all else is equal, a QALY 
gain to one person is of the same value as a QALY gain to anyone else, not in 
the sense that it advocates the equal distribution of resources regardless of 
benefit (McKie et al, 1998: 41) 
 
McMillan et al (2006) cited the principle of justice as the overriding moral 
consideration when setting healthcare priorities, particularly when comparing one 
clinical service or treatment programme against another under conditions of 
scarcity. Within Rawls' 'Theory of Justice' (Rawls, 1971) a just system of distribution 
of 'goods' (such as healthcare) is one in which those members of society who are 
worst off will be better off under this system than any other. It is arguable whether 
the standard QALY approach meets this criteria for justice as those who are 'worst 
off' i.e. with the most severe illness or disability who may require an unequal 
proportion of healthcare, will not be considered independently within the QALY 
approach. 
 
The unbiased distributively-neutral QALY approach has therefore been criticised for 
discriminating against particular groups of healthcare recipients, such as children, 
the severely ill, and, to a lesser extent, the socio-economically disadvantaged 
(Cookson et al, 2009), and those with a chronic illness: 
 
If, for instance, a chronically ill patient is in a health state with a QALY weight of 
0.5, his/her added life years will only receive half the value of added years for 
an individual in full health (Johannesson, 2001: 573) 
 
It may also give rise to other, arguably, prejudicial distributional decisions. For 
example, in theory, the QALY method does not support the provision of very 
expensive treatments for small numbers of patients, or support expensive services 
that, by their nature, do not generate large numbers of QALYs:  
 
If a healthcare system were to take QALY-maximisation as its only goal it would 
not just be hyper-expensive treatments it would have to give up on ….many 
areas of medical care, such as palliative care, which do not generate many 
QALYs for their cost, would have to be dropped (Hunter and Wilson, 2011: 10) 
 
An early and vociferous critic of the QALY, the bioethicist John Harris, reflecting 
concerns that the egalitarian, objective QALY was both ageist and discriminatory 
against those with least capacity to benefit, declared (somewhat provocatively) that 
the QALY was "a life-threatening device" (Harris, 1987: 117). Harris based his 
criticism primarily upon the QALY requirement to value life-years rather than 
individual people's lives, and stated:  
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If what matters most is the number of life-years the world contains, then the 
best thing we can do is devote our resources to increasing the population. Birth 
control, abortion and sex education come out very badly on the QALY scale of 
priorities (ibid: 119) 
 
2.4.3 A UTILITARIAN APPROACH 
 
Utilitarianism is obviously this method's philosophical parent  
(Menzel, 1999: 254) 
 
The QALY approach emphasises the efficient distribution of health benefits and, as 
noted, overlooks individual claims to healthcare. In doing so it acknowledges one of 
the principal edicts of utilitarianism i.e. that: 
 
Once note has been taken of the person's utility, utilitarianism has no further 
direct interest in any information about him ….Persons do not count as 
individuals in this any more than individual petrol tanks do in the analysis of the 
national consumption of petroleum (Sen and Williams, 1982: 4) 
 
A utilitarian basis for distributing health benefits has been critically explored by 
many authors, including for example, Sen (1979), Olsen (1997) and more recently, 
Coast (2009). In pursuit of a reasonable approach to healthcare distribution and 
priority-setting, a utilitarian approach, it is argued, offers insufficient ethical 
justification for the deployment of resources and does not reflect the multiplicity of 
factors that dominate the way in which the public think about decision problems in 
this area (Anand and Wailoo, 2000). As Newdick (2005: 30) commented: 
 
No-one will argue that considerations of cost and efficiency are irrelevant. But if 
they become the dominant or only concern, can they be described as ethical? 
 
It has been argued that to overlook the needs of some patients, particularly those in 
evident need, is both counter-intuitive and inequitable. Richardson and McKie 
(2005: 269) observed that:  
 
…there is a fact about the human psyche that will inevitably trump the utilitarian 
rationality that is implicit in cost-effectiveness analysis 
 
Furthermore, a utilitarian approach to healthcare distribution can: 
 
… allow the interests of minorities to be overridden by the majority; and it may 
not help in eradicating health inequalities (NICE, 2008c: 9). 
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It has been proposed that to produce a more ethically justifiable system of 
healthcare distribution, specific normative determinants of healthcare entitlement – 
such as those based on choice and causation – should be considered (Anand and 
Wailoo, 2000).  
 
2.4.4 QALYS AND AUTONOMY 
 
Many of the most widely debated ethical issues within healthcare relate to the 
concept of autonomy and the freedom, or otherwise, of individuals to decide what 
they do and what is done to them (this is a common understanding of autonomy; an 
alternative construction is discussed below). People are increasingly aware of (and 
prepared to claim) their right to be treated as self-determining individuals, free from 
the controlling interference of others and able to engage in informed decision-
making with respect to their own healthcare, in other words, to be autonomous 
(O'Neill, 2002).  
 
Logically perhaps, with regard to healthcare distribution, respecting an individual's 
autonomous preferences requires acknowledging (at least) their healthcare choices, 
bearing in mind that being autonomous and respecting autonomy also demands 
consideration of the autonomous choices of others. However, the principle inevitably 
comes into conflict with other important ethical values such as equity and justice. 
(UKCEN, 2013) and does not accord with the overriding ethical stimulus for the 
QALY approach: the need to benefit the majority. Therefore, a policy of aggregated 
health-maximisation does not allow for individual, engagement in the process of 
healthcare distribution and, in this sense, the standard QALY method has little 
regard for the principle of respect for autonomy (in its individualistic sense), as it is 
unable to accommodate a need to respect individual choices regarding healthcare.  
 
2.4.4.1 RELATIONAL AUTONOMY 
 
A relational account of autonomy (Verkerk, 2001; Ho, 2008) possibly offers a more 
adaptable means of considering the relationship between autonomous choices and 
healthcare distribution. 
 
It is increasingly argued that the traditional individualistic concept of autonomy that 
acknowledges individuals as free and independent autonomous agents is 
inadequate and that autonomy is better understood in the context of personal and 
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institutional relationships that facilitate or possibly impede the making of real 
choices:  
 
This new understanding of autonomy – known as ‘relational’ autonomy – claims 
to be a more accurate description of the actual basis for autonomous action, as 
well as a better grounding for our obligation to respect each other’s autonomy 
(MacDonald, 2002: 195) 
 
For example, in a clinical healthcare setting, the individualistic notion of autonomy 
considers illness as a problem of individual patients (Sherwin, 1998) and assumes 
that patients regard family involvement or their respective interests as being in 
conflict.  
 
Donchin (1995) claimed that an idealised image of the otherwise healthy patient, 
self-sufficient and accustomed to making decisions about what they do and what is 
done to them is symptomatic of a "pervasive distortion in moral thinking  that arises 
from a false conceptualisation of individuals as capable of existing apart from any 
social relationships" (ibid: 45). Therefore, the traditional approach to autonomy, 
overlooks the many contextual features of patients' lives that may prevent them 
from undertaking real choice, even if they fulfil the accepted requirements for being 
'autonomous' – being informed, having capacity, not being coerced etc. 
 
Much of the available literature on relational autonomy has arisen via feminist 
scholarship and the work of academics such as Donchin (1995), Sherwin (1998) 
and Christman (2004) that has highlighted the networks of social relationships and 
interdependencies that facilitate autonomous action (MacDonald, 2002). Such 
relationships, it is maintained, are generally neither chosen nor optional and 
therefore, to perceive autonomy solely as an individualistic concept is erroneous. 
 
It has been claimed that a relational perspective on autonomy has implications for a 
wide range of issues, such as our understandings of informed consent, advocacy 
and confidentiality (MacDonald, 2002). With regard to the QALY approach, a 
relational understanding of autonomy suggests that QALYs, health maximisation 
and autonomy may not necessarily be mutually exclusive concepts. Relational 
autonomy acknowledges  self-determination within an overall context of 
interdependency and therefore enables the structure by which particular actions can 
be deemed autonomous – or by which an individual can be regarded as 
autonomous with respect to particular actions – to be more broadly articulated (IEP, 
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2014). Such (relational) autonomous actions are most effectively realised when the 
social conditions that support it are in place. These include the supportive structures 
– both personal and political – that give one the confidence to take charge of 
choices (Sherwin, 1998). This has implications for a proposed adjustment to the 
standard QALY approach that is discussed below and examined in detail in Chapter 
3. 
 
2.5 THE QALY: A NEED FOR ADJUSTMENT 
 
By taking into account both the quantity and quality of life generated by a health 
intervention, the QALY approach to healthcare distribution reflects a contemporary 
view that mere survival is an insufficient measure of health benefit - the expected 
quality of life years gained must also be considered. By offering a 'common 
currency', the QALY approach enables the relative cost-effectiveness of competing 
healthcare interventions to be explicitly compared in terms of 'cost per QALYs 
gained' and facilitates transparency within healthcare distribution and prioritisation 
decisions.  
 
However, healthcare must be distributed in a way that balances morally competing 
arguments (Edlin et al, 2011) and healthcare priorities must be determined in an 
ethically defensible way. The QALY model – particularly the principle of QALY-
maximisation – has been subjected to on-going critical appraisal (Dolan et al, 2005; 
Shah, 2009; Hunter and Wilson, 2011). A persistent criticism is that, in its standard 
form, the QALY approach does not offer an ethically defensible (normatively 
desirable) approach to distributing healthcare (UKCEN, 2013).  
 
As noted by Shah (2009) and others, the purpose of a healthcare system should not 
be to simply maximise health benefit. For example, a range of commitments, values 
and principles (Department of Health, 2009, 2010) guides NHS provision. It has 
therefore been argued that the achievement of maximum overall aggregate health 
benefit is not a sufficiently equitable basis upon which to determine healthcare 
distribution. Such apparent lack of fairness has been a key stimulus for exploring 
alternative approaches to QALY distribution (Nord et al, 1999; Sassi et al, 2001; 
Schwappach, 2002; Bleichrodt et al, 2004; Cookson et al, 2009) and has led to 
proposals that the QALY approach be amended – via 'QALY-weighting' – in order to 
increase equity and to enable a more transparent and equitable approach to 
healthcare priority-setting (Nord, 1999; Olsen et al, 2003; Johannesson, 2001; 
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Richardson and McKie, 2005; Baker et al, 2010). 
 
--------------------------------------- 
 
The next chapter examines the concept of weighting health benefits and, 
specifically, weighting the QALY, in pursuit of a more equitable system of healthcare 
distribution and priority-setting. 
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3 WEIGHTING HEALTH BENEFITS 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
It is increasingly argued that the equitable distribution of NHS services demands an 
explicit approach to priority-setting. A possible means of achieving this, it is claimed, 
would be to weight health benefits (QALY gains), in circumstances where the 
predicted health outcomes are the same, in accordance with one or more pre-
determined criteria. This, it has been maintained, would offer a fairer approach to 
healthcare distribution and enhance transparency and objectivity within priority-
setting decisions (Wailoo et al, 2009). 
 
This chapter explores the concept and process of 'QALY-weighting' and critically 
evaluates its ethical legitimacy and its potential to enhance healthcare priority-
setting.  
 
3.2 WEIGHTING HEALTH BENEFITS: 'QALY-WEIGHTING' 
 
It is essential that publicly-funded healthcare resources be deployed effectively and 
efficiently. In order for this to be achieved, a measureable system of quantifying the 
outcomes of healthcare is required – hence the widely established use of QALYs. 
However, as discussed in the previous chapter, the concept of 'QALY-
maximisation', which aims to achieve the maximum QALY gain at the least financial 
cost, has attracted substantial criticism due to the fact that, in focusing on the 
overall benefit gained from a healthcare intervention, it disregards any differences 
between the recipients' (individuals or groups of patients) healthcare needs. A 
fundamental problem presented by the standard, unweighted QALY is that a QALY 
accrued has the same value regardless of its recipient. In other words, an increase 
of one QALY is valued equally if it is gained by an individual "who is already 'rich' in 
years" as it is to "someone whose life in the absence of treatment will be short and 
miserable." (Bleichrodt, et al, 2004: 158). Consequently, there has been 
considerable debate about whether QALYs gained by different beneficiaries of 
healthcare should be weighted equally (Donaldson et al, 2011). 
 
Weighting QALYs would – in circumstances where the predicted health outcomes 
are the same – require attaching a degree of 'distributional weight' to health gains 
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accrued by some healthcare recipients, in other words, assigning differential 
weights to QALYs by mathematically adjusting the QALY by a factor that takes into 
account, for instance, the individual characteristics or attributes of their recipients 
(Williams, 1997; Nord, 1999; Johannesson, 2001; Richardson and McKie, 2005; 
Wailoo et al, 2009). Weighting may mean that 'weight' is added to the standard 
QALY – in effect giving its recipient higher priority for healthcare – or subtracted, 
thereby implying lower priority. 
 
Efficiency, in terms of 'allocative efficiency', is at the heart of the conventional QALY 
approach. Nonetheless, increased efficiency is one of the perceived advantages of 
QALY-weighting. For example, a simple if highly contentious efficiency-based 
argument would be that, if the current system of distributing income is justifiable, 
then a QALY gain for those who make the greatest contribution to the society 
through their higher productivity (higher productivity = higher taxes paid = higher 
contribution) should be weighted higher than a QALY gain for those who contribute 
less. Alternatively, in the interest of efficiency, it could be deemed acceptable to 
weight the QALY gains of those who, regardless of income, make a greater 
contribution: 
 
…those who have more to contribute to society should be rewarded more 
extensively…since the fruits of human capital and productivity of such people 
could trickle down and contribute to a richer society overall  
(Dolan and Tsuchiya, 2006: 383) 
 
3.2.1 WEIGHTING CRITERIA 
 
The suggestion that the QALY should be weighted demands consideration of 
criteria that could be used to validate the incorporation of a distributional bias into 
an otherwise impartial system of healthcare distribution. Several authors have 
discussed the theoretical, practical and ethical issues concerning attaching 
distributional weights to the QALY (e.g. Nord et al, 1996; Nord, 1999; Dolan and 
Olsen, 2002) and a range of methods have been used to identify 'equity weights'. 
This has been mainly achieved by eliciting preferences from the general 
population regarding various possible weighting criteria. Examples of potential 
weighting criteria (Brazier et al, 2007: 290) include: 
 
 Severity of health before receiving treatment 
 Severity of health should patients not receive treatment 
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 Age and life stage of a typical patient 
 Socio-economic background of a typical patient 
 Whether or not patients brought the ill health on to themselves 
 How long patients have had the condition for 
 The number of patients involved and whether or not they are 'identifiable' 
 
3.2.2 HOW QALY-WEIGHTING COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED 
 
Although the concept of the unweighted, aggregated, egalitarian QALY is deep-
rooted and, it has been claimed, the incorporation of weighting would complicate the 
QALY distribution process, thus obstructing transparency (Drummond et al, 2009), 
Alan Williams, one of the QALY's chief advocates indicated that weighting, within a 
system of collective prioritisation, would not necessarily be at variance with the 
original strictures of the QALY method: 
 
….there is nothing in the QALY approach that requires QALYs to be used in a 
maximising context…more complex rules will almost certainly be needed if 
collective priority-setting is to reflect the views of the general public  
(Williams, 1995: 224) 
 
The process of QALY-weighting, it is asserted, would be fairly straightforward and 
would simply require the standard QALY model to be modified by the assignment of 
weights to health utility gains – thereby adjusting the number of QALYs generated 
by a particular health intervention. The number of weighted QALYs could then be 
compared with the relevant cost-per-QALY threshold: 
 
For example, an intervention generating 5 additional QALYs in a patient group 
for whom a weight of 1.5 was considered applicable would generate 7.5 equity-
weighted QALYs. Provided the additional cost was no more than £150 000, 
then this would be considered a cost-effective intervention, assuming a 
threshold of £20 000 (£150 000 per 7.5 QALYs) (Wailoo et al, 2009: 985) 
 
Alternatively, the cost-per-QALY threshold itself could be adjusted in accordance 
with whatever weighting was attached to the QALY.  
 
3.2.3 DETERMINING WEIGHTING VALUES 
 
The specific values to be accorded to the weighted QALY, it has been claimed, 
could be determined by seeking people's views and preferences on collective 
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priority-setting from behind a Rawlsian 'veil of ignorance' (Rawls, 1971). The 
process was effectively detailed by Williams (1995: 223):  
 
We have to imagine ourselves outside the society of which we are members, 
and then choose that set of rules for collective priority-setting which would be 
most likely to achieve the distribution of health benefits that we think best for 
our society. Then, and only then, will we be assigned, by lottery, an actual place 
in that society. We may find ourselves favoured by our rules, or we may be one 
of the unfortunate people who are disadvantaged by them, but we would have 
achieved a set of rules which we would have to accept as fair. The question 
which I would ask the reader to consider is whether, under these  conditions, 
you would choose a set of rules which would maximise the health of the 
community as a whole, as measured in QALY terms, and, if not, why not?  
 
3.2.4 PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR QALY-WEIGHTING 
 
In both the UK and beyond, there is evidence of public backing for weighting 
QALYs, or for at least taking personal characteristics or attributes into consideration 
when allocating limited healthcare (Wilmot and Ratcliffe, 2002; Anderson et al, 
2011). This is supported by evidence of increasing societal willingness to trade 
efficiency for a more explicitly equitable – i.e. weighted – distribution of healthcare 
resources (Schwappach, 2003).  
 
From the evidence available, it does not appear that members of the public's views 
on 'weighting health benefits' or 'QALY-weighting have been explicitly sought. This 
is perhaps unsurprising given the complexities of weighting per se and the public's 
unfamiliarity with the terminology. Evidence of the public's views, values and 
preferences on weighting has been extrapolated from studies of public views on 
various aspects of resource allocation; data being obtained via quantitative methods 
such as stated preference surveys (e.g. Buxton and Chambers, 2011). 
 
An impartial utilitarian approach, it is claimed, overlooks the multiplicity of factors 
that dominate how the public think about decision problems in this area (Anand and 
Wailoo, 2000; Schlander, 2008), and evidence suggests that a system of QALY-
maximisation is at odds with many people's views on the equitable distribution of 
healthcare:  
 
…a number of studies have shown that the public would not naturally choose 
the most efficient allocation of resources and aim simply to maximise QALYs 
gained (Buxton and Chambers, 2011: 287) 
 
Baker et al, (2010) reported that members of the public appear to be open to the 
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possibility of using separate QALY weights for different groups of beneficiaries, and 
Richardson et al (2011) found that respondents to a survey of members of the 
public preferred to share resources between patients rather than maximising life 
years – 'sharing' being interpreted in terms of a more equal distribution of resources 
than would occur with an exclusive focus upon efficiency.  
 
Nord et al, (1995) reported that survey respondents rejected a policy of 
maximisation and distributive neutrality when the consequence was a loss of equity, 
and Schlander (2008) found that there was little, if any, evidence that an emphasis 
on maximisation is shared by the general population. Anand and Wailoo (2000) 
report that some citizens are guided by multiple perspectives, including the 
protection of individual rights and embedded community values. 
 
It appears therefore that there would be substantial public support for introducing a 
system of weighting health benefits in accordance with the individual characteristics 
or attributes of their recipients (Olsen, 2000; Wilmot and Ratcliffe, 2002; Lancsar et 
al, 2011). This, it is claimed, would more accurately reflect societal preferences 
concerning how healthcare resources should be allocated. For example, for many 
people arguments in favour of treating children over older people maintain an 
instinctive plausibility as do considerations for those with dependents. As Williams 
(1995: 225) observed: 
 
….there is ample evidence that most people (including the elderly) would give 
extra weight to benefits accruing to young people over the same benefits 
accruing to old people. There is a similarly widespread view that people with 
young children should have some priority over their childless contemporaries  
 
There is also evidence to suggest that, when informed of the fact that individual 
patients find two health improvements to be of identical benefit, members of the 
public generally express a strong preference for prioritising those with the worst 
initial health state (Richardson and McKie, 2005), and are willing to sacrifice 
aggregate health gains, and to include a degree of bias within the allocation of 
resources, in order to give priority to certain groups of patients, such as the severely 
ill (Shah, 2009). 
 
However, public support for QALY-weighting is not unequivocal. For example, 
Bryan et al (2002) found some broad public support for the QALY-maximisation 
model, and Lancsar et al (2011) observed that focus group respondents were 
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reluctant to weight QALYs based on the characteristics of their recipients except in 
a small number of specific cases. Anderson et al, (2011) observed that when asked, 
members of the public initially favour giving priority to healthcare interventions that 
produce the most life years of the highest quality, and that: 
 
It is only when it is pointed out that this will disadvantage the elderly, the 
permanently disabled and chronically ill, and others with a limited capacity to 
benefit that members of the public begin to have misgivings (ibid: 143) 
 
3.2.5 NICE AND QALY-WEIGHTING 
 
The national Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) is an independent 
organisation, established in 1999, that is responsible for providing UK national 
guidance on promoting good health and preventing and treating ill health (NICE, 
2013a). The various reports of NICE's Citizens Council14 provide evidence of how 
QALY-weighting considerations – and public participation – contribute to NICE 
activities.  
 
The report of one Citizens Council meeting: Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) 
and the severity of illness (NICE, 2008b) provides the clearest evidence of how 
NICE approach QALY-weighting.  
 
Addressing the need to either take severity of illness into consideration, alongside 
cost and clinical effectiveness evidence or include severity of illness within the 
calculation of the QALY i.e. weight the QALY in accordance with the severity of a 
patient's ill-health, the Citizens Council report recommended that NICE and its 
advisory bodies should only take severity of illness 'into consideration (ibid: 4) when 
making decisions. It was concluded, if not unanimously agreed by Council 
members, that taking this approach (as opposed to QALY-weighting) would give 
NICE appraisal committees greater flexibility. 
 
Throughout the QALYs report, and other reports of the Citizens Council, NICE 
repeatedly acknowledges the need for its committees and advisory bodies to take 
potential weighting criteria 'into consideration', but does not appear ready to commit 
itself to formal weighting or, as the QALYs report puts it: "modifying the QALY" (ibid; 
14). Interestingly, one of the expert speakers at the Citizens Council 'QALYs' 
meeting suggested that, as NICE appraisal committees already have a degree of 
                                               
14
 The role and influence of NICE's Citizens Council is examined in Chapter 6 
45 
 
flexibility and the discretion to take account of clinical need: 
 
They could be mandated to give more weight to social value judgements, and 
proportionately less to cost-effectiveness (ibid: 9) 
 
However, it appears that NICE's current approach is to avoid mandatory QALY-
weighting and to rely on the discretion of its committee members15. 
 
3.2.6 POTENTIAL CHALLENGES  
 
Although QALY-weighting may be achievable and the advantages can be defined, 
the practicalities of weighting health gains, in the interest of both equity and 
efficiency, would be expected to raise considerable societal concerns as such an 
approach would inevitably result in the sacrifice of health gains by some in order to 
meet the health needs of others. 
 
How to reflect preferences over efficiency and equity in a reliable manner is a 
fundamental difficulty in the realisation of QALY-weighting. It has been suggested 
that an 'equity-efficiency trade-off' may be necessary (Bleichrodt et al, 2005). 
Whitehead and Ali (2010: 15-16) illustrated an example of such a trade-off: 
 
For example, it may be more efficient (in terms of lives saved) to implement an 
intervention in easy-to-reach affluent areas rather than hard-to-reach poor 
areas; however, a decision-maker may trade-off equity versus efficiency to 
promote distributional equity of health outcomes  
 
Although weighting may be intuitively appealing, the procedural issues involved in 
both the weighting process and its application have yet to be determined. It has so 
far been deemed impractical because of the perceived technical challenges of 
incorporating weights in a manner that respects societal preferences over efficiency 
and equity (Wailoo et al, 2009). These include uncertainties about the identification 
of relevant characteristics and a lack of agreement on which methods would be 
most effective in determining the necessary weights.  
 
Dolan and Tsuchiya (2006) considered the process of 'eliciting distributional 
judgements' and discussed at some length the practicalities of undertaking a study 
aimed at determining publicly supported equity weights. Baker et al (2010) 
highlighted three significant challenges faced by those attempting actually identify 
                                               
15
 Social value judgements are examined in Chapter 5 
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QALY-weights, these are: 
 
identifying characteristics of beneficiaries over which weights should be 
derived; designing and presenting questions so that respondents can 
understand complexities and make choices; and elicitation of quantitative 
preference data from members of the general public to allow the estimation of 
QALY weights (ibid: 3) 
 
According to some observers, one of the fundamental barriers to the inclusion of 
weighting criteria has been the relative obduracy of traditional health economics 
(Dolan et al, 2005; Richardson and McKie, 2005). As has been noted, a system of 
healthcare distribution that promotes the principle of health maximisation does not 
necessarily concur with the attitudes of the public. One reason for this, it has been 
argued, is that within a cost-utility analysis (QALY) approach, there is an inherent 
supposition that people's preferences are commonly applicable. In other words, 
society's values are assumed, despite the range of evidence that indicates wide 
variations in people's preferences (Dolan et al 2005). 
 
There is a need for a more comprehensive understanding of what the public think 
about the possibility of weighting health benefits. Although there are indications of 
members of the public's apparent support for weighting, there is not, as yet, any 
secure evidence base for introducing such a system (Baker et al, 2010). 
 
3.2.7  ETHICAL JUSTIFICATION 
 
Ethical concerns, relating to, for example, equity, justice, rights and autonomy, 
permeate the QALY-weighting and priority-setting debate, and the ethics-related 
literature concerning these concepts is substantial (e.g. Jecker and Pearlman, 1992; 
Dworkin, 1993; Williams, 1995; McKie et al, 1998; Butler, 1999; Dolan and Olsen, 
2002; Newdick, 2005; Daniels and Sabin, 2008).  
 
The ethical justification for weighting QALYs lies primarily in its potential to respond 
more effectively to the diversity of healthcare needs. As has been discussed, a 
system of egalitarian impartiality is the principal ethical weakness of a health-
maximisation approach to healthcare distribution. 
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3.2.7.1 EQUITY 
 
Health equity is one of the main avowed objectives of public health policy 
across the world. Yet economic evaluations in public health (like those in health 
care more generally) continue to focus on maximizing health gain. Health equity 
considerations are rarely mentioned (Cookson et al, 2009: 231) 
 
It is increasingly contended that, in certain circumstances, there may be a need to 
forego health maximisation and to combine considerations of cost and efficiency 
with a greater concern for equity within healthcare distribution. As Bleichrodt et al 
(2005: 656) observed: 
 
Several authors have raised concerns about the equity implications ….and 
have argued that it may be necessary to differentiate between individuals based 
on, for example, age, health status or previously enjoyed health 
 
'Equity' in this context implies justice' rather than simple impartiality or even-
handedness. Differentiating between patients (who stand to benefit equally from a 
particular intervention) necessitates the incorporation of a degree of explicit partiality 
into healthcare distribution decision-making and, as already noted,  has been the 
main motivation for exploring the feasibility of weighting QALYs in accordance with 
pre-determined criteria (Baker et al, 2010). Equity, it is claimed,' necessitates that 
some individuals (or groups) receive more, even if the recipients' overall health gain 
is less than that of others who, although greater in number, are less ill (UKCEN, 
2013).  
 
The addition of 'equity weights' to the QALY model, it has been argued, would, to 
some extent counter the discriminatory nature of the conventional QALY 
approach16. In other words, the perceived lack of 'fairness', inherent within the 
QALY model – indicated by its disregard for individual needs – could be corrected if 
the QALY were to be adjusted to a value enhanced (or diminished) by the specific 
circumstances and/or characteristics of its recipient(s). QALY-weighting would, 
therefore, enhance the equitable distribution of health benefits across the 
population.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
16 Paradoxically, the conventional  QALY is weighted in that the length of time spent in a health state is weighted  
     by its utility value 
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3.2.7.2 RIGHTS 
 
Rights are justified claims (entitlements) that demand action or restraint from others 
i.e. rights impose duties on other people to either act or refrain from action (Gillon, 
1986). The existence of a 'right to healthcare' has been widely debated (e.g. 
McCarrick, 1992; Eleftheriadis, 2012)17 and the extent to which such a right may 
impose (on governments for example) a duty to provide certain healthcare services 
has also been subjected to critical appraisal (Gauri, 2004). QALY-weighting would, if 
undertaken in accordance with individual characteristics and attributes, appear to sit 
well within a broad rights-sensitive approach to healthcare distribution. The duties 
imposed on decision-makers to act in accordance with the rights of those who may 
access healthcare services i.e. all citizens, would imply that the right of the 
individual patient to receive healthcare imposes a duty (upon providers) to ensure 
that such healthcare as is required is made available. However, a significant and 
perhaps obvious proviso to such a rights-based justification for weighting is that the 
imposed duty to provide healthcare could, in practice, extend only so far as is 
possible within the confines of a limited healthcare budget. A consideration of 
QALY-weighting and rights can therefore offer only partial acknowledgement 
weighting's ethical justification. 
 
3.2.7.3 AUTONOMY 
 
The ethical principle of 'respect for autonomy' requires that rational individuals 
should be free to think, act and make decisions independently (O'Neill, 2002) and, 
according to this principle, autonomous individuals should be free to make informed 
choices. However, as previously discussed, the standard QALY model, limits 
individual choice and potentially inhibits the exercising of autonomy – at least with 
regard to commonly perceived, individualised understandings of autonomy.  
 
As has been discussed, weighting QALYs would enable resources to be directed 
towards individuals or groups of individuals in accordance with their individual 
characteristics or attributes. This, in itself, offers the possibility of enhancing the 
autonomous choices of recipients of the 'weighted QALY': a basic illustration of 
enhanced autonomous choice brought about by weighting health benefits was 
                                               
17
 A right to healthcare is discussed in Chapter 4 
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presented by NICE's decision (made in 2009) to accept higher incremental cost-
effectiveness ratios for some end-of-life treatments18. 
 
A relational account of autonomy19, which acknowledges autonomous choice in the 
context of personal and institutional relationships, could further extend the potential 
for autonomy to play a meaningful role in (weighted) QALY distribution. This is 
because such a view asserts that autonomous choice is essentially linked to the 
wider contextual features of an individual's existence and acknowledges the 
interests and involvement of others within individual choices (Ho, 2008). Therefore, 
QALY-weighted healthcare distribution, which recognises healthcare recipients' 
attributes and characteristics (possibly including, as noted above, relationships such 
as dependents) could potentially enhance the range of autonomous choices by 
acknowledging that the respective interests of the individual patient and those close 
to them, are not necessarily in conflict.  
 
A relational autonomy perspective does not, in itself, indicate that autonomy would 
inevitably be enhanced by QALY-weighting; but that if the range of individual 
choices in relation to healthcare distribution were to be improved – however 
marginally – such choices might be further enhanced from a relational autonomy 
perspective. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
 
Overall, the incorporation of weighting into the QALY approach appears to possess 
ethical credibility. This examination now proceeds to consider a contentious 
potential QALY-weighting criterion, one that, at its heart, invokes concerns for the 
social and ethical integrity of healthcare distribution and priority-setting: 
responsibility for healthcare need. 
  
                                               
18
 This is discussed further in Chapter 5 
19 An overview of relational autonomy is provided in Chapter 2 
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4  RESPONSIBILITY FOR HEALTHCARE NEED AS 
A RESOURCE-LIMITING PRINCIPLE 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
When demand for healthcare services exceeds available resources, the application 
of resource-limiting strategies – such as priority-setting and rationing – becomes 
inevitable. The terms 'priority-setting' and 'rationing' are often applied synonymously 
within the healthcare literature (Coulter and Ham, 2000). Each implies: 
 
…the withholding of potentially beneficial health care through financial or 
organizational features of the health care system in question  
(Norheim, 1999: 1426) 
 
In the interests of delivering an equitable healthcare service, the rationale for limiting 
resources must be clear, effective and defensible. In addition to the strategic 
withdrawal of services and reducing funding for one service or another, a range of 
criteria have been proposed that, it is claimed, could be applied to validate 
resource-limiting strategies. One particularly contentious suggestion is that 
healthcare should be limited in accordance with the extent to which a patient is 
deemed to be responsible for generating their own healthcare need. 
 
This chapter examines this suggestion and, in light of relevant ethical concerns, 
considers whether a valid ethical argument can be made for the incorporation of a 
'responsibility principle' within healthcare distribution policy. 
 
4.2 PRIORITY-SETTING AND RATIONING 
 
4.2.1  PRIORITY-SETTING 
 
Priority-setting is an accepted feature of healthcare provision. For example, within 
an emergency/trauma setting it is generally understood that patients with an 
immediate need for treatment should have priority over others. However, in 
situations where a clinical distinction between patients is less easily made i.e. where 
there are no obvious medical reasons for giving priority to one patient, or group of 
patients, over another as each will benefit to the same degree (respond equally well 
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to treatment), other factors must be considered to help decision-makers identify 
priorities (Baltussen and Niessen, 2006; Sibbald et al, 2009; Arvidsson et al, 2010). 
 
Strategic priority-setting is founded within NHS decision-making, delivery and 
performance management systems (Robinson et al, 2012) where the extent to 
which healthcare services and treatments are provided is determined. It takes place 
at various planning stages – from government to clinical commissioning group levels 
(Williams et al, 2012). Prescribed economic goals, such as the NHS target of 
delivering up to £20bn in efficiency savings by 2015 (Ball and Sawyer, 2009), 
inevitably initiate priority-setting, and guidance from national organisations such as 
NICE may also contribute to resource-limiting decisions (Green and Gerard, 2009). 
 
At whichever level decisions are undertaken, priority-setting derives from the need 
to strike a balance between available resources, predicted healthcare need and the 
amount of benefit it is anticipated can be produced from a healthcare budget. This 
may result in priority-setting strategies such as the closure of a particular healthcare 
service or reducing in-patient hospital bed numbers (Robinson et al, 2011).  
 
4.2.2 RATIONING 
 
Given that the finite nature of a healthcare budget is generally understood (although 
not necessarily accepted), healthcare 'priority-setting' is perhaps a more 
comprehensible and socially acceptable concept than healthcare 'rationing'. For 
many people the word 'rationing' may have negative, emotive meanings. Rather 
than identifying a hierarchy of access to healthcare based, to some extent at least, 
on logical criteria (as in priority-setting), the term may have connotations of 
unfairness and imply placing restrictions on access to healthcare or withholding 
treatment that is perceived to be beneficial (Norheim, 1999). Dickinson et al (2011: 
363) highlighted the distinction between the terms:  
 
… 'rationing' usually relates to the withholding of resources to the cost of 
individual patients, whereas 'priority-setting' has less starkly negative 
connotations, referring more to populations than individuals, without directly 
alluding to punitive resource allocation 
 
Placing limits on healthcare is a long-standing source of debate (Owen-Smith et al, 
2010; Weinstein and Skinner, 2010; Hicks, 2011; Kelly and Cronin, 2011). However, 
without some kind of resource-limiting criteria it is unlikely that effective and 
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defensible distribution decisions would be possible. For example, justifiable 
decisions regarding the allocation of scarce resources such as organs for 
transplantation demand clear and effective rationing criteria (Neuberger, 2012).  
 
Healthcare rationing has been subjected to considerable scholarly investigation 
(e.g. Newdick, 2005; Morris et al, 2007; McMillan and Hope, 2010, Neumann, 
2011), and stories concerning the funding of healthcare treatment – for example, 
restrictions being placed on non-urgent treatments such as fertility treatments and 
cosmetic surgery – are a continuing source of debate in print, broadcast and online 
news media (e.g. Aziz, 2011; BBC News, 2012; Smith, 2012). 
 
A distinction can be made between the explicit rationing of healthcare services 
('macro-rationing') and the rationing of healthcare treatment to an identified patient 
or group of patients – sometimes referred to as 'bedside rationing' ('micro-rationing') 
(Strech and Danis, 2012). Explicit rationing is undertaken according to established 
'rules' of entitlement. For example, in the UK, national funding thresholds determine 
the extent to which costly treatments will be supported. NICE currently applies a 
funding threshold range of £20,000 to £30,000 per QALY gained (Claxton et al, 
2013).  
 
The application of funding thresholds often attracts adverse publicity (BBC News, 
2008, BBC News 2010; Hope, 2013) but other more implicit forms of rationing – 
undertaken at the discretion of gatekeepers, such as doctors and nurses, and more 
reliant upon professional judgement and clinical decision-making than on policy 
demands – are less overt and consequently receive less public exposure. It has 
been noted that, if rationing is inevitable, then explicit, rule-based rationing – such 
as the application of funding thresholds – is  preferable to implicit, case-based 
rationing at the bedside (Daniels and Sabin, 2002; Winkler et al, 2012).  
 
The very notion of 'rationing' signifies limits being established on the amount of a 
particular resource that one individual or group receives. The diversity of individual 
health needs: "the multi-dimensional nature of health (Williams and Kind, 1992: 21), 
indicates therefore that, when rationing decisions are made, some patients – 
whether implicitly or explicitly – must concede healthcare gains to others. 
Consequently, criteria (determinants, parameters and considerations) must be 
identified and principles (values, rules and assumptions) established that underpin 
rationing and enable decisions to be taken in as clear and objective a manner as 
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possible.  
 
4.3  RESPONSIBILITY AS A RESOURCE-LIMITING PRINCIPLE 
 
The consequence of acknowledging responsibility as a resource-limiting principle 
would be that healthcare could justifiably be constrained, or even wholly withheld, in 
proportion to the estimated culpability of a patient for their own ill-health. At the 
heart of the 'responsibility principle' debate therefore is the question of whether or 
not individuals deemed to be personally responsible for their ill-health should 
receive lower priority for healthcare (Buyx, 2008). 
 
One of the founding principles of the NHS was that high quality care should be 
freely available to all on the basis of clinical need. Although this value-driven aim 
may have been compromised by the mounting disparity between available 
resources and demand, there persists, among the UK public, a widespread belief 
that what may be regarded as 'essential' NHS services will be available if and when 
required (Ziebland et al, 2011).  
 
It is perhaps conceded – if not always willingly – that patients may be denied 
treatment that is not clinically indicated i.e. where there is no prospect of it 
benefitting the patient; while such decisions may contradict a patient's perceptions 
of their own healthcare need, they are regarded as an appropriate function of a 
clinician's role (Lockwood and MacFie, 2012). However, a suggestion that 
healthcare should be rationed or lower priority given to those whose ill-health is in 
some sense 'self-inflicted' both conflicts with the original goals of the NHS and 
invokes a range of practical and ethical concerns. For example, unlike most other 
criteria for limiting healthcare resources – such as financial restrictions or clinical 
diagnoses – applying this principle could not be undertaken on economic or 
scientific evidence alone; it would demand the application of explicit social value 
criteria to priority-setting20.  From this perspective therefore, the 'responsibility 
principle' can be seen as a proposal of particular moral concern; it would, for 
example, possibly invoke social determinants of 'blame', 'punishment', 'desert' and, 
of course. 'responsibility' itself. 
 
                                               
20 Social value judgements, an increasingly influential factor in healthcare distribution policy, are examined in   
    Chapter 5 
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Smoking and alcohol use are the most commonly cited examples of 'self-inflicted' 
illness-causing behaviours, others conditions that it has been claimed should  affect 
priority for health care include obesity, drug abuse and lack of physical exercise 
(Moss and Siegler, 1991; Bikhchandani et al, 2007; Grice, 2006; Glantz, 2007; 
Feiring, 2008).  
 
The topic has been extensively debated in the academic literature (e.g. Bowling, 
1996; Dolan et al, 2005; Steinbrook, 2006; Buyx, 2008; Browning and Thomas, 
2009; Sharkey and Gillam, 2010; Snelling, 2012; Persson, 2013). Although it 
remains, with a few notable and well-publicised exceptions, such as stories of obese 
patients being denied priority treatment if they do not change their lifestyle (Grice, 
2006), a primarily theoretical debate: 
 
Scholars are only at the beginning of exploring what a 'responsibility principle' 
may imply for healthcare allocation (Bringedal and Feiring, 2011: 357) 
 
However, it is a proposition that increasingly appears to be gaining credibility with 
both healthcare professionals and the public. For example, in 2012, the findings of a 
survey reported that a majority of doctors support measures to deny treatment to 
smokers and the obese. Respondents to the survey were asked "Should the NHS 
be allowed to refuse non-emergency treatments to patients unless they lose weight 
or stop smoking?": 
 
Some 54% of doctors who took part said the NHS should have the right to 
withhold non-emergency treatment from patients who do not lose weight or stop 
smoking. Some medics believe unhealthy behaviour can make procedures less 
likely to work, and that the service is not obliged to devote scarce resources to 
them (Campbell, 2012) 
 
4.4 PUBLIC SUPPORT 
 
The requirement for healthcare policy to reflect public views is increasingly 
acknowledged (Menzel, 1999; Richardson and McKie, 2005; NICE, 2008a), and 
indicates a need for public consultation in value-based distributional decision-
making (McKie et al, 2009; Mitton et al, 2009): 
 
For a particular value judgement to be incorporated into the methodology it 
must demonstrate 'social legitimacy' – that is, there must be systematic 
evidence of societal support for the change (Shah, 2009: 78) 
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As is maintained throughout this thesis, consideration of the 'responsibility principle' 
demands effective public participation.  
 
In an extensive review of the literature pertaining to people's preferences regarding 
the maximisation of health benefits, Dolan et al (2005) reported on a wide range of 
views, noting that: 
 
There is some evidence to support the view that people who are considered to 
be responsible for their ill health should be given lower priority …it is certainly 
an issue that generates much controversy (ibid: 205) 
 
This was confirmed by Edlin et al, (2011) who reported that responsibility plays a 
significant but not necessarily pivotal role in the public’s view of priority setting.  
 
Walker (2010) describes a feeling that those whose ill health is in some sense self-
inflicted should be given lower priority for health care as "a common and recurring 
intuition." This 'intuition' has been examined by a number of authors (e.g, Ubel et al, 
2002; Dolan and Tsuchiya, 2006; Sharkey and Gillam, 2010). 
 
4.5 ADVANTAGES/JUSTIFICATIONS 
 
The justifications for adopting a 'responsibility principle are most often expressed in 
terms of either enhanced equity or with regard to the perceived economic benefits. 
 
The equity benefits are explained with reference to a potential increase in justice 
and fairness – rather than simply equality – within healthcare distribution (Olsen et 
al, 2003). Personal responsibility for ill-health is one of a range of potential QALY-
weighting criteria (see Chapter 3), the application of which, it has been claimed, 
would demonstrate a fairer approach to both healthcare distribution and priority-
setting (Walker, 2010). Identifying responsibility as a priority-setting factor would 
increase equity by compelling those individuals deemed to be 'morally culpable' to 
be held accountable for their actions – in the sense that their actions ('self-inflicted 
ill-health') have a potentially negative impact on other 'non-culpable' individuals, 
 
In addition to the financial need to identify acceptable priority-setting criteria due to 
limited resources, one economic justification for incorporating the principle is the 
increasing costs of 'lifestyle-related' illness. For example, it is estimated that a 
continuing trend in obesity will present a loss of 2.2 to 6.3 million QALYs in the UK 
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during 2010–30 (Wang et al, 2011).  
 
In 2012, a report by the NHS Future Forum recommended the NHS to: 
 
...use every contact with patients and the public to help them maintain and 
improve their physical and mental health and wellbeing 
(Department of Health, 2012: 8).  
 
The report was regarded by some as part of a strategy to reduce related healthcare 
costs, which Campbell (2011) labelled "An exploding timebomb of bad lifestyles". 
 
Responsibility may be evaluated from the perspective of several theories of justice. 
In the context of an examination of the 'responsibility principle', it may be considered 
most effectively from the perspective of distributive justice – concerned with the 
socially just allocation of goods – that is ordinarily reflected within the economic 
framework used to distribute economic benefits and burdens across members of 
society (Roemer, 1996).  
 
Acceptance of a 'responsibility principle' may also accord with a concept of social 
justice as described by Rawls (1971 & 1999) who notably advocated the concept of 
'justice as fairness', achieved by advancing 'ends' through cooperation. Rawls' first 
principle of justice claimed that "Each person is to have an equal right to the most 
extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of 
liberty for all" (Rawls, 1999: 266) and his second principle stated that " Social and 
economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest 
benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and (b) 
attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity (ibid). These principles indicate the potential for philosophical 
recognition (at least) of a 'responsibility principle'. For example, the first principle 
may be considered in light of access to healthcare services (an equal right for all); 
the  second, and more applicable, principle indicates that individuals believed to 
have directly brought about their healthcare needs may have weaker claims on 
social resources to meet those needs than 'non-culpable' individuals (achieving 
benefit to the least advantaged).  
 
Clearly, the reliability of such an evaluation of the 'responsibility principle' from the 
perspective Rawls' principles of justice would be reliant on how the notion of 'least 
advantaged' is defined in this context. In order to determine fair principles of social 
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justice, Rawls offered a model of a fair choice situation (the 'veil of ignorance'); a 
hypothetical choice of mutually acceptable principles of justice taken from a position 
from outside of the society of which the chooser is a member21. Rawls claimed that 
people would adopt principles to govern the assignment of rights and duties and 
regulate distribution of social and economic advantages across society and that, by 
choosing from behind the 'veil of ignorance', they would have to accept these 
principles as fair. It would, it is contended, be desirable that the public's support for 
the 'responsibility principle' be evaluated from such a hypothetical position. 
 
4.6 POTENTIAL CHALLENGES 
 
Conceptually at least, it may be possible to accept that, when healthcare resources 
are limited, individuals should accept some responsibility for their use of these 
resources.  
 
Distinguishing between patients – which implies denying treatment to one in favour 
of another – on the basis of whether they are considered responsible for their ill-
health, challenges the conventions of NHS care. The degree to which an individual 
should be considered to be 'responsible' for their ill-health is both debatable and 
indeterminate. Healthcare professionals could therefore be asked to adopt a 
judgemental role with regard to determining the extent to which a patient has 
knowingly ignored a known risk. 
 
There are convincing moral arguments for exercising caution before allowing 
healthcare priority-setting to be influenced by perceptions of patients' responsibility 
for their healthcare needs (Wikler, 2002) and for favouring a system that focuses on 
meeting patients' needs rather than asking whether they 'deserve' to be treated. 
One of the main difficulties would be ensuring that resource allocation, according to 
this principle, is undertaken fairly. Four broad conditions would have to be met: 
 
1. The need for healthcare must have arisen as a direct, identifiable, result of 
an individual's actions 
2. Such actions should have been undertaken autonomously  
3. The individual should have been aware that the actions would create a 
healthcare need  
                                               
21 See section 3.2.3 
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4. The individual should have been aware when they acted that their 
healthcare needs resulting from it would receive lower priority 
 
Satisfying such conditions would be extremely difficult as each is open to 
interpretation and potential challenge. Brock and Wikler (2006) outlined the 
difficulties associated with one commonly cited source of 'self-inflicted' illness – 
smoking: 
 
Smoking is typically begun when individuals are young adolescents, and …. it is 
highly addictive, which undermines the voluntariness of continuing to smoke. 
Individuals in industrial countries are now generally familiar with the health risks 
of smoking, but this is less true among less educated populations in developing 
countries, where smoking is an increasing problem. No one anywhere has been 
informed before they smoke that, if they do, their health needs from smoking 
will receive lower priority for treatment than will other health needs. Thus, it 
would generally be unfair to give smokers lower priority for treatment of 
smoking-related diseases on the grounds that they were morally responsible for 
those health needs 
 
4.7 THE ARGUMENTS 
 
Sharkey and Gillam (2010) reported that the 'responsibility debate' commenced in 
1991 with the publication of opposing papers concerning alcoholic patients and liver 
transplantation (Cohen and Benjamin, 1991; Moss and Siegler, 1991). The debate 
intensified with the publication, two years later, of opposing papers regarding 
smokers and access to coronary artery bypass surgery (Underwood and Bailey, 
1993; Shiu, 1993). In a helpful review, Sharkey and Gillam (2010) mapped out  the 
relationship between, twelve key arguments – and counter arguments – relating to 
what they termed "the lower priority debate". These were divided into arguments 
that lie within three broad areas: medical, policy and moral. Sharkey and Gillam 
(2010) reported that most of the identified arguments had been refuted and that the 
debate (on self-inflicted illness) has therefore stagnated. However, this view was, 
itself, refuted by Bringedal and Feiring (2011: 357) who stated that:  
 
Far from being stagnated, or stalled….the debate about responsibility for health 
is flourishing and is also offering alternatives to the luck egalitarian version of 
the principle of health responsibility 
 
With regard to the current study, it is contended that the debate is ongoing but that it 
has not progressed due to the limitations of inquiry conducted into the key issues 
that lie within the spheres of public perceptions and social values. 
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4.8 RESPONSIBILITY 
 
Of the many questions raised by a consideration of the 'responsibility principle', 
perhaps the most fundamental yet most insoluble relates to the concept of 
'responsibility' and, in particular, how it should be defined in this context.  
 
The extent to which it is reasonable to declare an individual 'responsible' for his or 
her actions is the subject of long-standing ethical and legal debate, which is 
predicated on the concept of responsibility itself. I.e. what does it mean to be 
'responsible' for the commission of an act? How is such 'responsibility' determined? 
Any justification for a responsibility principle must respond to such questions by 
clearly defining responsibility and acknowledging both the degree of responsibility 
an individual should bear (for their ill-health) and how this might be evaluated 
(Strawson, 1994; Speak, 2013). For example, which illness-inducing factors should 
be considered relevant to identifying ill-health as 'self-inflicted'? Which of these 
might people be held responsible for and to what extent? (Anand and Wailoo, 2000; 
Sharkey and Gillam, 2010). For, as has been noted, an individual can only be 
considered blameworthy for actions that are within their own control and therefore, 
'self-inflicted' ill-health cannot be solely aligned with 'responsibility': 
 
...not every smoker develops cancer; indeed, 80% do not. The fact that he [the 
smoker] is in the 20% that do is not solely a question of choice but, at least in 
one sense, of bad luck. Hence his health in such a situation is in large part an 
outcome of a random "lottery" and thus beyond his control-except insofar as he 
chose to enter the lottery (Le Grand, 1987: 271) 
 
It could be argued, for example, that the heavy smoker is a 'victim' of their addiction 
and, as a result, should not bear responsibility for their ensuing healthcare needs 
(Martin, 2001). 
 
The issue of clearly determining the degree of responsibility upon which a 'weaker 
claim' may be based may ultimately prove insurmountable. The relevance and 
legitimacy of personal responsibility in priority-setting is, therefore, far from 
conclusive (Cappelen and Norheim, 2005; Daniels, 2011) and the question of 
whether it maintains social or ethical validity persists and is a central feature of this 
study. 
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4.9 RIGHTS 
 
Acceptance of the 'responsibility principle' would depend on responses to rights-
based questions such as:  
 
Do those who fail to take care of their own health have a lesser right to 
treatment for resultant diseases? (Steinbrook, 2006) 
 
Is a claim to healthcare less legitimate if the individual contributes to their 
illness than if no such correlation is established? (Bringedal and Feiring, 2011).  
 
The view that individuals are accountable to the other members of the society to 
which they belong offers some justification for the inclusion of a 'responsibility 
principle'. If an individual is considered to be accountable in this way, it may suggest 
an attendant duty to behave in a certain manner in accordance with the conditions 
of that accountability. It may further imply that other people ('society') have a 'right' 
(a justified entitlement) to expect that duty to be fulfilled and, where it is not, a 
corresponding right to act (or not act), by for example, limiting the accountable 
individual's access to healthcare.  
 
It is conceivable therefore to translate this view into an argument that accepting 
responsibility for ill-health or healthcare need means having a positive duty – in 
accordance with the rights of society – to 'look after yourself' healthcare-wise.  
 
Broadly, rights may be divided into three categories: moral rights; legal rights plus 
what may be described as special or institutional rights that are created as a result 
of prior action such as contracts or membership of a group or society. The concept 
of moral rights lies at the heart of the 'responsibility debate'. However, it is in terms 
of enforceable 'legal' rights that any practical measure to incorporate responsibility 
as a priority-setting or weighting principle criterion would be established. Currently, 
a legal right to healthcare is only limited by the availability of healthcare services or 
by clinical judgement. 
 
4.9.1 A RIGHT TO HEALTHCARE? 
 
The existence of a 'right to healthcare', and whether or not such a right can possibly 
be absolute or unconstrained, has long been the subject of considerable debate 
(Buchanan, 1984; Eleftheriadis, 2012). 
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The first guiding principle of the NHS is that it provides a "comprehensive service 
available to all" (NHS for England, 2013) and this principle applies: 
 
… irrespective of gender, race, disability, age, sexual orientation, religion, 
belief, gender reassignment, pregnancy and maternity or marital or civil 
partnership status…..It has a duty to each and every individual that it serves 
and must respect their human rights (ibid: 3) 
 
The concept of rights in relation to the 'responsibility principle' is centred on whether 
any right to healthcare could (or should) be diminished by the degree to which a 
person is considered to have contributed to their own ill-health. In other words, 
could society's duty to provide healthcare be weakened in relation to people's self-
chosen actions? 
 
If we assume that all citizens enjoy a right to a decent minimum of healthcare, 
can particular individuals forfeit that right even when they wish to preserve it? 
….When people engage in such actions, does society have the same obligation 
to provide healthcare to them as it does to patients who need care because of 
bad luck in life's lottery of health? (Beauchamp and Childress.2001: 358) 
 
An argument in support of this view would be that a lifelong smoker, for example, 
has created a need for healthcare treatment that arises as a direct result of their 
smoking, by their persistent and apparently autonomous actions. As a result, the 
argument proceeds, the smoker must accept that their right to healthcare is 
diminished and society's duty to provide healthcare is reduced accordingly22. 
 
In this sense, a right to healthcare is conditional on acting in accordance with 
identifiable duties. For example, a duty to not deliberately harm oneself to the point 
where others would be required to intervene (financially or in other ways). Or a duty 
to maintain optimal health and therefore minimise one's need to utilise finite 
healthcare resources23. The smoker, it may be argued, has diminished their claim to 
treatment when compared with the non-smoker who requires the same healthcare 
intervention through no fault of their own. The argument is not that an individual 
should lose the right to all forms of healthcare. It is that their right to certain forms of 
healthcare – arising as a direct result of their actions – is diminished i.e. it is weaker 
than the right of those whose ill-health is not 'self-inflicted' (Anand and Wailoo, 
2000). 
                                               
22 Although this argument and its conclusions may be valid, it is purely theoretical, and as has been highlighted  
     already, it would present many practical challenges 
23 Therefore, this argument proceeds, in order to justify an entitlement to healthcare, individuals have a moral duty  
     to safeguard their own  health 
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4.10 AUTONOMY 
 
A key issue in appraising responsibility (in any circumstances) is determining the 
degree to which an individual may be considered responsible for their actions. This, 
it may be argued should include an appraisal of the extent to which they have acted 
autonomously.  
 
There are, potentially, numerous social and cultural factors that may enhance or 
inhibit the exercising of autonomy and it is questionable whether all lifestyles, 
lifestyle choices and any related ill-health are necessarily a direct consequence of 
fully autonomous choices (Devisch, 2011).  
 
It is acknowledged for example, that an individual's socioeconomic status has 
implications for autonomous action and the expression of personal preference 
through choice. A potential by-product of higher socioeconomic status is the 
enhanced ability to exercise control, self-efficacy, and self-direction (Snibbe and 
Markus, 2005). In other words: 
 
…some people get more of what they want, more of the time, than others  
(ibid: 703) 
 
Level of education may also influence an individual's ability to exercise autonomy 
and, possibly, to perceive the extent of individual choice. Also, issues of addiction 
and other mental disorders may cloud the objective evaluation of a fully autonomous 
choice. For example, how 'free' is the smoker (or alcoholic) with regard to their 
actions? Is it possible that he or she may be regarded as 'victims' of their addiction 
and therefore not wholly accountable for their health care needs?  
 
It is also acknowledged that autonomy requires more than mere freedom from 
interference (MacDonald, 2002). Sherwin (1998) emphasised the importance of 
supportive social conditions for nurturing autonomous action and noted that an 
individual's relationships with others and with institutions must be constituted in 
such a way as to facilitate genuine opportunities for choice24. 
 
The implication of such apparent enhancement or reduction of autonomy in 
accordance with factors such as socioeconomic status, education and addictions, or 
                                               
24 The concept of 'relational autonomy' is discussed in Chapter 2 
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with regard to personal and institutional relationships, is that the notion of autonomy 
– with regard to determining the degree of responsibility an individual should bear 
for their actions – is not clear-cut.  
 
Where an individual persistently lacks the capacity for rational thought, decisions 
and action – as with a progressive condition that diminishes mental capacity such 
as dementia – overriding their autonomy (to the extent to which they are perceived 
capable of having or exercising autonomy), may be claimed to be ethically justifiable 
(Rabins and Black, 2010). Their autonomy is diminished (or absent) and therefore 
the requirement to respect autonomy is correspondingly reduced. The concept of 
'best interests' is frequently invoked as moral justification for making decisions on 
behalf of those unable to exercise autonomy (Bingham, 2012).  
 
However, circumstances where overriding autonomy is most clearly defensible is 
where someone's actions may cause harm to others. For example, if an individual's 
actions generate the need for a costly or scarce healthcare resource – an organ 
transplant due to liver damage caused by alcohol consumption for example – it may 
be claimed that their autonomous actions threaten harm to others who, through no 
fault of their own – liver damage due to infection for example – require the same 
limited resource and who may be unable to obtain it due to their place in the 
(egalitarian) queue. At the heart of the pro-responsibility autonomy argument is that 
overriding the first individual's autonomy is morally permissible as their entitlement 
to healthcare treatment is less valid than that of the less 'blameworthy' individual to 
that same treatment. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
 
As has been demonstrated, the debate on the incorporation of a 'responsibility 
principle' is both complex and  contentious. Although it is possible to perceive a 
number of valid theoretical ethical arguments in support of the proposal, many of the 
answers to questions it raises are not easily found. However, one issue that 
emerges is that, in order to progress the debate, there is a need for greater public 
involvement. There is empirical evidence that suggests that members of the public 
do wish to give less priority to those who are considered to be in some way 
responsible for their ill health and it is therefore essential that the 'responsibility 
principle' be systematically investigated in light of the public's views, values and 
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preferences. The next section of this thesis examines the role of public participation 
in healthcare priority-setting. 
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SECTION: B 
 
 
PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT 
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5 SOCIAL VALUES 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The concept of social values plays an increasingly significant role in healthcare 
distribution. It is no longer the case that distributional planning can be predicated 
solely on considerations of cost and efficiency; social values – represented by the 
qualities and beliefs shared by and within a society – are now a fundamental 
consideration when determining healthcare distribution and priority-setting. 
 
This chapter examines the concept of social values and social value judgements in 
relation to weighting health benefits and priority-setting.  
 
The explanatory focus of this examination is the manner in which the National 
Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) has identified social values as a key 
component of its role. 
 
5.2 SOCIAL VALUES 
 
It is acknowledged that within a publicly-funded healthcare system, distribution 
policy should reflect shared values that incorporate recognisable social concepts 
(e.g. 'generosity') and context-dependent moral sentiments (e.g. 'pride') that are 
believed to be commonly applicable to members of a society. These are generally 
defined as 'social values' (NICE, 2008c; Zahn et al, 2009). Social values: 
 
…constitute preferences or evaluative claims about an aggregate or community 
of persons (Menzel, 1999: 250) 
 
Social values are increasingly referred to within healthcare planning and distribution 
decisions and there is: 
 
…growing interest in involving citizens in policy development to ensure that 
decisions are legitimate, and reflect the broad social values of the public 
(Bombard et al, 2011: 135)  
 
There is also recognition of the need to incorporate the non-scientific, non-
quantifiable but increasingly relevant aspects of healthcare delivery: 
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Values such as justice, equity, dignity, non-discrimination, autonomy, and 
solidarity figure prominently in debates about priority setting. The way in which 
these values are weighed in decision making varies widely between different 
countries, but policy makers the world over increasingly must grapple with the 
problem of how to strike a balance between the values in a way that is socially 
and ethically justifiable (UCL, 2013) 
 
The perceived social value of a QALY – as opposed to its monetary equivalent – 
has been subjected to considerable empirical investigation (Baker et al, 2010; 
Donaldson et al, 2011). The social value derived from applying the QALY approach 
to healthcare distribution is generally determined via the estimation of health gains 
(in quality of life, length of life and number of persons treated) and, as previously 
observed (Chapters 2 and 3), is the same regardless of the characteristics of the 
individual(s) to whom the QALY relates. For example, an intervention that results in 
a small loss of QALYs for some but a greater gain of QALYs for others will result in 
net efficiency gains – and thus social improvement. Therefore, the social value of 
the standard unweighted QALY is commonly explained in terms of the QALY's 
health-generation and/or maximisation function.  
 
However, it is generally acknowledged that social values cannot be evaluated 
simply in terms of incremental changes in health reflected in the standard QALY-
maximisation approach i.e.: 
 
QALY gains cannot be directly interpreted as a measure of social value 
(Gyrd-Hansen, 2004: 1102) 
 
Dolan et al (2005) queried what they termed the "descriptive validity" of QALY-
maximisation, noting "…a diminishing marginal social value" associated with 
changes in both health state and length of life determined by a number of factors, 
such as severity of illness and age. 
 
Evidence from the literature suggests that many people would support using 
societal preferences to construct values for weighting QALYs in accordance with the 
individual characteristics or attributes of their recipients (Olsen, 2000; Wilmot and 
Ratcliffe, 2002; Lancsar et al, 2011).  
 
Gyrd-Hansen (2004) identified a number of potential sources of social value, each 
of which reflects possible criteria for weighting QALYs (see chapter 3). Relating, for 
example, to factors such as age, social role and health-related lifestyle. As 
healthcare and healthcare distribution affects, to some degree, the lives of all 
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citizens and encompasses fundamental ethical concerns, the range of potential 
social values is wide. Baker et al (2013) found that there was a plurality of social 
values but noted: 
 
…a paucity of rigorous research investigating the views of the general 
population in relation to the social values that should underpin healthcare 
resource allocation 
 
5.3 ELICITING PREFERENCES FOR QALY UTILITY VALUES 
 
Preference elicitation, regarding various health states, is one of the key features of 
the QALY method. It enables the quantifiable representation of 'quality of life' in the 
form of utility values and offers an insight into the practicalities of eliciting social 
values:  
 
The bulk of the empirical work involved in making the concept operational is 
concerned with eliciting the values that people attach to different health states, 
and the extent to which they regard them as better or worse than being dead 
(Williams, 1995: 222) 
 
Identifying the population from which preferences should be sought when seeking to 
obtain collective value judgements about a state of health has been the subject of 
considerable debate (e.g. Dolan et al, 2003; Brazier et al, 2004). For example, 
should preferences be sought from the perspective of individuals who are currently 
experiencing (or have experienced) a particular health state, or from those on 
whose behalf resource allocation decisions may be made but who may not (nor ever 
have been) in the health state at the time they assess its value?: 
 
The trouble is that these hypothetical preferences often bear little resemblance 
to the real experiences of those in the health states (Dolan et al, 2009: 371) 
 
It could be argued that the preferences of sub-groups – for example, patient groups 
such as inpatients, outpatients or recipients of cancer care, stroke, maternity, 
emergency care or mental health services – rather than individuals, would provide 
more collective judgements. However, it is generally accepted among health 
economists that preferences from general population samples should be used 
rather than those of discrete sub-groups (Conner-Spady et al, 2000). One frequently 
argued rationale for using members of the public is that, in a publicly-funded 
healthcare system, the views of the general population are most appropriate and 
most relevant (Gudex, 1986; Drummond et al, 2005; NICE, 2008a; EuroQol Group, 
2013a; Tolley, 2009). 
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Respondents are normally asked to value health outcomes in terms of how they feel 
about it for themselves rather than in terms of how they feel about the health of 
others or of the community as a whole. Arguably, such individual, self-interested 
perspectives are insufficiently robust to provide (when aggregated) a collective 
'social value judgement' about a state of health.  
 
It has been suggested therefore, that the adoption of a broader more community-
focused perspective, that considers the desirability of health states or health state 
changes to others, would be better able to incorporate broader social value 
concerns such as those relating to 'fairness' (Weinstein et al, 2009). Although 
Richardson and McKie (2005: 272) warned that: 
 
The process of community consultation confronts a familiar problem. 
Encouraging subjects to adopt the ''caring-for-others perspective'' paves the 
way for judgments based on ''fairness'' and ''justice''. But it also paves the way 
for biased, intolerant, and dogmatic preferences 
 
However, Menzel (1999) supported a view that most individuals would have 
preferences about what is good for society as a whole and would express relational 
or distributive values: 
 
 These would be societal values as expressed by individual members of the 
society – "individual social welfare functions," we might say (ibid: 250) 
 
Morris et al (2007: 24) provided some reassurance for the aggregatability of 
individual preferences in terms of identifying social preferences and social values. 
Whilst acknowledging that the utility function within consumer choice theory is 
subjective and idiosyncratic and the utility obtained depends entirely on individual 
preferences – essentially the consumer's likes and dislikes – they noted that: 
 
The consumer is, however, assumed to be rational, which essentially means 
that their behaviour is consistent with their aims. We assume that individuals 
behave as if they make decisions with the aim of maximising their well-being 
 
Weinstein et al (2009: S7) stated that the individual-based approach to measuring 
value "…is consistent with the principle of consumer sovereignty, the keystone of 
welfare economics" that underpins the QALY process. 
 
A number of authors, for example, Baker et al (2010) have discussed one of the 
inherent challenges of eliciting quantitative preference data i.e. the elicitation and 
explanation of values that arise from the non-medical, non-scientific features of a 
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health state. For instance, preferences for certain health states, at both individual 
and societal levels, may be dependent on a multiplicity of psychosocial 
considerations relating to influential factors such as personal relationships and 
employment status. Generic health status measures such as the EQ-5D (EuroQol 
Group, 2013a) may fail to capture all of these factors.  
 
The process of eliciting preferences (the context, descriptions of health states, 
instructions etc.) may influence the preferences declared (Dolan et al 2005). Patrick 
et al (1994) discussed the 'cognitive burdens' involved in preference decisions, and 
Loomes and McKenzie (1989) referred to two phenomena that are of practical and 
theoretical concern with regard to the accurate elicitation of preferences. These are 
'framing effects' – individuals' stated preferences between alternatives are liable to 
be substantially affected by the way in which the alternatives are framed – and 
'utility effects' whereby different procedures for eliciting preferences, or even 
different variants of the same procedure, produce systematically different estimates 
of utilities for the same sets of outcomes25. 
 
5.4 HOW NICE HAS ADDRESSED SOCIAL VALUES 
 
An examination of the role of social values in relation to weighting health benefits is 
aided by considering how NICE has addressed these concepts. The key point of 
reference for this evaluation is the NICE publication: Social Value Judgements: 
Principles for the development of NICE guidance (NICE, 2008c) – henceforth 
referred to as Social Value Judgements.  
 
An exploration of NICE's approach also helps to further illustrate some of the ethical 
aspects of the QALY-weighting debate as Social Value Judgements has been 
described as an attempt by NICE to "…create an explicit ethical framework for 
funding decisions" (McMillan et al, 2006: 127). 
 
5.4.1 NICE  
 
Since being established in 1999, a particularly contentious feature of NICE's work 
has been its role in determining the cost-effectiveness of healthcare treatments. The 
organisation's approach to funding decisions has been frequently criticised; chief 
among these criticisms has been that NICE's funding threshold is inappropriate and 
                                               
25
 A number of methods used to value health states are outlined in Chapter 2 
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that its evaluations fail to capture patients' personal experiences of their condition 
and treatments (Devlin et al, 2003). The need for an empirical basis for NICE's 
funding threshold of £20,000 to £30,000 per QALY gained has been highlighted 
(Donaldson et al, 2011; Claxton et al, 2013). NICE has also been accused of 
inconsistency in its approach to cost-effectiveness decisions; thereby exacerbating 
inequalities in access to healthcare (Cookson et al, 2001)26.  
 
In its early years, NICE faced increasing demands to acknowledge the impact of 
social values on its decision-making processes.  
 
In 2009, in a significant development, NICE announced that, providing certain 
criteria were met, it would accept higher incremental cost-effectiveness ratios for 
some medicines over others, signifying that its appraisal committees would in future 
assign additional weight to health gains from life-extending end-of-life treatments 
(NICE, 2009a).  
 
The change in NICE policy took place against "a background of legal action by 
patients, attendant publicity and political discomfort" (Raftery, 2009: 271). It 
represented an explicit departure from the distributive neutrality of the standard, 
impartial QALY model and was made in response to mounting concern that effective 
new drugs for end-stage cancer frequently failed NICE's funding threshold or 'cost 
per QALY' test. It also followed the publication of the 'Richards Review' (Richards, 
2008), in which it was stated that:  
 
Many stakeholders believe that the value society places on supporting people 
nearing the end of their life is not adequately reflected when the cost-
effectiveness of drugs is appraised (ibid: 4) 
 
A public consultation on the amendment to NICE policy found that the majority of 
respondents supported it on the grounds that rejecting proven life-extending 
treatments on the grounds of cost-effectiveness alone was not acceptable (NICE, 
2009b). 
 
 
 
                                               
26 The bioethicist John Harris, in a critical exposition of NICE's approach to cost-effectiveness decisions which, he  
     claimed, discriminate against the old and those with diminished life expectancy, stated that "NICE should not be    
     in the business of evaluating patients rather than treatments; to do so is contrary to basic morality and contrary  
     to human rights" (Harris 2005: 375) 
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5.4.2 NICE 'SOCIAL VALUE JUDGEMENTS' 
 
Prior to this significant threshold change, the first edition of Social Value 
Judgements (NICE, 2005a) emerged following extensive consultation and a revised 
(current) edition was published in 2008 (NICE, 2008c). The aim of the publication is 
to offer guidance on the non-scientific aspects of NICE decision-making and to 
describe: 
 
…the principles that NICE should follow when applying social value judgements 
to the processes it uses to develop guidance. It is particularly concerned with 
the social value judgements that NICE should adopt when making decisions 
about effectiveness and cost-effectiveness (NICE, ibid: 5).  
 
The document as a whole summarises NICE's approach to value judgements 
relating to society (as opposed to scientific value judgements).  
 
5.4.2.1 'SOCIAL VALUE JUDGEMENTS': QALY-WEIGHTING 
 
The notion of QALY-weighting, either directly or by implication, is not a prominent 
concern of Social Value Judgements, which promotes a view that distributive 
fairness and an obligation to serve the interests of the entire population limit the 
capacity for subjective weighting of health benefits. Issues relating to cost-
effectiveness – and, by implication, priority-setting – are addressed within a section 
entitled "Evidence-based decision-making". Although a number of possible 
weighting criteria ('Individual choice', 'Rare conditions', and the 'Rule of Rescue') are 
considered (albeit briefly), their potential contribution to NICE's decision-making is 
largely rejected. Social Value Judgements illustrates NICE's view that any attempt 
to restrict the use of a healthcare intervention to a particular sub-group, for example, 
according to a patients' age or gender, must be supported by: 
 
…clear evidence about the increased effectiveness of this intervention in this 
subgroup (NICE, 2008c: 25) 
 
Therefore, although the need to consider factors other than the relative costs and 
benefits of a particular treatment i.e. social values, is the focus of this publication, its 
central proposition is 'fairness', or the: 
 
…need to distribute health resources in the fairest way within society as a 
whole (ibid: 22) 
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5.4.2.2 'SOCIAL VALUE JUDGEMENTS': AN 'ETHICAL FRAMEWORK' 
 
In describing the social value principles (also described as "broad moral principles" 
(NICE, 2008c: 26)) that NICE should follow in developing its guidance – particularly 
with regard to the social value judgements that it should adopt when making 
decisions about effectiveness and cost-effectiveness (ibid) – it appears that NICE is 
attempting to provide a degree of ethical resilience for its procedures whilst offering 
a reasonably coherent manifestation of what the organisation terms its "moral 
obligations to the people it serves" (ibid: 29), and a degree of ethical sensitivity is 
therefore evident throughout Social Value Judgements. 
 
Throughout the publication, issues such as fairness, equality, inclusiveness and 
support are emphasised and what might be regarded as 'ethical indicators', for 
example, terms such as 'principles', 'discrimination', and 'equality' are prominent. 
Reducing health inequalities, "including those associated with sex, age, race, 
disability and socioeconomic status" (ibid: 28) is a key ethical imperative for NICE 
and a short section of Social Value Judgements is dedicated to outlining the impact 
of NICE guidance on health inequalities (ibid: 28).  
 
It may be argued that NICE's commitment to equality (as demonstrated within Social 
Value Judgements) highlights the need for equality within its own processes rather 
more than the need for equality within healthcare distribution. However, NICE's 
equality guidelines indicate that considerations of equality within resource allocation 
decisions (and not simply the processes involved in making these decisions) do 
contribute to NICE activities.  
 
The second section of Social Value Judgements describes the core of NICE's 
ethical approach. NICE has adopted the 'four principles' approach to bioethics 
(Beauchamp and Childress, 2008): 
 
Because they provide a simple accessible and culturally neutral approach that 
encompasses most of the moral issues that arise in healthcare 
(NICE, 2008c: 8).  
 
The section outlines the four principles - respect for autonomy, non-maleficence, 
beneficence, and justice, their relationship to healthcare and, to a lesser extent, 
their impact on NICE activity.  
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Reference to the four principles method is unsurprising given that it is a popular and 
influential approach to ethical analysis, however it should be noted that its ubiquity 
and extensive acceptance has been subjected to criticism (Campbell, 2003; Lee, 
2010). NICE acknowledges the inherent tensions within and between the four 
principles and points out that: 
 
These guidelines are, to a considerable extent, concerned with attempting to 
resolve the inherent tensions between them within the context of the social 
value judgements that NICE and its advisory bodies have to make (NICE, 
2008c: 8) 
 
The principle of autonomy, previously identified as an essential component of 
NICE's ethical approach, is constrained within Social Value Judgements. This is, 
perhaps, unsurprising given the organisation's role. As McMillan et al, (2006: 127) 
noted:  
 
…the very mention of the principle of autonomy in a document such as this 
[Social Value Judgements] can give a very misleading impression 
 
Although "a well ordered society confirms the autonomy of persons" (Rawls, 1999: 
456) and the concept of the autonomous patient is an accepted tenet of 'good' 
healthcare, Social Value Judgements acknowledges that respect for autonomy 
"cannot be applied universally or regardless of other social values" (NICE, 2008c: 8) 
and states that individual's expectations of receiving treatment:  
 
…should not impose a requirement on NICE's advisory bodies to recommend 
interventions that are not effective, or are not cost-effective enough, to provide 
the best value to users of the NHS as a whole (ibid: 20) 
 
In outlining its ethical approach, Social Value Judgements emphasises the principle 
of justice. The "problem" (perhaps NICE's use of quotation marks here is 
illuminating – see below) of distributive justice is introduced and two approaches to 
distributive justice that can be used to resolve problems arising from the mismatch 
between demands and resources in healthcare are outlined (ibid: 9):  
 
1) The utilitarian approach (maximising the health of the community as a 
whole) 
  
and 
 
2) The egalitarian approach (to allow each individual to have a fair share of the 
opportunities available)  
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The strengths and weaknesses of utilitarian and egalitarian approaches are 
acknowledged and it is stressed that NICE does not subscribe fully to either. 
Instead, it gives emphasis to 'procedural justice', ensuring that its decision-making 
process is transparent and its decisions explicit.  
 
What amounts to an effective rejection of distributive justice as a key principle within 
this document is surprising, particularly in so far as NICE dismisses the egalitarian 
approach which, it states "…cannot be fully applied when there are limits on 
resources" (ibid: 9).  
 
The conclusion drawn from such a reluctance to engage with the complexities of 
distributive justice is that NICE regard demonstrating its internal 'ethical processes' 
– as evidenced by transparency etc. – to be easier than ensuring external 'ethical 
practice', which would entail making multifaceted and potentially controversial 
recommendations.  An impression is therefore conveyed that, despite a number of 
references to 'fairness' within Social Value Judgements, NICE is less concerned 
with ensuring that health resources are distributed fairly, or that they be maximised, 
than it is with confirming that it is, in itself, operating in an ethically justified manner. 
Although NICE declares the "need to distribute health resources in the fairest way 
within society as a whole (ibid: 18), responsibility for ensuring distributive fairness it 
seems, lies with individual NICE committees and advisory bodies: 
 
NICE and its advisory bodies must use their own judgement to ensure that what 
it recommends is cost effective and takes account of the need to distribute 
health resources in the fairest way within society as a whole (ibid: 22) 
 
Reference is made to the work of Daniels and Sabin (2002) on the importance of 
"accountability for reasonableness". Referring to the consultation that preceded the 
publication of Social Value Judgements, McMillan et al (2006: 128) noted an 
apparent inconsistency in NICE's support for Daniels and Sabin's approach: 
 
These authors [Daniels and Sabin] recognise that while justice is the overriding 
ethical concern for priority setting, it is not possible to describe a set of 
principles that will guarantee a just outcome. They think this is because we live 
in a pluralistic country and cannot expect there to be consensus about the 
principles that are relevant to prioritisation …. NICE has used the Citizens 
Council to do precisely what Daniels and Sabin think we cannot do – generate 
unproblematic principles that will automatically produce a just prioritisation 
 
This 'inconsistency' remains within the current edition of Social Value Judgements in 
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which evidence from NICE Citizens Council reports27 is implicitly accepted as a valid 
representation of mutually acceptable principles for decision-making. 
 
Social Value Judgements appears to be an attempt to establish the ethical 
resilience of NICE processes whilst providing a reasonably coherent manifestation 
of NICE's "moral obligations to the people it serves" (NICE, 2008c: 29). It provides a 
broad 'ethical framework' for NICE advisory bodies and assists in an understanding 
of the ethical basis for NICE guidance. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
 
A consideration of social values and how they may influence healthcare distribution 
decisions helps to elucidate the rationale for reflecting a 'public voice' within 
healthcare distribution policy. Healthcare priority-setting, it is asserted, is 
significantly aided by reference to social values, and this view is comprehensively 
supported by the available literature. The incorporation of a 'responsibility' principle 
within priority-setting, it is further contended, demands the critical exposition of 
social values.  
 
The increasing relevance of social values and social value judgements to healthcare 
distribution indicates a need for enhanced public participation to inform decision-
making. The concept and impact of public participation are examined in the next 
chapter. 
 
 
  
                                               
27
 The role of NICE Citizens Council is addressed in Chapter 6 
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6  PUBLIC PARTICIPATION  
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
It is increasingly argued that healthcare distribution policy should reflect public 
views, values and preferences and that there should be greater public involvement 
in priority-setting. The process of 'public participation' is the means by which 
decision-makers seek to engage with the public on such issues. 
 
This chapter examines the role of public participation in healthcare priority-setting, 
with particular emphasis placed on how evidence of the public's views has been 
sought. A narrative overview of the literature identifies strategies for achieving public 
participation. Studies into deliberative approaches to public engagement are 
increasingly prominent, and the role of NICE's Citizens Council is examined as both 
an example of a deliberative focus group approach and a means by which public 
participation is sought.   
 
A proposition is made that public participation in relation to healthcare priority-
setting would be enhanced by understanding the ethical reasoning and arguments 
used to support the stated views, values and preferences of members of the public. 
 
6.2 PUBLIC PARTICIPATION  
 
As noted in earlier Chapters28, the need for healthcare priority-setting to incorporate 
a valid public perspective is increasingly acknowledged (Menzel, 1999; Richardson 
and McKie, 2005; McKie et al, 2009; Mitton et al, 2009). In the current policy 
context, within which concerns about quality and accountability are increasingly 
considered, publicly-funded health systems wish to be seen as responsive to the 
expectations, needs and priorities of the public, and public participation (or public 
involvement29) has become a key feature of UK health policy (Department of Health, 
1999; Green and Gerard, 2009; Health and Social Care Act, 2012): 
 
                                               
28
 The requirement for healthcare policy to reflect public views is noted in Chapters 1 and 4 (Section 1.2.5 and     
     Section 4.4) 
29 The term 'public participation' and public involvement' are often applied interchangeably (e.g. Donovan and   
     Coast, 1996; Litva et al, 2002) 
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Scholars have argued the need for public input to enhance the legitimacy of 
priority-setting decision-making, and governmental reports have advocated 
greater public input in health care priority-setting (Martin et al, 2002). 
 
6.2.1 HOW PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IS ACHIEVED 
 
Various mechanisms exist for involving the public in health policy, and public 
participation generally involves members of the public adopting one of two 
substantive roles: either as public representative, directly participating in decision-
making processes, or as public consultant whose views are solicited to inform 
decisions (Abelson et al, 2007). 
 
The roles are fulfilled in several ways. Examples include: NICE's Citizens Council, 
described by Abelson et al (2007: 42) as "…the highest profile example of an 
institutionalized public involvement model" (discussed in section 6.4 below); the 
increasing use of patient representation (Martin et al, 2002), for example in health 
technology appraisals and the formulation of clinical guidelines (NICE 2013b) and 
the use of patient and public involvement forums, which have become an integral 
part of the governance structures of NHS providers (Baggott, 2005). Within these 
settings, members of the public may directly participate in decision-making whilst 
also informing the on-going public debates on, for example, priority-setting and 
rationing medical treatment (Wright, 2011; Campbell, 2012).  
 
Besides government-led initiatives that facilitate public involvement, there is 
considerable consumer-led activity. Structured patient groups, interest groups and 
organisations such as Alzheimer's Society (alzheimers.org.uk), the Spinal Injuries 
Association (spinal.co.uk) and the mental health charity MIND (mind.org.uk) provide 
an influential public voice to the formulation of treatment guidelines and key health 
policy decisions (Tattersall, 2002; Landzelius, 2006). In addition, organisations, 
support groups and charities representing a range of subcultural groupings based, 
for example, on ethnicity (blackmentalhealth.org.uk) and sexual orientation 
(stonewall.org.uk) offer an increasingly influential and diverse representation of 
public views and public involvement in the formulation of health policy. 
 
With regard to public participation and this study, it is important to note that not all 
forms of public participation need to be representative of the population as a whole, 
nor do they need to directly influence decision-making. For example, local initiatives 
may be focused on engaging an identified engaged section of the public in order to 
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inform local policy. Alternatively, the public's views, values and preferences may be 
sought via researchers seeking to explore concepts and shed light on them with the 
aim of developing theory, rather than seeking representativeness (Corbin and 
Strauss, 2008)30, and it is this process of public participation that is of most 
relevance to this study. 
 
6.2.2 ARGUMENTS FOR PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 
 
Arguments in favour of public participation are frequently stated in terms similar to 
that used to justify eliciting preferences for QALY utility values from members of the 
general public31 i.e. that in a tax-funded funded healthcare system, services are paid 
for by the public and their implementation should therefore be guided by them – it is 
the public's assessment of benefit that matters (Florin and Dixon, 2004). 
 
A second argument in favour of public participation concerns the potential benefits 
that may ensue. Public participation, it is claimed, is a means of generating trust and 
improving accountability within healthcare systems (Church et al, 2002) and has the 
potential to create service improvement and improve public confidence in the NHS 
(Health Committee, 2007; NICE, 2013b). Thus, healthcare services, it is argued, will 
be more responsive to the people who use them and, in turn, more responsive 
services will lead to improved healthcare (Wait and Nolte, 2006). This argument in 
favour of public participation may also make reference to the perceived benefits for 
those individuals at the centre of healthcare delivery whose views, values and 
preferences, it is argued, may frequently not be heard: 
 
Most of the parties involved in healthcare reform debates – governments, 
politicians, healthcare professionals, pharmaceutical companies, special 
interest groups – actively work to make their desires known. Despite their 
obvious interest in this debate, however, it is the patients who will likely have 
the greatest difficulty in providing input to these discussions  
(Diederich et al, 2012: 1) 
 
Practical motivations for public participation include: an appreciation of untapped 
community resources; broadening the range of inputs to decisions or solutions to 
health problems, and the belief that participation may lead to more cost-effective 
decisions (Frankish et al, 2002).  
                                               
30 Such studies are mainly founded within the academic areas of bioethics and health economics (see section 6.3)  
31 Discussed in Chapter 5 
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A further contention may be that involving the public helps to ensure that health 
policy decisions – that have significant ethical as well as technical dimensions – 
more effectively reflect the values of the community. Public involvement is therefore, 
according to this view, an intrinsic 'good' in itself (Florin and Dixon, 2004). With 
regard to the focus of this thesis, this is an applicable argument for public 
participation; the socio-ethical implications of the incorporation of a 'responsibility 
principle' within healthcare distribution would, it is contended, require the effective 
exploration of both individual and community values via the involvement of 
members of the public in their role as public consultants. 
 
6.2.3 ARGUMENTS AGAINST PUBLIC PARTICIPATION  
 
Arguments against public participation generally make reference to the perceived 
limitations of public contributions, the divergence between public and 'professional' 
knowledge and understanding and the unwillingness of members of the public to 
engage in health policy debates (Frankish et al, 2002, Abelson et al, 2007). 
  
These arguments include the view that health professionals are the legitimate and 
superior decision makers (Scanlan et al, 1996) and that participation would involve 
those who have less skill or knowledge than those responsible for carrying out the 
decisions and who are less accountable for outcomes than professional decision-
makers (Brownlea, 1987). Concerns have also been expressed about the apparent 
validity of public preferences; that they may, for instance, be based on prejudices 
rather than factual information (Sharkey and Gillam, 2010). It should not therefore 
be assumed that public participation is universally regarded as an essential 
component of health policy activities. Indeed, Abelson et al (2007: 40) describe the 
call for public involvement as a "popular “motherhood” gesture" that overlooks the 
conflicting interpretations of who the public is and how the public expresses values.  
 
The promotion of public participation may also overlook the fact that many members 
of the public may not actually wish to be involved in informing health policy. For 
example, the perceived importance of autonomy to the effective delivery of 
healthcare32 may encourage healthcare planners to believe that members of the 
public wish to be more involved in healthcare, or even that the public expect to be 
consulted about the quality of healthcare services and how the healthcare budget is 
                                               
32
 Autonomy is discussed in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 
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allocated. However, such an "apparently seamless link between individuals as 
[autonomous] patients and individuals as citizens" (Wait and Nolte, 2006: 155) 
should not be presumed. Members of the public may be less motivated to 
participate in health policy than professional healthcare decision-makers as a result 
of the divergence of their interests; the contrast in available information and levels of 
understanding concerning healthcare planning and policy and, perhaps most 
significantly, the fact that most members of the public ordinarily have only infrequent 
and unplanned contact with the healthcare system. This suggests that, despite the 
claims of those who promote public participation, the planning of and distribution of 
healthcare services may not be of particular concern to a significant proportion of 
the population. 
 
Concerns regarding representation and influence may also affect members of the 
public's willingness to formally contribute to health policy initiatives33. There may be 
a perception of limited representation by members of subgroups and subcultures 
and by those involved with the 'less glamorous' healthcare services such as mental 
health care (Donovan and Coast, 1996). In an assessment of guiding principles for 
the design of public involvement processes, Abelson et al (2004) reported citizens' 
concerns about: 
 
… the unbalanced power relationships between participants and consultation 
organisers; and the exclusivity of processes with respect both to the selection of 
participants (i.e. who is invited/who is not invited) and the degree of content 
knowledge necessary to be able to participate meaningfully (ibid: 210) 
 
Furthermore, although the public voice is increasingly influential, within most public 
participation initiatives, the role of the public in contributing to policy discussions is 
generally a reactive rather than proactive one. Authority rests with the policy-makers 
to determine how public input should inform healthcare decisions. 
 
Although not strictly an argument against public participation, a particular difficulty 
faced by those wishing to facilitate public involvement is that definitions of 'the 
public' may vary34 and 'members of the public' may assume different roles according 
to how they interact with the healthcare system. For example, contemporary users 
of NHS care have been claimed to assume concurrent roles of (among others) 
                                               
33 Representation concerns may deter public involvement in formal activities, such as patient and public  
    involvement forums, rather more than participation in consultative approaches such as surveys 
34 Definitions used within this thesis are outlined in Chapter 1 
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'decision-maker', 'care manager', 'co-producer of health', 'taxpayer' and 'active 
citizen' (Coulter, 2002) and the means by which individuals traverse these different 
roles has implications for how they perceive both the healthcare services and their 
own involvement.  
 
There is also extensive diversity within what is commonly termed 'public opinion'35 
as there is diversity among the individuals, groups and sub-groups that comprise 
the 'public'. One of the key factors in conceptualising public participation is to 
determine how such diversity could, or should be, managed. One of the inherent 
challenges of public participation is ensuring that – in its representative sense at 
least – it is able to draw together these different roles. 
 
Ensuring meaningful public participation requires determining the extent to which 
individuals or groups can legitimately be regarded as representative of 'the public' (if 
generalisable representation is sought rather than representation via a consultative 
role36). It also necessitates dealing with a range of stakeholders that include large 
organisations and smaller interest groups and ensuring that elicited views on 
societal distribution of healthcare are distinguishable from that of a self-interest 
perspective. Identifying the means by which public participation is facilitated – 
surveys, interviews, focus groups, for example, and ensuring a well-considered 
framework for analysis – are therefore important both in relation to eliciting views 
and in the interpretation of findings. 
 
Although opportunities exist for participation across a range of healthcare-related 
organisations and settings, and the ways in which public participation is realised are 
many and diverse, there appears to be no single conceptual framework underlying 
public involvement (Wait and Nolte, 2006). Consequently, its aims demand 
clarification. Is it, for example, concerned with achieving instrumental goals i.e. to 
inform policy decisions? Or, more concerned with process-oriented goals that seek 
to improve the legitimacy of decision-making? (Abelson et al, 2007). Therefore, the 
evidence-base needed to support and enhance public participation is deficient 
(Staniszewska et al, 2008) and research is needed to investigate the rationale, aims 
and objectives applied within various public participation contexts. Greater 
                                               
35
 See Chapter 1 
36
 'Generalisable representation' is used here to refer to participation processes that seek to demonstrate some   
     generalisable aspects of public views, values etc.  
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transparency is also required regarding how public participation activities align with 
the general healthcare policy-making process. 
 
6.2.4 PUBLIC PARTICIPATION – SUMMARY   
 
From the above discussion it is evident that public participation/involvement in 
health policy activities is an ongoing and increasingly employed strategy that offers 
members of the public an opportunity to contribute in a variety of roles both directly 
(via representation) and indirectly (via consultation) in how healthcare services are 
planned and resources allocated. It has the potential to make a valuable 
contribution to health service policy decisions and may ultimately lead to improved 
healthcare. 
 
However, the differences in lay-professional knowledge and the extent to which 
each is valued must be considered, and it should not be routinely accepted that 
members of the public wish to 'participate'. There is also need to ensure that 
diversity (of both the 'public' and 'public opinion') is effectively managed within a 
clearer conceptual framework for public participation activities. 
 
With regard to the current study, the category of public participation under 
examination is that of public consultation and how the views, values and 
preferences of members of the public can contribute via this approach to the debate 
regarding a 'responsibility principle'. It is contended that such consultative 
participation, in which public participants may be purposively recruited, offers a 
significant degree of flexibility and adaptability to the diversity of public opinion and 
individuals' background, needs and expectations. Arguably, the methods used by 
researchers seeking 'public opinion' into healthcare policy issues – whether via 
quantitative or qualitative methods – can effectively enable the voices of otherwise 
unrepresented individuals and groups to be expressed within participation activities. 
A key consideration in this regard, is to the process of participant recruitment37  
 
6.3 LITERATURE OVERVIEW 
 
The following is a brief narrative overview of the literature that outlines the 
theoretical and contextual framework of public participation in this area. 
                                               
37 This is discussed further in Chapter 10 
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There is a substantial body of literature exploring questions of public participation in 
priority setting and resource allocation Mitton et al (2011). Anderson et al (2011) 
noted an increasing trend to include the public in decision making and there is 
evidence that members of the public believe that their views ought to be considered 
with regard to setting health priorities (Mitton et al, 2011).  
 
Policy and decision makers have acknowledged that the public's views should 
constitute an important, although not necessarily determining, input into priority-
setting (Mitton et al, 2009; Mitton et al, 2011). The integration of public views with 
other perspectives is clearly required – rather than regarding the public view as the 
sole determinant of how healthcare resources should be allocated and priorities 
identified: 
 
In the health field, theorists stress that citizens need to express their values to 
health policy-makers in order to assist them in setting health goals  
(Murphy, 2005: 173) 
 
However, the view that the public must be involved in healthcare distribution does 
not have total support. Robinson et al, (2011) reported that some NHS areas had 
taken a conscious decision not to involve the public in their priority-setting activities, 
arguing that: 
 
…there was a need to get the process established in-house and that 
organisations from across the health economy needed to agree on decisions 
before involving patients or the public (ibid: 49) 
 
A range of studies have examined the views, values and preferences of members of 
the general public in relation to various aspects of healthcare distribution, including: 
QALY-maximisation (Bryan et al, 2002; Dolan et al, 2005) priority-setting (Mason et 
al, 2011; Anderson et al, 2011), and QALY-weighting (Baker et al, 2010). Some 
have examined the views of members of the public together with those of health 
professionals (e.g. Coast, 2001a), and others have explored the reasons behind 
people's preferences (e.g. Dolan and Cookson, 2000; Madden et al, 2005). 
 
The majority of studies appear to have employed quantitative methods and have 
therefore produced generalisable statistical evidence obtained via, for example, 
stated preference surveys (Buxton and Chambers, 2011). Some have been used to 
generate data that may be used to estimate relative QALY weights (e.g. Baker et al, 
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2010; Lancsar et al, 2011). Some studies have employed a mixed methods 
approach i.e. using both quantitative and qualitative methods (e.g. Bombard et al, 
2011), whilst others have applied qualitative methods only. Various qualitative 
methods, using both individual and group-based approaches, have been used. 
These have included: focus groups (e.g. Dolan and Cookson, 2000; Block et al, 
2001) and semi-structured interviews (e.g. Coast, 2001a; Dolan and Shaw, 2004). 
The findings of these studies offer the most substantial evidence available of public 
participation in relation to healthcare distribution. 
 
6.3.1 DELIBERATIVE APPROACHES 
 
Citizen deliberation has been identified as a key means for setting health-care 
priorities that aim to promote individual and community health  
(Murphy, 2005: 173) 
 
Enabling effective public participation in priority-setting requires the identification of 
empirically-based and ethically defensible social objectives (Richardson and McKie, 
2005). Various strategies have been used in the design of more proactive public 
participation processes (Abelson et al, 2003) in an attempt to achieve meaningful 
citizen engagement in decision making. These have included deliberative strategies 
aimed at achieving more 'informed involvement', such as via 'citizens' juries' 
(Lenaghan, 1999; Mullen, 2000). 
 
Mitton et al, (2009) suggested that authors of deliberative processes – such as 
citizens' juries' – find them to produce better results and that there appears to 
increased satisfaction with the process when there are opportunities for face-to-face 
contact between the public and decision-makers. Abelson et al (2003: 239) 
observed that: 
 
A common thread weaving through the current participation debate is the need 
for new approaches that emphasize two-way interaction between decision 
makers and the public as well as deliberation among participants. 
 
Kim and De Vries (2009) proposed the practice of 'deliberative democracy' – 
involving ordinary citizens in deliberative political issues (Steiner, 2012) – as a 
means to overcoming the challenge of eliciting informed and considered ethical 
opinions from members of the public.  
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Robinson et al (2011) reported that the use of citizens' forums allowed members of 
the public to influence the planning of services. Issues regarding service-provision 
were highlighted at the forums and subsequently, action was taken to resolve these 
issues: 
 
Although limited as a means of involvement in specific decisions, these forums 
were seen as beneficial in helping to address the broader issue of resource 
constraints and the need for priority setting (ibid: 50). 
 
Mitton et al, (2009) undertook a scoping review to examine public engagement in 
priority setting and resource allocation. They reported that there appears to be 
growing interest in deliberative approaches to public engagement, which are more 
commonly on-going rather than one-off and more apt to involve face-to-face contact.  
 
Citizen deliberation, where the public are "exposed to the arguments of others 
(Dolan et al, 1999: 916), is a prominent theme in health policy literature: 
 
….as citizens articulate their values, they may guide policy-makers to choose 
health services that respond to health inequalities associated with social 
contexts (Murphy, 2005: 172) 
 
The Citizens Council of the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence 
(NICE)… 
 
…where thirty people – from all walks of life and with no particular background 
in the subjects to be discussed or experience in public life – were recruited to 
advise a national level health policy agency on the value judgements that  
underpinned its decisions (Davies et al, 2005) 
 
…was developed as a result of the increasing popularity of deliberative approaches 
in public engagement. 
 
6.4. NICE CITIZENS COUNCIL  
 
NICE's Citizens Council an advisory body made up entirely of members of the 
public (NICE, 2013c) seeks to enable public participation in the wide range of issues 
the organisation must respond to. The Council was established in 2002 to provide 
advice about the social values that should underpin NICE guidance and in order that 
such guidance should: 
 
…broadly reflect the values of the population who both use the service (as 
patients) and who ultimately provide it (as taxpayers) (NICE, 2005b) 
87 
 
 
The Council represents a deliberative approach to public participation (Davies et al, 
2005) and meets once a year to address pre-determined issues relevant to NICE's 
work. Meetings are usually held over two days during which Council members hear 
presentations from a range of experts and subsequently address the topic under 
discussion in various ways (within breakout groups, plenary sessions etc.) with the 
intention of producing recommendations submitted to the NICE board.  
 
The aim of expert presentations, breakout groups and plenary sessions within 
Citizens Council meetings is to encourage Council members to communicate with 
one another and to explain their views on the issues.  
 
A question or series of questions is posed for the Citizens Council to consider and 
Council members' views on a range of statements are sought via a 'tracking survey' 
at various stages within their deliberations. For example, at the start of the meeting, 
following exposure to expert presentations and at the end of the meeting. The 
Council's conclusions are usually presented, in the form of an 'Executive Summary' 
that includes examples of their discussions and data relating to the 'tracking survey'.  
 
Council meetings operate in accordance with a deliberative focus group approach. 
Focus groups are used to explore a range of phenomena (e.g. Block et al, 2001; 
Wilmot et al, 2002; Abelson et al, 2009). Emphasis is placed on interaction within 
the group and the joint construction of meaning (Bryman, 2008). The aim is to 
capitalise on communication between participants in order to generate data 
(Kitzinger, 1995). 
 
Since its inception, the Citizens Council has specifically addressed a number of 
topics relevant to the distribution of healthcare, priority-setting and rationing. These 
have included Age (NICE, 2004), Ultra-orphan drugs38 (NICE, 2005c), The 'rule of 
rescue' (NICE, 2006a) and, in 2008, the Council considered QALYs and the severity 
of illness (NICE, 2008b).  
 
The process of Council meetings and reports is recognition of the need for, although 
not necessarily clear evidence of, public involvement in formulating NICE guidance. 
The extent to which NICE seeks to assimilate public preferences within its guidance 
                                               
38 "Ultra-orphan drugs" is a term used to describe a drug indicated for a very rare disease. "NICE uses the term for  
     conditions occurring in less than 1000 people in the UK" (NICE 2005c: 28) 
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is not fully articulated, within the Council's reports. It is not possible for instance to 
ascertain the degree to which empirically based social objectives were sought, 
empirical data being limited to results of the tracking surveys39.  
 
A further limitation of the reports is that there is little indication that the influence of 
group dynamics, such as the development and articulation of group norms that may 
inhibit dissenting voices, has been considered. In addition, the involvement and 
influence of the moderator(s) is not well defined. 
 
Overall, with regard to the NICE Citizens Council, the impact of public participation 
is not clearly defined and there seems to be a lack of integration of the Council's 
findings into the wider activities of the organisation.  
 
6.5 ENHANCING PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 
 
It has been reported that within conventional approaches to healthcare economic 
evaluation there is a general assumption that people's preferences are commonly 
applicable (Richardson and McKie, 2005), despite evidence suggesting that such 
methodological dogma may lead to widespread public attitudes being overlooked, 
misrepresented or even ignored (Dolan et al, 2005). 
 
Many policy analyses proceed from an assumption what ordinary people want, 
assumptions about the effect of different kinds of intervention, or assumptions 
about the motivation of different actors. Unfortunately, such assumptions may 
be wrong, and the whole analysis thereby misleading. It is not sufficient to 
assume what the 'person on the Clapham omnibus' thinks, believes, or wants, 
at least not if it is a matter that could be investigated (Holm, 1997: 30) 
 
Unsupported survey results may offer an insufficient understanding of what the 
public feel about how resources should be allocated. Such evidence is susceptible 
to criticism that it is unsupported by evidence of valid arguments (Harris, 2005).  
 
Therefore. A more in-depth approach to eliciting and analysing the views, values 
and preferences of members of the public regarding healthcare priority-setting is 
required in order to both improve the depth of understanding and to enhance the 
influence of public participation. 
 
                                               
39
 There is little evidence of how the Council's recommendations were attained other than by the on-going voting   
     system reflected within the tracking survey of opinions. 
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Deliberative approaches to public engagement may enable the elicitation and 
analysis of social objectives. However, for these objectives to be ethically valid, they 
must be ethically defensible. The process of eliciting and analysing ethically 
defensible public views, values and preferences regarding priority-setting therefore 
demands systematic examination.  
 
It is contended that this may be achieved by exploring the underlying ethical 
reasoning used by members of the public in relation to priority-setting, and by 
examining how such reasoning is applied in the form of ethical arguments. There is 
little evidence in the available literature to suggest that this has been undertaken 
(see Chapter 8). 
 
--------------------------------------- 
 
The next chapter examines the concepts of ethical reasoning and argumentation 
and considers how these concepts have been examined in relation to healthcare 
distribution. 
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7  ETHICAL REASONING AND ARGUMENTS 
 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In order to enhance public participation in healthcare priority-setting, and to improve 
both the understanding and influence of the views, values and preferences of 
members of the public in this area, it is necessary to identify and examine 
empirically-based, ethically-defensible social objectives that may helpfully inform 
policy debates.  
 
It is contended that the elicitation and examination of ethical reasoning and 
arguments used by members of the public to support their stated views, values and 
preferences regarding healthcare priority-setting – particularly in relation to the 
application of a 'responsibility' principle – would contribute to the identification of  
such ethically-defensible objectives.  
 
This chapter explores the concept of ethical reasoning and argumentation and 
considers how they have been elicited and analysed. The rationale for exploring 
reasoning and arguments in relation to healthcare priority-setting is defended, 
particularly in relation to how their elicitation and analysis could increase awareness 
of the public's views, values and preferences and enhance public participation in 
healthcare priority-setting. A lack of available evidence of the examination of ethical 
reasoning and arguments is identified. 
 
7.2 ETHICAL REASONING AND ARGUMENTS 
 
The technical notion of an argument reflects the process of deductive reasoning 
(Overton, 1990; Fisher, 2004); it is typically represented by an ordered pair, 
consisting of premises and a conclusion that directly results from the premises 
(Parsons, 1996). Its validity relates to its adherence to a logical form, i.e. "the 
conclusion follows from the reasons as a matter of logic" (Thomson, 1999: 39), the 
truth of its premises and the extent to which it is able to withstand objective scrutiny 
and be justified. In surveys where unreasoned preferences are sought (e.g. "State 
how strongly you agree with the following…"), there is no potential for reasoning or 
arguments to be elucidated so any 'conclusion' offered is unsupported. 
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An ethical argument is distinguished by a conclusion that makes some sort of moral 
claim: that may be an imperative i.e. "You should do x, for a, b and c reasons" or 
that something is (morally) right or good (Thomson, 1999). The conclusion therefore 
functions as an authentic reasoned ethical preference.  
 
Ethical arguments are distinct from simple expressions of values or preferences; 
they are more representative of a 'process' within which reasoning may be exposed 
(Lawrence and Helm, 1987). Therefore, in addition to arguments that accord with 
the traditional technical-logical framework it is possible to discern ethical arguments 
from within the evaluative processes people employ to justify their views and 
preferences. Banks et al (2006) identified some of the components of such 
evaluative processes, including: 
 
 Expressing an instinct or gut feeling; making distinctions; 
 Reference to ethical principles 
 Use of personal experience 
 Use of analogies, parallels and examples 
 Slippery slope arguments 
 
The processes of ethical deliberation can therefore produce recognisable ethical 
arguments that do not necessarily arise from rational, logical forms of 
argumentation. For example, if an initial, possibly intuitive, reaction to a question or 
topic is referred back to within a process of ethical reflection (applying one or more 
of the components of ethical evaluation described above) which ultimately leads to a 
conclusion; and a coherent link can be made between the two positions (starting 
point and conclusion) i.e. there is evident coherence between the intuition, 
components of evaluation and conclusion, it may be possible to identify a justified, 
valid, ethical argument (Banks et al, 2006). 
 
An example of an ethical argument is evident within a frequently cited priority-setting 
principle – the 'rule of rescue':  
 
…the imperative people feel to rescue identifiable individuals facing avoidable 
death (McKie and Richardson, 2003: 2407) 
 
Its application is evident within such life-saving, but costly, interventions as renal 
dialysis and major organ transplantation. It is broadly based – within a healthcare 
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context – on an ethical argument constructed as follows (premisesA and conclusion 
(moral claim)B indicated): 
 
 Allowing a person to die when interventions that may save their life are 
available is morally wrongA   
 Lifesaving interventions (e.g. renal dialysis) are availableA 
 Therefore, people must not stand idly by if such rescue measures are 
availableB 
 
This argument implies that greater weight should be attached to the health gains of 
the severely ill or those facing the threat of imminent death. Jonsen (1986) claimed 
that the 'rule of rescue' argument derives from an instinctive rather than utilitarian 
imperative, and Hadorn (1991) as cited by Richardson and McKie (2005: 269) 
observed that: 
 
…any plan to distribute health care services must take human nature into 
account if the plan is to be acceptable to society 
 
However, as McKie and Richardson (2003: 2411) argue, the 'rule of rescue' can 
also be defended from a utilitarian point of view: "…on the basis of the utility gained 
by the individual from the knowledge that an attempt to help has been made". To 
this may be added a further utilitarian justification: that overall well-being is 
increased if people believe that they live in a society in which such a 'rule' is applied. 
Subjecting ethical arguments to even rudimentary examination therefore, reveals 
underlying – and possibly contradictory – views, motivations and obligations. 
 
One of the basic requirements for examining ethical reasoning and arguments is 
that the examination should produce findings that are objective and able to 
withstand scrutiny. This means identifying evidence and valid arguments in support 
of stated views, values and preferences that are objective and justifiable: 
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If that support is strong, and if it is not culture bound, that is, accepted by 
people in one specific culture and not generally accepted in other cultures, then 
anyone at any time should follow the argument and accept the claim that 
comprises the argument's conclusion. If the claim commands our consent 
because of the compelling nature of the support for that claim, then we can say 
with some confidence that the claim is not simply a matter of personal opinion 
or cultural perspective: It is 'objective'. As the British philosopher Karl Popper 
has said, "objective means justifiable, independently of anybody's whim": a 
justification is 'objective' if in principle it can be tested and understood by 
anybody. What we seek in ethics are precisely those elements and features of 
an ethical argument that we are compelled to accept whether we want to or not, 
'independently of anybody's whim' (Curtler, 2004: xvii) 
 
7.3  RATIONALE FOR EXAMINING REASONING AND ARGUMENTS  
 
To identify empirically-based and ethically defensible social objectives that will 
helpfully inform policy discussions, the reasoning that underpins people's stated 
views, values and preferences must be examined and the arguments used to 
construct and defend these judgements must be effectively analysed.  
 
Examining the ethical reasoning and arguments that underpin members of the 
public's views, values and preferences would, it is contended, enhance public 
participation within healthcare priority-setting. It also offers the potential to examine 
'public opinion' regarding a contentious proposal such as that presented by the 
'responsibility principle', to a greater and more explanatory depth than has hitherto 
been achieved.  
 
For example, it is possible that the existing evidence of support for (or opposition to) 
QALY-weighting may be flawed if stated preferences are based on conflicting or 
inconsistent reasons. Recognising possible conflicts and inconsistency in reasoning 
are important factors in arriving at a well-considered decision (Hardman, 2009), i.e. 
only when it is acknowledged that, in reasoning terms, "you can't have it both ways", 
is a valid decision possible. Effectively exploring preferences therefore involves the 
identification and, hopefully, resolution of conflicts and inconsistencies in reasoning 
(Thomson, 1999). Most importantly, and what existing studies have tended to 
overlook (see below), examining reasoning and arguments would allow the 
exploration of the reasons why people regard certain issues (in relation to 
'responsibility' and priority-setting) as important.  
 
In order to identify logically valid arguments, the ways in which members of the 
public seek to resolve both logical and ethical conflicts, inconsistencies and 
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contradictions in their responses should be considered. For example, are reasoning 
strategies and arguments contradicted or rejected in response to contrasting 
prioritisation strategies? Or are moral distinctions made between types of 'self-
inflicted' ill-health? By exploring the processes of ethical reasoning and 
argumentation, it may be possible to identify which ethical principles, theories and 
concepts are used to underpin people's views, and whether or not some moral 
concepts are dominant. 
 
If ethically defensible preferences can be identified from forms of ethical reasoning 
and argument that are distinguishable from self-interest, a social perspective might 
be a legitimate one (Dolan et al 2003). Dolan and Tsuchiya (2006: 387) explained 
how a legitimate societal perspective may be obtained: 
 
The societal perspective can be operationalized in two ways. One is by 
indicating that the respondents themselves are not directly affected by the 
scenarios, and the other is by indicating that they are to imagine themselves 
making decisions for a community to which they themselves belong. The latter 
is sometimes called the societal inclusive perspective. In order to establish 
whether the social perspective is being achieved, the effect of self-interest on 
the results can be tested 
 
However, concern has been expressed that ethical arguments proposed by 
members of the public lack philosophical contemplation. Scully et al (2006a: 751), 
commenting on the view that many expert scientists and bioethicists find lay 
people's ethical judgements less trustworthy than those of professional ethicists, 
stated:  
 
These experts suggest that, instead of weighing the evidence and the 
arguments, non-philosophers usually have an immediate response to an issue, 
and then search for reasons to legitimate their intuitions 
 
Such concern may also reflect a perception of public views and values regarding 
health-related ethical issues as inconsistent and poorly defined, thereby making 
their elicitation and analysis – beyond quantitative approaches – both problematic 
and ultimately, an inapplicable basis for public policy (Levitt, 2003; Harris, 2005).  
 
However, this perception has been refuted and it has been argued that publicly-
stated arguments should be valued as much as those within professional bioethical 
discourse (Scully et al, 2006b, Partridge et al, 2009). Nonetheless, a comparison of 
ethical arguments put forward by members of the public with those applied within 
professional discourse could potentially make a valuable contribution to the public 
95 
 
participation/priority-setting debate.  
 
7.4 A LACK OF AVAILABLE EVIDENCE 
 
A range of studies – chiefly within health economics40 – have examined public 
views, values and preferences concerning various aspects of healthcare 
distribution, including for example: QALY maximisation (e.g. Bryan et al, 2002); 
priority-setting, either in accordance with health gain (e.g. Mason et al, 2011) or 
based on patients' individual characteristics (e.g. Anderson et al, 2011); and QALY 
weighting (e.g. Baker et al, 2010), and there is evidence that public attitudes 
towards healthcare distribution are influenced by various ethical concerns. For 
example, Olsen et al (2003) reviewed the ethical reasons underlying people's views 
on incorporating personal characteristics within healthcare priority-setting and 
reported that utilitarian and egalitarian explanations appear to be frequently used, in 
addition to justifications based on individual desert and merit. 
 
However, confirmation of 'what the public think' about how healthcare is distributed 
and how priorities are identified is mostly founded on generalisable statistical 
evidence obtained via, for example, the self-completion of questionnaires (e.g. 
Dolan and Shaw, 2003) or interviews in which participants were asked to state and 
explain preferences in order to assist the further development of quantitative 
measures of preferences (Shaw et al, 2001). Obviously, the primary purpose of 
such studies has not been to examine reasoning and arguments. Olsen et al (2003: 
1171) noted the lack of research aimed at distinguishing "ethically based 
considerations from prejudices" and called for increased qualitative research 
designed to probe people's beliefs and their ethical bases.  
 
A number of studies have examined 'lay', or 'non-expert', ethical reasoning and 
arguments relating to topics other than healthcare distribution, including: medical 
genetics (Banks et al, 2006) and the use of technologies to extend human lifespan 
(Partridge et al, 2009).  
 
Banks et al, (2006) examined the processes by which non-professionals make 
                                               
40
 Hasman (2003:43) reviewed the empirical literature on priority setting in healthcare and explained that the  
    differing  aims of researchers are dependent on their professional focus: "Economists tend to elicit the  
    preferences people have in the priority choice situation, political scientists look for political incentives and public   
    opinion, whereas ethicists traditionally focus on the principles or values, which people hold" 
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ethical evaluations in relation to a contested area in medical genetics. The authors 
examined participants' reasoning and arguments and highlighted the role played by 
the use of personal experience, analogies and examples, noting that:  
 
The issues that lay people find important, and the ways they express and 
develop their opinions and arguments, constitute an important dimension in 
policy decisions (ibid: 300) 
 
Partridge et al (2009) conducted interviews and focus groups with 'lay' participants 
in order to examine ethical concerns about life-extension research. The authors 
found that participants made explicit reference to ethical concerns: 
 
…often using words such as "ethical", "moral", or "philosophical", to identify 
these key issues for them, while at other times, participants only implicitly 
referred to key ethical themes (ibid: 71) 
 
7.5 EXAMINING ETHICAL ARGUMENTS: A COMPARISON 
 
An overview of two studies that have examined ethical arguments offers an 
indication of differences in how such an examination may be undertaken. The 
studies on which this comparison is based are McKie et al (2009)41 and Scully et al 
(2006b)42. Each demonstrates a different approach to exploring ethical arguments. 
 
McKie et al investigated people's beliefs about a particular topic (priority-setting with 
regard to treatment costs). The authors stated that they sought to "…explore the 
values, arguments and rationalisations underlying those views" (ibid: 2), although 
this exploration was mainly a descriptive process that identified and discussed a 
range of themes arising within the study and a number of positions taken by 
participants. As the authors themselves stated, they offered an overview of 
participants' reasons and arguments, and this was presented in a narrative, rather 
than analytical form. 
 
McKie et al also sought to enhance the strength of the views obtained by eliciting 
"underlying values rather than unreflective preferences" (ibid: 1). Participants were 
asked to consider alternative principles for resource allocation and given the 
opportunity to deliberate and discuss the issues and verbalise the underlying values 
                                               
41 McKie, J., Shrimpton, B., Richardson, J. and Hurworth, R. (2009) Treatment costs and priority setting in health  
     care: A qualitative study, Australia and New Zealand Health Policy, 6 (11). 
42 Scully, J. L., Banks, S. and Shakespeare, T. W. (2006b) Chance, choice and control: Lay debate on prenatal  
     social sex selection, Social Science and Medicine, 63 (1), pp. 21-31. 
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and reasons. This appears to have been done primarily to elicit 'strong evaluation' 
(involving reflection on one's own preferences) rather than 'weak evaluation' (simple 
weighing of alternatives, expression of preferences etc.). Therefore, the rationale for 
identifying values and reasons was to enhance the views obtained and to 
emphasise the importance of deliberation and reflection in preference elicitation. It 
was not done so that the values and reasons themselves could be subjected to 
systematic analysis.  
 
In contrast, Scully et al set out to explore the processes by which non-professionals 
make ethical evaluations and to examine the evaluative processes of reasoning and 
argumentation used in relation to a given topic (prenatal social sex selection). 
Rather than requiring participants to solely give their views or make a choice 
between alternatives, the researchers sought to identify the implicit or explicit 
normative framework that gave rise to participants' opinions. They used a brief 
scenario to initiate and focus the discussion and asked participants to articulate and 
discuss their reasons for their opinions. 
 
Scully et al analysed their participants' arguments – particularly the form of moral 
reasoning applied, its coherence, the predominant rationales offered, the moral 
values espoused, and the way in which participants verbalised their ethical views. In 
a further report of the same study (Banks et al, 2006) the authors described how 
they also explored morally relevant concepts that underpinned people's views – 
components of ethical reasoning such as expressions of instinct; making 
distinctions; rational/logical argument; reference to principles; use of personal 
experience; analogies and examples; slippery slope arguments and meta-
reflections. 
 
Scully et al also investigated how participants framed a problem; they undertook 
data analysis to identify ethical content and arguments and made the comparison 
between participants' ethical reasoning and that which is evident within the bioethics 
literature. 
 
In summary, McKie et al (2009) undertook a study of public views, an aspect of 
which was the description of the underlying reasons, values and arguments. Scully 
et al (2006b)'s paper was based on a study which explicitly sought to examine how 
the public make ethical evaluations, including the role of rational argumentation 
within this process. 
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The extent to which evidence is available of the ethical reasoning and arguments 
supporting the public's views, values and preferences regarding healthcare 
distribution and priority-setting is considered in the next chapter. 
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8 EXAMINING ETHICAL REASONING AND 
ARGUMENTS: A LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Economics is commonly defined in terms of the relationship between people's 
unlimited wants and society's scarce resources. The definition implies a central 
role for an understanding of what people want, i.e. their objectives  
(Richardson and McKie, 2005: 265) 
 
The purpose of this literature review is to identify studies that have examined public 
attitudes and preferences regarding healthcare distribution and/or healthcare 
priority-setting and to evaluate these with regard to the methods employed and the 
extent to which they have elicited and/or examined participants' ethical arguments. 
The study is restricted to qualitative studies in consideration of the limitations of a 
quantitative approach to this subject discussed in Chapter 7. The methodological 
literature regarding qualitative reviewing and synthesis (Barbour, 2001; Britten et al 
2002; Major and Savin-Baden, 2010) indicates that this literature review has been 
undertaken with the application of a "systematic approach" but does not represent a 
fully formed qualitative systematic review. 
 
8.2 SEARCH METHODS 
 
8.2.1 SOURCES 
 
Four online bibliographic databases were searched for the years 1985–2013: 
Medline, EconLit, CINAHL, Applied Social Sciences Index and Abstracts (ASSIA) 
and Web of Knowledge. It was felt that these databases struck a balance between 
those containing primarily healthcare-focused articles and those that draw upon 
broader social science content. Subsequently, reference lists of articles were hand-
searched to detect articles that were not identified in the computerised search.  
 
8.2.2 SEARCH TERMS 
 
Search terms, applied separately, in combination and with appropriate truncation 
symbols, included: 'QALY', 'priority-setting', 'rationing', 'public participation' and 
'argument'. Searches were undertaken in 2013 and restricted to items published 
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since 1985. Rather than focusing on title and abstracts, search terms were applied 
to 'all text' as 
 
…the indexing of qualitative research on existing electronic databases is 
generally inconsistent, and there is often no methodological information in the 
study's title or abstract to allow it to be clearly identified as a qualitative study 
(Petticrew and Roberts, 2006: 86) 
 
8.2.3 INCLUSION CRITERIA AND ARTICLE SCREENING 
 
The following specific inclusion criteria were applied: peer reviewed articles 
reporting qualitative primary research involving members of the public, published in 
the English language and limited to a timespan of 1985 to 2013.  
 
The initial searches yielded a large and unmanageable number of results. This 
number was reduced to approximately 250 by applying qualitative search terms: 
'qualitative' OR 'qualitative research' OR 'qualitative study' OR 'qualitative method*' 
OR 'grounded theory' OR 'interviews' OR 'focus group*' OR 'discussion group*' OR 
'deliberative' 
 
This number was further reduced by applying to the results the additional search 
terms: 'reasoning', 'values' and 'preferences'. 
 
Articles were reviewed for relevance; those covering unrelated topics – for example, 
the elicitation of health utilities – or those that did not describe qualitative research 
were excluded from the review. Subsequently, 51 potentially relevant articles were 
identified, and they were obtained and reviewed for possible inclusion. Of the 51 
papers, 33 were excluded (Appendix One) leaving 18 articles to be included within 
this review. Table 8.1 briefly summarises the papers that were selected via this 
process, the methods used, the outcomes of these research studies and whether 
there is evidence that a specific attempt was made to examine ethical reasoning 
and arguments.
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TABLE 8.1: ARTICLES INCLUDED IN LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Author(s) Study design / 
methods 
Aim(s) of study Participants Ethical reasoning / 
arguments examined 
 
Main findings 
Abelson et al 
(2009) 
 
'Modified grounded 
theory approach.' 
Focus groups (plus 
telephone survey) 
 
To examine people's 
values toward a health 
care system and  to 
develop 
conceptualisations of 
trust  
 
Public. Age: 18-
79 
Addressed 'values'.  
 
No attempt made to 
explore reasoning or 
arguments 
Thematic findings 
regarding 'trust' 
Block et al (2001) 
 
Focus groups (x14) 
 
Content analysis of 
perceived benefits 
 
To identify the range of 
benefits that are 
significant for a wide 
cross-section of social 
groups 
 
Multiple 
countries. 
 
Public - 122 
participants 
Not explored Identification of a means of 
measuring health systems 
performance 
Bombard et al 
(2011) 
 
'Citizens' Reference 
Panel'.  
 
Five, one-day sessions 
over a two year period 
 
Pre and post-panel 
questionnaires 
To elicit a set of ethical 
and social values to be 
used to guide a Health 
Technology 
Assessment review and 
appraisal process 
 
To explore the 
feasibility of using 
participatory 
approaches to elicit 
these values 
 
14-person 
Citizens' 
Reference Panel 
on Health 
Technologies 
 
Age range = 18 
to 71+ 
Discussed the elicitation of 
ethical and social values 
into the evaluation of 
health technologies. 
 
Identified core values via 
group deliberation. 
 
Coding of data included 
'Patient autonomy' and 
'Challenges to social 
values and arrangements'. 
 
Identification of 'core 
values' across a variety of 
health technologies 
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TABLE 8.1: ARTICLES INCLUDED IN LITERATURE REVIEW (continued) 
 
Author(s) Study design / 
methods 
Aim(s) of study Participants Ethical reasoning / 
arguments examined 
 
Main findings 
Coast (2001a) 
 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
 
Initial fieldwork 
undertaken 
via focus groups 
 
Data analysis via 
constant comparison 
To consider the 
application of the 
theoretical notion of a 
principal–agent 
relationship to societal 
health care decision 
making 
 
'Citizens' – 13 
members of UK 
public 
 
'Agents' (working 
in a health 
service role) 
 
Interviewees 
purposively 
selected based 
on comments 
made in focus 
groups 
 
Arguments reported but not 
analysed 
With regard to the 'citizen-
agent' relationship, it 
appears to operate as a 
system of equivocation 
 
Questions the perceived ' 
typicality' of citizen 
informants 
Coast (2001b) 
 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
 
Data analysis via 
constant comparison 
To explore people's 
views about whether 
they would want to 
know about any 
rationing of their own 
health care. 
 
'Citizens' –
members of the 
UK public 
 
(plus 'informants' 
– members of 
interest groups, 
elected 
representatives, 
health service 
workers) 
 
Arguments reported but not 
analysed 
 
Reasons for responses 
elicited 
Majority of participants 
wanted to know 
about rationing 
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TABLE 8.1: ARTICLES INCLUDED IN LITERATURE REVIEW (continued) 
 
Author(s) Study design / 
methods 
Aim(s) of study Participants Ethical reasoning / 
arguments examined 
 
Main findings 
Cookson and Dolan 
(1999)* 
Focus groups 
 
Used 'rationing 
exercises' 
 
Categorised responses 
corresponding to five 
rationing principles. 
Participants' reasons 
were then 
subcategorised – coded 
into 'principles' and 
'factors' 
 
To investigate public 
support for ethical 
principles of health care 
rationing 
 
60 public 
participants. Ten 
focus groups – 
approximately six 
participants in 
each. 
 
Age range 18-70 
 
Reported participants' 
arguments e.g. 8% argued 
that it is unethical to make 
explicit rationing choices – 
but these arguments were 
not analysed  
 
Offered some analysis of 
participants' reasons for 
decisions – e.g. the most 
common justifications 
given for decisions 
 
Provided summary 
statistics of participants' 
responses 
 
 
Identified public support for 
three rationing principles: 
(1) a broad 'rule of rescue', 
(2) maximising the health of 
the whole community and 
(3) reducing inequalities in 
people's lifetime 
experience of health. 
 
Dicker and 
Armstrong (1995) 
 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
 
Thematic analysis 
To explore the 
assumptions underlying 
responses to questions 
of resource priorities in 
the NHS. 
 
Patients x16 Participants' responses 
reported and some 
arguments stated but not 
analysed  
Identified recurring themes 
within the interviews e.g. 
Participants' reluctance to 
use their own needs as a 
basis for determining 
preferences - balanced by 
the use of others' needs as 
justification for service 
priorities. 
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TABLE 8.1: ARTICLES INCLUDED IN LITERATURE REVIEW (continued) 
 
Author(s) Study design / 
methods 
Aim(s) of study Participants Ethical reasoning / 
arguments examined 
 
Main findings 
Dolan et al (1999)* Focus group To investigate the 
extent to which people 
change their views 
about priority setting in 
healthcare as a result of 
discussion and 
deliberation 
 
60 Arguments not discussed 
or analysed 
Public views about priority-
setting are systematically 
different when people have 
been given an opportunity 
to discuss the issues. 
Dolan and Cookson 
(2000)* 
Focus group To elicit the general 
public's views about the 
extent to which health 
gain matters  
 
60 respondents Aim of focus groups: to 
enable participants to 
"raise, discuss, and reflect 
upon, different arguments" 
 
Participant responses 
analysed but arguments 
not examined 
 
Support for the view that 
equality of access should 
prevail over the 
maximisation of benefits 
Dolan and Shaw 
(2004) 
 
Focus groups 
 
Variant of Grounded 
Theory 
To explore whether and 
how people wish to give 
differential priority 
based on certain 
characteristics of 
potential donor kidney 
recipients 
 
23 participants 
meeting in four 
groups of five or 
six 
 
Group discussions 
described 
 
Arguments not analysed 
People are willing and able 
to distinguish between 
potential recipients 
according to a range of 
characteristics beyond 
expected treatment 
benefits.  
 
 
*Cookson and Dolan (1999); Dolan et al (1999) and Dolan and Cookson (2000) are papers based on the same study 
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TABLE 8.1: ARTICLES INCLUDED IN LITERATURE REVIEW (continued) 
 
Author(s) Study design / 
methods 
Aim(s) of study Participants Ethical reasoning / 
arguments examined 
 
Main findings 
Kuder and Roeder 
(1995) 
 
Focus groups 
 
Scenario-based 
discussions 
 
Thematic analysis 
 
To assess public views 
on age-based rationing 
of healthcare 
 
46 participants Identified common themes 
 
Participants' arguments 
presented but not 
examined 
Reluctance to withhold 
treatment on basis of age 
Litva et al (2002) 
 
Focus groups and 
follow-up semi-
structured interviews 
 
Thematic analysis 
To examine the public's 
preferences for being 
involved in particular 
types of rationing 
decisions 
 
34 members of 
the public (plus 
others) 
Arguments presented and 
quotations are used "to 
illustrate the themes 
presented and to allow the 
reader to judge the veracity 
of the interpretation" 
 
Findings demonstrate 
variations in the willingness 
of members of the public to 
be involved in health care 
decisions 
 
McKie et al (2009) 
 
Semi-structured group 
discussions 
To investigate whether 
the public believes high 
cost patients should be 
a lower priority for 
public health care than 
low cost patients 
41 participants Sought to "…explore the 
values, arguments and 
rationalisations" –, 
exploration was mainly a 
descriptive process that 
identified and discussed a 
range of themes arising 
within the study and a 
number of positions taken 
by participants.  
 
Considered participants' 
conclusions as well as their 
reasoning 
 
Demonstrated the  
tendency for people to 
disregard costs in 
prioritising health care 
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TABLE 8.1: ARTICLES INCLUDED IN LITERATURE REVIEW (continued) 
 
Author(s) Study design / 
methods 
Aim(s) of study Participants Ethical reasoning / 
arguments examined 
 
Main findings 
Owen-Smith et al 
(2009) 
 
And 
 
Owen-Smith et al 
(2010) 
 
Interviews  
 
Data analysis via 
constant comparison 
To examine how 
patients react to explicit 
rationing decisions 
 
31 patients (plus 
21 healthcare 
professionals) 
Arguments elicited and 
justifications for arguments 
discussed 
Found that nearly all 
patients wanted to know 
about rationing decisions 
and regarded implicit 
rationing as paternalistic 
Werntoft et al 
(2007a) 
 
And  
 
Werntoft et al 
(2007b) 
 
Interviews 
 
Content analysis 
To describe the views 
and reasoning of people 
aged 60 years and over 
about prioritization in 
health care with regard 
to age and willingness 
to pay 
 
446 Categorised and analysed 
participants' reasoning 
 
Quotations, including 
arguments, used to 
illustrate categories 
Views expressed indicated 
contradictory opinions and 
experiences 
Wilmot and 
Ratcliffe (2002) 
 
Focus groups To investigate public 
preferences in the 
allocation of donor liver 
grafts for transplantation 
 
22 members of 
the public 
Quotations, including a 
range of arguments, used 
to illustrate the discussion. 
 
Arguments not analysed 
Participants approach was 
flexible and thoughtful – 
occasionally resorting to 
arguments based on what 
is 'obvious' and 'natural'. 
Suggesting that members 
of the public would be able 
and willing to respond 
positively to a more open 
and consultative system of 
donor liver prioritisation 
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8.3 FINDINGS 
 
8.3.1 METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION 
 
8.3.1.1 FOCUS GROUPS 
 
Focus groups were the most frequently used approach to data collection. Abelson et 
al (2009) applied what they termed a 'modified grounded theory approach', using 
focus groups (plus telephone survey) to examine the public's values toward a health 
care system and to develop conceptualisations of trust. Block et al (2001) used a 
series of focus groups (n=14) in order to identify the range of health benefits that 
are significant for a wide cross-section of social groups. Also using focus groups, 
Cookson and Dolan (1999) and Dolan and Cookson (2000) investigated public 
support for ethical principles of health care rationing identified in the literature. 60 
participants within an age range of 18 to 70, took part in the focus groups (n=10). 
Focus groups were also used by Wilmot and Ratcliffe (2002) to investigate public 
preferences in the allocation of donor liver grafts for transplantation. In addition, 
focus groups were employed by Dolan and Shaw (2004) and Kuder and Roeder 
(1995). McKie et al (2009) used what they termed "semi-structured group 
discussions" to investigate whether the public believes high cost patients should be 
a lower priority for public health care than low cost patients. 
 
8.3.1.2 INTERVIEWS 
 
Dicker and Armstrong (1995) interviewed 16 participants in order to explore the 
assumptions underlying responses to questions of resource priorities in the NHS. 
Owen-Smith et al (2009 and 2010) conducted interviews with patients (n=31) and 
healthcare professionals (n=21) to examine how patients react to explicit rationing 
decisions. Interviews were also used by Werntoft et al (2007a & 2007b) to describe 
the views and reasoning of people aged 60 years and over about prioritisation in 
healthcare with regard to age and willingness to pay. Coast (2001b) conducted 
semi-structured interviews with members of the public to explore people's views 
about whether they would want to know about any rationing of their own health care. 
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8.3.1.3 MIXED QUALITATIVE METHODS 
 
Following initial fieldwork undertaken via focus groups, Coast (2001a) conducted 
semi-structured interviews with members of the public and health service personnel. 
The interview sample was purposively selected on the basis of their comments 
during focus groups. Using focus groups and follow-up semi-structured interviews, 
Litva et al, (2002) examined the public's preferences for being involved in particular 
types of rationing decisions. 
 
8.3.1.4 DELIBERATIVE METHODS 
 
Bombard et al (2011) sought to elicit a set of ethical and social values to be used to 
guide a Health Technology Assessment review and appraisal process and explored 
the feasibility of using participatory approaches to elicit these values. They utilised a 
'Citizens' Reference Panel' plus pre and post-panel questionnaires.  
 
8.3.2 EXAMINATION OF REASONING AND ARGUMENTS 
 
Arguments not explored:  
 
Block et al (2001) examined people's expectations and experiences of healthcare 
systems, but participants' reasoning and arguments were not explored. Dolan and 
Shaw (2004) investigated whether and how people wish to give differential priority 
based on certain characteristics of potential donor kidney recipients. They reported 
that people are willing and able to distinguish between potential recipients according 
to a range of characteristics beyond expected treatment benefits. Participants' 
arguments were not examined. In the study by Abelson et al (2009), no attempt was 
made to explore reasoning or arguments, but the authors did provide some, fairly 
lengthy, quotes – including arguments – from participants in order to inform the 
discussion.  
 
Arguments identified but not explored: 
 
Cookson and Dolan (1999) identified public support for three rationing principles: (1) 
a broad 'rule of rescue', (2) maximising the health of the whole community and (3) 
reducing inequalities in people's lifetime experience of health. The findings included 
reports of the arguments participants used, for example, 8% of participants argued 
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that it is unethical to make explicit rationing choices, but these arguments were not 
analysed. The authors also indicated some analysis of participants' reasons for 
decisions by identifying the most common justifications given for decisions. In a 
further report on this study, Dolan and Cookson (2000) stated that the group 
discussions were designed to enable participants to "raise, discuss, and reflect 
upon, different arguments" (ibid: 19). Participants' responses were analysed but 
arguments were not examined. An additional aim of Dolan and Cookson's study 
was to investigate the extent to which people change their views about priority 
setting in healthcare as a result of discussion and deliberation. It was found that 
public views about priority-setting are systematically different when people have 
been given an opportunity to discuss the issues (Dolan et al, 1999). 
 
Dicker and Armstrong (1995) identified recurring themes within the interviews. For 
example, participants' reluctance to use their own needs as a basis for determining 
preferences. This was balanced by the use of others' needs as justification for 
service priorities. Participants' responses were reported and some arguments stated 
but not analysed. 
 
Kuder and Roeder (1995) assessed public views on age-based rationing of 
healthcare. Their focus group participants, it was reported, were reluctant to 
withhold treatment on the basis of age. Common themes were identified and 
participants' arguments were presented within the paper, but not subjected to 
analysis. The authors emphasised the value of statements and opinions being 
presented in participants' own words. 
 
Wilmot and Ratcliffe (2002) reported that participants' approach was flexible and 
thoughtful; occasionally resorting to arguments based on what is 'obvious' and 
'natural'. Quotations, including a range of arguments, were used to illustrate the 
discussion but the arguments themselves were not analysed. Coast (2001a; 2001b) 
identified arguments but these were not subjected to analysis. 
 
Other: 
 
Bombard et al (2011) discussed the elicitation of ethical and social values into the 
evaluation of health technologies and identified core values via group deliberation. 
The authors reported that panel members felt ill-equipped to reflect on ethical and 
social values. In their findings, Bombard et al (2011) used participant responses to 
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illustrate the expressions of 'values'. 
 
Litva et al, (2002) and their findings demonstrated variations in the willingness of 
members of the public to be involved in health care decisions. Participants' 
arguments were presented and, interestingly, Litva et al included quotations from 
participants "to illustrate the themes presented and to allow the reader to judge the 
veracity of the interpretation" (ibid: 1829). 
 
McKie et al (2009) sought to "…explore the values, arguments and rationalisations" 
(ibid: 2). However, the exploration was primarily a descriptive one that identified and 
discussed a range of themes arising within the study and a number of positions 
taken by participants. The authors considered participants' conclusions as well as 
their reasoning and offered an overview of participants' reasons and arguments, 
which were presented in a narrative, rather than analytical form. 
 
Owen-Smith et al (2009 and 2010) elicited arguments, and the justifications 
participants gave for these were presented and discussed. They found that nearly 
all patients wanted to know about rationing decisions and regarded implicit rationing 
as paternalistic. Werntoft et al (2007a and 2007b) categorised and analysed 
participants' reasoning. Quotations, including some arguments, were used to 
illustrate a number of categories. 
 
8.4 DISCUSSION 
 
Research into the ethical reasoning and arguments used by the general public in 
relation to their stated views, values and preferences regarding healthcare 
distribution and priority-setting is limited.  
 
Although the primary purpose of the studies reviewed was not to examine reasoning 
and arguments, a number of authors indicated their intention to explore arguments 
(McKie et al, 2009) and some described participants' arguments (Wilmot and 
Ratcliffe, 2002) and reasoning (Werntoft et al (2007a) or elicited ethical and social 
values (Bombard et al, 2011). While others reviewed the literature in an attempt to, 
for example, identify ethical reasons that underpin public views (Olsen et al, 2003) 
or to consider the reasoning behind public preferences regarding QALY-
maximisation (Dolan et al, 2005). It is not apparent that ethical arguments that 
underlie public responses regarding healthcare distribution have been subjected to 
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systematic examination. 
 
The notion of identifying responsibility for healthcare need as a priority-setting 
principle was not a focus of any of the articles reviewed. Although the literature 
review did not include 'responsibility'-related search terms, it was anticipated that 
any existing studies into public ethical arguments relating to this principle would 
emerge from within the existing search criteria. However, none did. 
 
This literature review demonstrates that various qualitative methods, using both 
individual and group-based approaches, have been used. These have included: 
focus groups (e.g. Dolan and Cookson, 2000; Block et al, 2001) and semi-structured 
interviews (e.g. Coast, 2001a; Dolan and Shaw, 2004). The findings indicate that 
qualitative studies have produced primarily descriptive accounts in which 
respondents' arguments are reported rather than being examined (e.g. Dolan and 
Cookson, 2000).  
 
Therefore, although attempts have been made to illustrate the ethical justifications 
for public preferences regarding healthcare distribution, the arguments used; their 
validity and underlying reasoning and premises – described as the 'missing link' 
between knowledge and action (Moore and Nelson, 2010) – do not appear to have 
been subjected to empirical analysis.  
 
Furthermore, there is no indication in the literature of ethical analysis being 
specifically applied to reasoning and arguments in relation to healthcare distribution 
issues. As Richardson and McKie (2005: 272) noted:  
 
The embryonic state of the economics literature on questions such as the 
elicitation of ethical preferences is a reflection of their neglect 
 
This review of the literature indicates that such an 'embryonic state' persists.  
 
The absence of such examination may reflect the perceived limitations of ethical 
inquiry and a belief that:  
 
…ethical questions are commonly considered to be better answered by appeal 
to theory rather than by practical testing (Jones, 2003: 348)  
 
However, empirical methods of research are becoming widespread in contemporary 
bioethics (Ashcroft 2003; Hasman, 2003; Borry et al, 2005; Myser, 2009; Harvey, 
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2011) and offer a practical response to such concerns (see Chapter 9).  
 
--------------------------------------- 
 
The concepts of ethical reasoning and ethical arguments provide scope for a 
detailed examination of what members of the public think about healthcare priority-
setting and have considerable advantages over other public participation 
approaches – particularly with regard to a potentially contentious proposal such as 
the incorporation of a 'responsibility' principle. 
 
Examining ethical reasoning and arguments demands a methodological approach 
that is sensitive to the often ill-defined nature of reasoning and argumentation and 
can enable reasoning and arguments to be understood in light of established ethical 
theory and principles whilst facilitating the production of justifiable outcomes via 
data analysis.  
 
Empirical ethics, a methodological approach that integrates ethics and empirical 
findings to reach a normative outcome, offers a means of achieving these aims, and 
is explored in the next chapter. 
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EXAMINING REASONING AND 
ARGUMENTS 
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9   EMPIRICAL ETHICS: A METHODOLOGICAL 
APPROACH 
 
 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter examines the concept of empirical ethics43 and its relationship to 
traditional approaches to ethical inquiry. Its applicability to the task of eliciting and 
analysing ethical reasoning and arguments is critically evaluated.  
 
9.2 APPROACHES TO ETHICAL INQUIRY 
 
Ethics is a branch of philosophy (moral philosophy) which, in its most basic and 
widely recognised expression, is concerned with establishing normative concepts of 
'right' and 'wrong' with regard to people's thoughts, decisions and actions (Driver, 
2007)44. Traditional ethical inquiry focuses on using a method of rational 
argumentation in the application of principles to tangible moral questions (often 
expressed as 'ethical dilemmas') and therefore provides a theoretical framework for 
examining the morality of thoughts, decisions and actions. This necessitates a 
process of moral evaluation, a rationalistic and deductive process, in which the 
background, justifications, values, etc. that underpin thoughts, decisions and actions 
are critically assessed with reference to established ethical theories and principles45. 
A range of ethical concepts may inform this process46.  
 
9.2.1 EXAMPLES OF ETHICAL CONCEPTS 
 
 Avoiding harm – possibly the most fundamental and readily appreciated ethical 
concept ('Above all do no harm' is a basic and widely recognised principle of 
medical ethics) 
 
                                               
43
 Evidence of the history and development of empirical ethics is mainly found within the philosophical literature.  
    However, as its application within this study is focused on a healthcare-related topic, this examination focuses  
    on the development and applications of empirical medical ethics and empirical bioethics which are presented   
    here as broadly analogous approaches 
44 'Right' and 'wrong' within a normative ethical context indicate the correct or incorrect moral norms for the   
    guidance and evaluation of conduct (Beauchamp and Childress, 2008) 
45 For example, why might it be claimed that an act is 'right' or 'wrong'? Who decides and in what context? Is an   
     assertion morally justifiable (via the application of ethical theories and principles)? Is it supported by objective  
     evidence or simply a matter of personal opinion? 
46
 Without such considered reasoning, ethical appraisal may be restricted to unsubstantiated, albeit familiar,  
    examples of 'moral evaluation' such as: "I think that's awful!" and "It should not be allowed!" etc.  
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 Moral obligations and duties – identifying moral rules (that impose ethical 
duties) assists in guiding decisions and actions 
 
 Assessing the consequences of actions – it may be claimed that the ethical 
acceptability of an act is most effectively determined by calculating its potential 
outcomes 
 
 Autonomy and rights – acknowledging individual choices and entitlements 
provides a basis for respecting others 
 
 Best interests – identifying and acting in accordance with the best interests of 
oneself or others as a basis for ethically justifying a decision or action 
 
 Values and beliefs – from which general ethical principles are formulated to 
guide decisions and actions 
 
9.2.2 NORMATIVE ETHICS 
 
A normative approach to ethical inquiry is evident when morally evaluative terms 
(such as 'right' and 'wrong') are applied to decisions and actions. Normative ethics 
typically gives rise to questions such as: "What is the 'right' thing to do?" or "Would it 
be 'wrong' to do X?" It is concerned with determining how people should act47 and 
with providing ethical guidance for action. The process by which normative 
evaluation is put into practice – 'applied ethics' – is concerned with applying 
established ethical theories and principles to specific situations so that general 
moral norms may be determined for particular circumstances (either in everyday life 
or within specific contexts such as healthcare). A popular and influential example of 
applied ethics is the 'four principles' approach to bioethics (see Chapter 5), 
incorporating the principles of respect for autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, 
and justice (Beauchamp and Childress, 2008). 
 
 
 
 
                                               
47
 'Should' is a commonly applied indicator of normative reasoning i.e. it may indicate a view on the right or wrong    
    way to act: You shouldn't do that; or represent an appeal for ethical guidance: Should we tell truth? 
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9.2.3 DESCRIPTIVE ETHICS 
 
An alternative approach to ethical inquiry is that of descriptive or comparative ethics, 
which is the study of people's moral conduct and beliefs. Descriptive ethics 
incorporates research from the fields of anthropology, psychology, sociology and 
history as part of the process of understanding what people either believe, or have 
believed, about moral norms. It is distinct from normative ethics in that, whereas a 
normative approach considers standards for the rightness and wrongness of actions 
and how people ought to act, a descriptive approach seeks to empirically investigate 
how people reason and act. Its aim is to establish what factually or conceptually is 
the case, not what ethically ought to be the case (Borry et al, 2005; Beauchamp and 
Childress, 2008) and has therefore been used by researchers seeking empirical 
evidence of how people behave morally i.e. to describe ethics and ethical behaviour 
rather than to determine what is right48. Although a descriptive ethics approach does 
not seek to identify moral norms, it is an important constituent of a focused empirical 
ethics approach (see below). 
 
9.2.4 NORMATIVE OR DESCRIPTIVE? 
 
Normative and descriptive ethics therefore offer different approaches to ethical 
inquiry. One is chiefly prescriptive and seeks to identify moral norms by applying 
theoretical concepts to real-life situations and the other is concerned with examining 
how people behave ethically. However, the distinction between the two approaches 
is possibly over-simplistic (Haimes, 2002). For example: 
 
When sociologists and other social scientists study how doctors, nurses, 
patients (and other people beyond the medical setting) make decisions which 
involve an ethical dimension they find that: 'a rigorous separation of the 
descriptive and the normative is practically untenable' (Hedgecoe, 2004: 131) 
 
The blurring of the boundaries between the two approaches is perhaps 
understandable as the moral evaluation of people's thoughts and decisions may 
also prompt consideration of their actual moral conduct.  Furthermore, the 
separation of normative and descriptive approaches is unhelpful to an examination 
of an ethically significant topic that seeks to produce empirical results. 
                                               
48 A descriptive ethics approach has been used to investigate issues such as the ethical problems encountered by  
    people living with AIDS (Cameron, 1993); professional attitudes towards specific  aspects of healthcare practice  
    (Dreyer et al, 2010) and the adequacy of the informed consent process within a hospital setting (Barnett et al,  
    2008)  
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9.2.5 MORAL RELATIVISM 
 
Applied ethical reasoning is generally founded on a belief that there are objective, 
universally applicable, moral standards that can be applied to actual situations in 
order to determine a normative outcome. An alternative relativist claim is that there 
are no objective moral standards; only standards that apply within cultures, groups, 
societies etc. Therefore, a 'true' statement concerning morality cannot be said to be 
a statement of facts, it is merely a statement expressing the values held by a 
specific culture, group etc. (Lukes, 2008). From a relativist viewpoint, perceptions of 
right and wrong are based only on one's social, cultural, religious etc. background 
i.e. approaches to morality are 'relative' to the particular culture, group, society or 
individual from which they emerge. However, whilst acknowledging the relativist 
perspective, this study seeks to explore the social implications of incorporating a 
'responsibility' criterion into healthcare distribution, and is therefore founded on a 
belief that ethical agreement (or at least understanding) can be achieved via the 
acknowledgement of some common principles – many of which can (or should) be 
universally applicable. 
 
9.3 ETHICS AND HEALTHCARE 
 
Although effective treatment is a priority for both healthcare providers and patients, 
it is generally acknowledged that the provision of 'good healthcare' is also 
dependent upon its ethical components, which demands consideration of issues 
such as respect, confidentiality, trust and rights. Ethics and ethical inquiry are as 
concerned with the ordinary aspects of healthcare as with its less common, 
although frequently challenging, features49.  
 
The provision of healthcare gives rise to a broad range of fundamental ethical 
questions concerning, for instance, its aims: do healthcare services exist principally 
to do 'good' or avoid 'harm'?50 Or, with regard to individual entitlements: do all 
citizens have an equal 'right' to healthcare? Perhaps the primary purpose of 
healthcare is to help or assist people – an ethical process in itself. At a societal 
level, deliberation of the 'big' healthcare ethical issues, such as abortion, euthanasia 
                                               
49 Although controversial healthcare issues are regularly highlighted within the media, the 'ethical debate' often  
    generates more passion than clarification 
50
 Obviously, neither concept ('good' or 'harm') is amenable to simple definition within a healthcare context 
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and the allocation of limited resources is underpinned by broader meta-ethical 
concerns regarding the value of human life and how it should be lived.  
 
9.3.1 MEDICAL ETHICS AND BIOETHICS 
  
The application of ethical analysis (both in terms of normative and descriptive 
approaches) to healthcare issues increased significantly in the second half of the 
twentieth century51. Technological advances that challenged traditional medical 
knowledge and practice were accompanied by changes in social attitudes and an 
increased awareness and acknowledgement of patient autonomy, rights and justice. 
Innovations such as dialysis and kidney transplantation, artificial respiration, 
resuscitation techniques, and prenatal diagnosis extended the range of available 
treatment options and increased the number of potential 'ethical dilemmas' within 
healthcare. 
 
The increasingly widespread application of ethical thinking to healthcare issues in 
the late twentieth century encouraged the expansion of the essentially analogous 
analytical disciplines of medical ethics and bioethics. Each has supposedly distinct 
characteristics. For example, medical ethics is founded within the field of applied 
ethics and is concerned with the study of moral values and judgments as they apply 
to medical practice, research and policy, whereas bioethics is concerned with 
morally evaluating critical aspects of healthcare provision (technological 
developments, abortion, euthanasia etc.). Borry et al (2005: 56-57) described the 
development of the bioethics discipline:  
 
Initially, people from many different disciplines, such as medicine, law, 
theology, biological sciences, social sciences, philosophy, humanities, etc. 
entered the dialogue. However, in a process of professionalisation and 
institutionalisation, the bioethical discussions quickly became anchored in the 
fields of theology and philosophy 
 
Both medical ethics and bioethics are frequently used to describe the application of 
ethical thinking to aspects of healthcare provision as each involves: 
 
                                               
51 "A turning point in medical ethics is widely agreed to have occurred after the Second World War, although  
    explanations for this vary. They include: the medical atrocities of the Nazi doctors; changing social attitudes,  
    including less deference to authority; more assertive attitudes to individual rights and self-determination; a shift  
    from the preoccupation of medical ethics with the individual patient at the expense of the community; the  
    increasing plurality of cultural and religious norms within some nations, including the UK; and the development of  
    a system of internationally recognised human rights" (British Medical Association, 2004: 4) 
 
 119 
 
…the self-critical application of modes of moral reasoning, in the form of ethical 
theory or fundamental moral principles, to questions raised by the biomedical 
sciences (Green, 1990: 180) 
 
9.4 EMPIRICAL ETHICS 
 
During the 1970's published work in medical ethics consisted either of 
theoretical discussions of ethical concepts or analysis of individual case 
discussions. During the late 1980's, as medical ethics caught the interest of an 
increasing number of academic physicians, a new form of ethics paper began 
to appear. These works, rather than emphasizing the theoretical methods of 
theologians or philosophers, used the empirical methods of social scientists and 
especially clinical epidemiologists (Arnold and Forrow, 1993: 195) 
 
Empirical ethics represents an emerging feature of ethical activity within both 
academic and professional healthcare arenas. An empirical ethics approach seeks 
to substantiate the philosophical basis for ethical inquiry and ethical 
pronouncements by integrating theoretical ethics and empirical research. It uses 
ethical theory to explore data in order to reach a normative conclusion with respect 
to a specific feature of social practice (Molewijk et al, 2004)52. Ashcroft (2003: 3) 
provided the following concise clarification of the empirical ethics process, indicating 
how the theoretical and empirical components combine. 
 
….theorists seek to frame hypothetical imperatives (on the assumption that p is 
true, do X) and to supply the empirical, contingent information (p is true) which 
will complete the hypothetical imperative, thus specifying what ought to be done  
 
Traditionally, ethical inquiry and empirical approaches have distinct objectives: 
ethics is primarily a prescriptive discipline, concerned with conceptual clarification 
and normative justification, and the social sciences represent a more descriptive 
discipline that emphasises the cultural setting and is concerned with empirical 
description, reconstruction, and analysis. Empirical ethics acknowledges the 
symbiotic nature of theoretical and empirical methods; it refutes what has been 
termed "the structural incompatibility" between the empirical description and 
analysis of the social sciences and the conceptual clarification and normative 
approach of ethics, and is undertaken in recognition of their basic complementarity 
(Zussman, 2000). 
 
                                               
52
 The question of whether something should be considered as 'right' or 'wrong' is undoubtedly a philosophical,  
     rather than empirical issue. However, such normative evaluation (determining 'right' and 'wrong') is not the  
     defining role of empirical ethics 
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The rationale for employing an empirical ethics approach is the desire to make 
effective moral judgements as opposed to theoretical moral pronouncements. 
Ordinarily, to assign normative status to empirical descriptions i.e. to seek to derive 
an 'ought' from an 'is', is to commit the 'naturalistic fallacy' (Holm, 1997). However, 
empirical ethics, it is claimed, seeks to do this – to use the actualities of lived 
experience to determine normative, value-based judgements that indicate how 
people should act (Hedgecoe, 2004). It therefore seeks to eliminate the meta-ethical 
distinction (between 'is' and 'ought) that has traditionally created a natural border 
between the social sciences and ethics approaches (Borry et al, 2005). 
 
Hedgecoe (2004) highlighted the historical differences between bioethics and the 
social sciences and referred to a 'critical bioethics' approach to aligning the 
disciplines; outlining some of the traditional/historical difficulties that may have 
impeded the development of empirical bioethics. The role of critical bioethics in 
identifying the framework within which ethical issues are identified and analysed, 
Hedgecoe argued, is dependent on bioethicists and social scientists recognising 
and embracing the value of each other's discipline. Hedgecoe also noted that 
identifying what counts as an ethical problem is, in the first place, a socially 
constructed concept. A significant aspect of a critical bioethics approach is therefore 
concerned with acknowledging how the social sciences can actively contribute to 
bioethical inquiry and recognising where the apparently diverse approaches 
complement one another and, in places, correspondence. For example, that the 
'is/ought' distinction (referred to above) is a concept assumed by bioethicists: 
"…while social science research suggests that at the very least such an idea needs 
more support (ibid: 126).  
 
The contribution of the social sciences to ethical inquiry was examined by Haimes 
(2002) who noted that the social sciences have a longstanding theoretical interest in 
analysing the role of ethics and ethical thinking in explanations of social change, 
social organisation and social action. The value of empirical ethics to social 
scientists is, it is argued, that combining theoretical and empirical work enables 
them [social scientists] to: "…enquire further into the social processes that lie behind 
the very designation of certain matters as being `ethical issues'" (ibid: 89). The 
potential outcome to be achieved by aligning these complementary approaches to 
inquiry is empirical findings that are of value to both disciplines separately and in 
combination. 
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The emergence of empirical ethics, both within healthcare and beyond, has 
occurred in line with the requirement for 'scientific substantiation' of research studies 
and the identification of the appropriate evidence-base to support research findings. 
This has had a direct influence on the practice of bioethics and provided a 
pragmatic basis for the growth in empirical ethics – researchers interested in 
medical ethics need to find ways in which their work can be assessed and funded 
(Hope, 1999). In addition, many clinical ethicists and bioethicists come from a 
background in the empirical social sciences – from within the medical or nursing 
professions for example – rather than from a philosophy and theology background. 
They are accustomed to the processes and requirements of empirical exploration 
and the need to provide demonstrable, evidence-based outcomes.  
 
9.4.1  COMPARISON WITH TRADITIONAL APPROACHES 
 
Traditional approaches to ethical inquiry have relied on establishing a theoretical 
basis for establishing a normative or descriptive conclusion. The relationship of the 
theoretical findings to empirical evidence has been generally slight and/or 
undervalued. If conventional ethical enquiry is enhanced by empirical input, this is 
mostly an 'unintended and unavoidable outcome', described by De Vries and 
Subedi (1998: xvii) as a "sociological version of the bioethical idea of double 
effect"53. 
As medical ethics/bioethics has advanced it has gradually adopted additional 
features of ethical inquiry such as narrative ethics (which places a particular 
emphasis on the empirical aspects of the issue under consideration54) (Zaner, 
2004), and feminist ethics55. The application of these additional ethical strategies 
has served to broaden the scope of traditional ethical analysis and has inspired 
increasingly diverse approaches, encouraging ethicists (and others) to engage in 
                                               
53
 The doctrine of double effect may be used to morally justify an action that causes a serious harm, such as the  
    death of a patient, as a side effect of promoting some good end. For example, a potential harm' such as the  
    death of a patient' is morally permissible if it is foreseen as a possible side effect (or 'double effect') of bringing  
    about a good result, such as pain relief; the harm being a foreseen (although unintended) side-effect of the good  
    act. For the doctrine to apply, the 'bad' outcome must not be the means of achieving the 'good' act i.e. if the only  
    way analgesia relieves pain is by killing the patient, the doctrine does not apply 
54
 Narrative ethics focuses on personal identity through the content of stories (what people say) and through the  
    analysis of the stories' form (how stories are told and why it matters to the individual or group) (Charon and  
    Montello, 2002) 
55 Feminist ethics challenges the traditional foundations of ethical inquiry – which emphasise what may be 
    regarded as masculine cultural traits such as dealing in abstract principles and analytical reasoning – and   
    promotes the view that ethical inquiry is best understood from a perspective that focuses on more 'feminine'  
    cultural traits such as emotion, trust and compassion (Card, 1991). One's approach to moral reasoning (and the  
    ethics of care) therefore, is inseparable from these traits and from the contextual circumstances and experiences  
    within relationships (Gilligan, 1982; Kuhse et al, 1998, Green, 2012). [See also: Chapter 2: 'Relational   
    autonomy'] 
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more holistic ethical inquiry. Ashcroft (2003:5) outlined three phases of the history of 
medical ethics:  
 
…a phase in which medical ethics was an internal part of the discourse and 
self-understanding of the medical profession; a phase in which this self-
understanding is problematized and made a topic for reflection in philosophical 
terms; and (the most recent) a phase in which analytical methods exhaust 
themselves and are supplemented by various other truth-producing strategies 
labelled 'empirical' 
 
Hedgecoe (2004: 130) highlighting the need for a more 'critical bioethics' 
summarised the chief problems of the traditional bioethics model (as viewed from a 
social science perspective): 
 
 Bioethics, founded on philosophy, gives a dominant role to idealised, rational 
thought 
 
 It tends to position individuals as the sole judge in ethical decision- making, 
in that it relegates social and cultural aspects to the status of at best, curios, 
and worst irrelevancies 
 
 The applied ethics model assumes that social reality cleaves down neat 
philosophical lines, with theoretical categories matching those in social 
reality: i.e. that what a philosopher says is the doctor-patient relationship 
actually represents the relationship between doctors and their patients in all 
settings. Consequently, bioethics does not have the right tools to resolve 
substantive moral problems, external to these categories themselves 
 
Although moral evaluation and ethical sensitivity are essential to determining what is 
'good' healthcare provision (in its various manifestations), theoretical ethics and 
ethical inquiry are often seen as somewhat disconnected from the actual 
experiences of healthcare professionals and patients, insensitive to specific clinical 
situations and unable to adequately incorporate the complexities of diseases and 
the contexts in which ethical problems arise (ten Have and Lelie, 1998). Theoretical 
ethical inquiry, it may therefore be believed, is too abstract, too speculative, and too 
dogmatic to be of practical assistance to empirical examination. This conceptual gap 
has served to isolate ethics and ethical inquiry from healthcare practice; it 
undermines the validity of its claims, and reduces its contribution to policy debates 
concerning important ethical issues.  
Conventional ethical inquiry can offer only theoretical and, by their very nature 
hypothetical, rules and principles upon which to appraise a particular topic. An 
increasing awareness of the need for 'real-life' ethics, and for ethical inquiry to be 
located more strongly within the actualities of healthcare practice and patients' 
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experience, has led to the emergence of the 'empirical turn' in healthcare 
ethics/bioethics (Borry et al, 2005) and, as the concept has developed, calls for 
greater empirical ethics activity in relation to healthcare and associated topics have 
increased (Hope, 1999; Molewijk et al, 2004; Richardson and McKie, 2005).   
 
The application of empirical ethics to healthcare situations reflects an increasing 
awareness that the foundations for ethical analysis of most healthcare and 
healthcare-related issues lie within the details of real-life events concerning real 
people with individual experiences and discrete preferences. There are inevitable 
differences, for example, between the approaches used in theoretical medical ethics 
to analyse problems, and the realities of 'hands-on' ethical reasoning that occurs in 
clinical practice. An example provided by Hope (1999: 219) explains how, within 
healthcare settings, the rationale for seeking the morally 'right' action is intrinsically 
linked to matters demanding empirical evaluation: 
 
One reason, for example, why doctors should keep patient information 
confidential is in order to foster patient trust and ensure that appropriate help is 
sought. And yet the effect of specific breaches of confidentiality is an empirical 
issue. Medical ethics has been shaped by empirical facts 
 
A constructive ethical examination of such events cannot be undertaken by 
reference to theoretical concepts and principles alone; it must be grounded within 
the actualities of the situation and in consideration of, for example, the possible 
consequences of action or inaction.  
 
Empirical ethics potentially offers the means to examine and resolve substantive 
moral problems. However, this does not imply that theoretical ethical inquiry is a 
meaningless endeavour. Ethical theories and principles guide actions and 
substantiate good judgement. They arise out of the practical contexts and 
dilemmas, and theory and practice, as Frith (2012: 201) observed: "are symbiotically 
related". 
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9.4.2 EXAMPLES OF EMPIRICAL ETHICS STUDIES 
 
The application of empirical research and data in bioethical inquiry has been 
demonstrated in a broad range of studies in which a variety of methods – both 
quantitative and qualitative – have been employed, for example: 
 
Levitt (2003) used an analysis of public consultation to raise questions about the 
role of the public in decision making about genetics and health care. The author 
applied ethical analysis and an exploration of available findings (large-scale surveys 
of opinion, consensus conferences and focus groups) to respond to the (ethical) 
question of whether the public should be consulted on important ethical issues in 
science and technology. This study  demonstrated the application of 'empirical 
ethics' in relation to the process of utilising social science data to explore a specific 
ethical question. 
 
Hasman (2003) offered a more reflective approach to an empirical ethics approach 
by examining the use of social science methodology in ethical explorations of 
priority setting in healthcare. The author explored values applied in priority-setting 
decisions and considered the weight that specific ethical values carry towards such 
decisions and how different reasons are balanced and traded against each other in 
the decision-making process. Empirical methods were reviewed and their 
applicability and efficacy discussed in relation to their adequacy as methods in 
empirical ethics. The author concluded that: "…a combination method is needed to 
give a comprehensive representation of values in priority setting and thus to meet 
the overall objectives of empirical ethics (ibid: 41). 
 
Alexander and Wynia (2008) provided an indication of what an empirical ethics 
methodology, in a more practical sense, may look like. The authors examined what 
they termed "the dynamic interplay" between the quantitative nature of surveys and 
the normative theories that survey data seek to inform. The authors illustrated the 
components of an empirical ethics survey and gave examples of key elements of 
such a survey's design, administration, and analysis. They pointed out some 
common-sense, but essential, ethical requirements such as the need to ensure that 
the wording of questions is clear "because the issues under study are often 
complex, conceptually inchoate, and/or sensitive or controversial" (ibid:157). They 
concluded that surveys are an effective method to inform bioethics, clinical practice, 
and health policy. 
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9.4.3 A PROCEDURAL ATTITUDE 
 
The preceding examples of empirical ethics studies indicate that the term has been 
used in a variety of ways to describe the methodological approach applied and 
demonstrate that, in its overarching function, empirical ethics is not a methodology 
in itself – it is not a way of 'doing ethics' – but that it is a basic procedural attitude to 
use the findings from empirical research in ethical reflection and decision-making. It 
represents a broad classification of ethical inquiry; encompassing different 
interpretations of combining ethics and empirical research or of attempting to 
integrate the two.  
 
Unlike studies of ethical dilemmas solely undertaken in light of established ethical 
theories and principles, empirical ethics (utilising, for instance, interviews, case 
studies and participatory observation) focuses on 'ethics-in-action'. At its heart is the 
need to substantiate what may otherwise be claimed to be simply theoretical 
reflections on a particular issue. 
 
An empirical ethics approach, in addition to introducing an empirical element into 
ethical inquiry places emphasis on the normative and descriptive ethics approaches 
described earlier.  
 
Although an empirical ethics approach is reliant on being able to evaluate an 
empirical fact in light of theoretical ethical considerations, it is not simply the case 
that ethical principles or concepts are conveniently linked to the empirical data. It is 
essential that there is integration of data with ethical theory/principles with the aim of 
enhancing ethical findings: 
 
Empirical findings contribute more than just descriptive information to which the 
ethicist applies their theories. They contribute to our very understanding of the 
principles themselves (Frith, 2012: 202) 
 
While empirical data cannot in itself resolve moral questions, it is helpful – in terms 
of gaining meaningful ethical knowledge – to discover how, for example, people 
interpret ethical norms, pronouncements and judgements and what they think about 
the issues and questions that lie at the heart of ethical inquiry. Of particular interest 
is how people approach ethical decision making when faced with complex practical 
questions (Wainwright et al, 2010).  
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Empirical ethics therefore enables ethical arguments to be explored via empirical 
investigation and would provide an appropriate 'procedural attitude' for undertaking 
the elicitation and analysis of ethical reasoning and arguments. The examination of 
reasoning and arguments in light of an empirical ethics approach would enable 
empirical verification of normative claims about public views, values and 
preferences concerning healthcare distribution. A fundamental aim would be to 
provide insight into the relationship between empirical data and ethical theories and 
principles by adhering to a methodological attitude that allows the integration of 
empirical information in ethical reflection and decision-making (Borry et al 2005).  
 
--------------------------------------- 
 
In order to effectively elicit ethical reasoning and arguments, and to subject data to 
meaningful and productive analysis, it is contended that a qualitative methodology, 
informed by an empirical ethics approach should be employed. This would entail 
adherence to the standards and requirements of qualitative research – in terms of 
data collection and analysis – with an emphasis, within data analysis, on exploring 
its relationship to a normative and descriptive ethical framework.  
 
How this could be effectively achieved is examined in the next chapter, in which a 
detailed proposal for a research study, guided by an empirical ethics methodology, 
is presented. 
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10  EXAMINING ETHICAL ARGUMENTS: A 
RESEARCH PROPOSAL 
 
 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The preceding chapters of this thesis have examined healthcare distribution and 
priority-setting – using the QALY approach as an exemplar of distributional practice 
– and have examined the possibility of incorporating a 'responsibility principle' into 
priority-setting. It has been established that, in order to effectively inform the current 
policy context, such a potentially divisive proposition demands a clear, evidence-
based account of the public's views. It has therefore been determined that, in order 
to achieve this, the ethical reasoning and arguments that underpin members of the 
public's views, values and preferences in relation to a 'responsibility principle', 
should be elicited and analysed. 
 
This chapter describes a detailed hypothetical proposal for a research study to 
examine this hypothesis56. The proposal is presented as a discrete stand-alone 
study that would effectively link with the overall aims pursued in this thesis. 
 
10.2 PURPOSE OF THE PROPOSED STUDY 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine ethical reasoning and arguments used by 
members of the general public to explain and defend their views, values and 
preferences in relation to identifying responsibility for healthcare need as a 
healthcare priority-setting and, by implication, QALY-weighting principle.  
 
It is hoped that its findings will complement and assist the interpretation of existing 
evidence of the public's views, inform the current policy context and contribute to 
the wider debate on how responsibility for healthcare need may influence healthcare 
priority-setting. 
 
Members of the public will be recruited to the study and participant data will be 
elicited via semi-structured interviews and focus groups. Data will be subjected to 
two phases of analysis: data coding and ethical analysis. The aim of data analysis 
                                               
56
 Although this is presented as a discrete proposal, reference is made to the preceding chapters of this thesis  
    where appropriate 
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will be to determine the nature and validity of arguments applied, identifying the 
reasoning and evaluative strategies participants have used in support of their 
arguments, and to subject reasoning and arguments to critical ethical scrutiny.  
 
Fundamentally, this study is an ethical inquiry that seeks to explore the tension 
between empirical evidence and ethics (Borry et al, 2005) by applying an empirical 
ethics methodology that integrates theoretical ethical inquiry with empirical research 
(Molewijk et al, 2004). The study is explorative and interpretive; it employs a 
qualitative design and applies a grounded theory approach. 
 
In consideration of the often misperceived aims of traditional (non-empirical) 
normative or descriptive ethical inquiry, it important to note what this study is not 
intended to achieve. Its primary focus is not on peoples' conclusions about the 
ethics of priority-setting or the (moral) 'rights' and 'wrongs' of incorporating a 
'responsibility principle', but on the resources and evaluative processes members of 
the public use to develop and express their points of view. Furthermore, although 
the evaluation of alternatives may be utilised within data collection, the study is not 
examining how participants evaluate, or rank alternatives. Neither is the study 
seeking to identify a broad socio-ethical consensus57 i.e. it is not intended that its 
findings will reveal the 'public's view' on how scarce health care resources should be 
allocated; it is concerned with examining reasoning and arguments rather than 
soliciting opinion. 
 
Although it is anticipated that the findings of this study will inform the broad policy 
context in relation to priority-setting, particularly in light of the demands for 
increased involvement of the public in policy formation, it is not intended that it will 
directly influence policy. It is acknowledged that public opinion does not always 
direct policy/practice and that there is not always a direct link between public 
opinion and policy formation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
57
 It is anticipated however, that data analysis will highlight issues of consensus and disagreement 
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10.3 RATIONALE 
 
This study is founded on the belief that: 
 
- Issues concerning the distribution of healthcare resources are fundamentally 
of ethical significance 
- Public participation is increasingly recognised as an important factor in 
healthcare policy and the lack of research into the public's ethical arguments 
is at variance with this 
- Understanding public views, values and preferences regarding healthcare 
priority-setting and the 'responsibility principle' cannot be achieved solely via 
surveys of public opinion, descriptions of preferences or by philosophical 
reflection. It demands the systematic examination of the underlying ethical 
reasoning and arguments. 
 
The foundations of public views, values and preferences must be understood if 
public participation in healthcare distribution decisions is to be enhanced and if 
public views are to effectively inform policy discussions. The rationale for the study 
therefore is the need to improve the link between theoretical arguments and 
empirical results in order to gain a better understanding of what members of the 
public think about healthcare priority-setting and the concept of a 'responsibility 
principle'. 
 
Within the healthcare distribution/priority-setting literature, there is considerable 
evidence of the professional voice and related arguments. However, although 
attempts have been made to elicit ethical values and describe ethical justifications 
for public preferences regarding how healthcare is distributed (see Chapter 8) there 
has been a lack of research specifically aimed at systematically examining 
members of the public's ethical arguments i.e. their validity and underlying 
reasoning and premises, in relation to healthcare distribution, priority-setting or the 
incorporation of a 'responsibility principle'. In fact, in terms of examining public 
views, values and preferences, there is no evidence of empirical studies aimed at 
distinguishing ethically based considerations from prejudices in this area (Olsen et 
al, 2003). 
 
Given the increasing focus on social and ethical issues in the healthcare distribution 
literature; the on-going public debate on rationing medical treatment; the need for 
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more evidence to inform ethical and policy debates regarding healthcare distribution 
and priority-setting – such as those relating to the 'responsibility principle' – and the 
paucity and limitations of previous studies, there is a need for the systematic 
investigation of the authenticity of people's views, values and preferences, and the 
identification of empirically-based and ethically-defensible social objectives in 
relation to these issues. This, it is contended, demands the critical examination of 
public views that exposes and analyses their underlying ethical reasoning and 
argumentation. 
 
It is anticipated that by offering lay participants an opportunity to engage with the 
conflicts and complexity of healthcare priority-setting, the findings of this study will 
complement and assist the interpretation of existing evidence of public opinion, 
inform the current policy context and contribute to the wider debate on how 
responsibility for healthcare need may influence priority-setting. The study findings 
will hopefully stimulate further research activity. 
 
10.4 RESEARCH QUESTION(S)  
 
The study will seek to answer the following research question: 
 
What are the ethical arguments that underpin the views, values and 
preferences of members of the public when asked to consider 
responsibility for healthcare need as a healthcare priority-setting 
principle?  
 
This question has  generated sub-questions that provide a clear link to data 
generation and analysis (Churchill and Sanders, 2007) and provide additional value 
and authority to the study: 
 
 What are the processes of ethical reasoning and moral evaluation used by 
members of the public to explain and defend their views, values and 
preferences?   
 Which ethical principles and theories and concepts are used to underpin 
participants' responses, and are some moral concepts dominant? 
 Are attempts made to synthesise different ethical approaches?  
 Are valid arguments applied – defined by either their logical structure or 
coherence? 
 How do participants seek to resolve both logical and ethical conflicts, 
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inconsistencies and contradictions in their responses? 
 Are views, values and preferences contradicted or rejected in response to 
contrasting prioritisation strategies? 
 Are moral distinctions made between types of 'self-inflicted' ill-health?  
 
10.5 RESEARCH AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
 
10.5.1 AIMS 
 
 To examine the ethical arguments that underpin the views, values and 
preferences of members of the public when considering responsibility for 
healthcare need as a possible healthcare priority-setting principle  
 To produce empirical evidence that will contribute to the existing knowledge-
base and, by complementing, enhancing and assisting the interpretation of 
existing evidence, inform the current policy context and the wider debate on 
healthcare priority-setting and the incorporation of a 'responsibility principle' 
 
10.5.2 OBJECTIVES 
  
 To elicit the views, values and preferences of members of the public 
regarding responsibility for healthcare need as a possible healthcare priority-
setting principle 
 To examine processes of ethical reasoning and moral evaluation  
 To examine the ethical nature and validity of arguments 
 To review existing sources of evidence by undertaking systematic reviews of 
academic literature concerning: (i) the elicitation of the views, values and 
preferences of members of the public regarding healthcare priority-setting in 
relation to responsibility for healthcare need and, (ii) the identification of 
moral reasoning and ethical argumentation used by members of the public in 
response to the distribution of healthcare 
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10.6 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
10.6.1 A QUALITATIVE APPROACH 
 
The broad scope of this study is innovative and a clear choice of methodology did 
not immediately suggest itself. A review of empirical ethics research was 
undertaken to inform the methodology (Bjørn et al, 1999; Richard et al, 2005; 
Schildmann et al, 2006; Van der Vorm et al; 2009). 
 
Although a quantitative approach enables public views to be identified, it is most 
appropriate for generating data across statistically representative samples of the 
population (Coast, 1999). Therefore, to effectively elicit, identify and explore 
participants' reasoning and arguments this study will employ a qualitative design 
and apply a Grounded Theory approach to data collection and analysis (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967; Charmaz, 2006), which will be undertaken via semi-structured 
interviews, focus groups and thematic analysis.  
 
Qualitative research emphasises words rather than quantification in the collection 
and analysis of data (Bryman, 2008). It allows the researcher to "get at participants' 
inner experiences, to determine how meanings are formed" (Corbin and Strauss, 
2008:12) and focuses is on the why and how of decision making rather than simply 
what, where, when. Hence, smaller but focused samples are more often needed 
than large samples. Qualitative studies are grounded in a philosophical position that 
is broadly 'interpretivist', in the sense that they are generally concerned with how the 
social world is interpreted, understood, experienced or produced (Ritchie and Lewis, 
2003).  
 
A potential weakness of qualitative methods is their vulnerability to accusations in 
relation to subjectivity and the representativeness of participants. With regard to 
subjectivity, the (relatively) small number of participants and potentially large bodies 
of data, pose a risk of both participants and data being selected that support a 
particular pre-determined view, making it problematic for an external observer to tell 
if or to what extent this may have occurred, leading to questions such as "whose 
perceptions are really being described in the findings?" This, plus the potential for 
the researcher to lose objectivity due to the nature of analysis involved, is managed 
by ensuring data trustworthiness (Morrow, 2005) (see below). The 
representativeness of participants is not the prime requirement when the objective is 
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understanding social processes: 
 
In qualitative investigations, researchers are not so much interested in how 
representative their participants are of the larger population. The concern is 
more about concepts and looking for incidents that shed light on them. And in 
regard to concepts, researchers are looking for variation, not sameness. 
Variation is especially important in theory building because it increases the 
broadness of concepts and scope of the theory (Corbin and Strauss, 2008: 156) 
 
10.6.2 GROUNDED THEORY 
 
Grounded Theory (Strauss and Corbin, 1990; Charmaz, 2006) is particularly 
appropriate for exploring areas where there is little existing knowledge on which to 
base hypotheses (Greenhalgh and Taylor, 1997; Mason, 2002). It is a comparative, 
iterative and interactive method that aims to develop theory that is 'grounded' in 
data. It is an inductive strategy58 for generating and confirming theory that emerges 
from close involvement and direct contact with the empirical world (Patton, 2002). It 
also allows for contextual sensitivity and interpretation (Strauss and Corbin, 1990) 
and for differences in participants' responses to be viewed as a source of data 
richness and deeper understanding of emerging concepts (Priest et al, 2001). 
 
Grounded Theory involves specific techniques of data collection and analysis that 
ensure rigour and comprehensiveness. These include concurrent data collection 
and analysis; subjecting data to constant comparative analysis as additional data 
are collected (Straus and Corbin, 1998), and the use of a coding paradigm to 
ensure conceptual development and density (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). Data 
analysis aims to discover dominant themes and later generate a conceptual 
framework that underpins the emerging theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). This 
approach was selected because of the limited nature of existing knowledge of the 
reasoning and arguments used by the public in relation to healthcare priority-setting 
and the 'responsibility principle'. 
 
10.6.3 COMBINING QUALITATIVE METHODS 
 
Data collection will be achieved through semi-structured interviews and focus 
groups. A decision to combine qualitative methods has been made in order to 
                                               
58 Induction is the process of estimating the validity of observations of part of a class of facts as evidence for a   
    proposition about the whole class i.e. a conclusion reached by this process. In inductive reasoning, the 
    conclusion, although supported by the premises, does not necessarily follow from them (Glaser and Strauss,   
    1967).  
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increase the richness of data and facilitate data confirmation (Lambert and Loiselle, 
2008).  
 
A mixed method approach will help to identify the extent to which issues are 
delineated and interpreted and it is anticipated that each method will reveal 
complementary data. For example, interviews provide an opportunity for detailed 
investigation of personal perspectives of complex and potentially sensitive issues 
(Ritchie and Lewis, 2003; Kvale, 2007), whereas focus group discussions, which 
emphasise group interaction and the joint construction of meaning (Block et al, 
2001; Bryman, 2008; Abelson et al, 2009), can help participants to explore and 
clarify their views in ways that would be less achievable within a one-to-one 
interview (Webb and Kevern, 2000). Combining or overlapping qualitative 
approaches thereby contributes to enhanced understanding and will potentially 
increase the depth and trustworthiness of the study's findings (Barbour, 1998; 
Farmer et al, 2006; Lambert and Loiselle, 2008). Qualitative method triangulation – 
generating complementary views of a concept or phenomenon – is increasingly 
advocated and is one of the principal ways of 'validating' qualitative research 
evidence (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003).  
 
Within this 'mixed methods' approach, focus groups and interviews may be 
conducted in a pre-determined sequence or may be undertaken in no particular 
order according to the aims of data collection. For example, researchers may obtain 
interview data and use focus groups to follow-up or confirm their findings 
(Wackerbarth et al, 2002) or undertake focus groups followed by semi-structured 
interviews (Coast, 2001a; Litva et al, 2002). For the purpose of this study, it is 
proposed that semi-structured interviews will precede focus groups so that the focus 
groups may explore issues emerging from interview data. 
 
It is anticipated that findings from both methods will corroborate one another but 
data sets from both approaches will not be regarded as equivalent i.e. it is not 
intended to reveal or imply a hierarchy of evidence, where one method is claimed to 
yield more accurate findings than the other (Barbour, 1998). 
 
Data analysis will identify and interpret processes by which participants' views, 
values, preferences, reasoning and arguments emerge according to each method. 
Although interviews may allow systematic exploration, focus groups may not allow 
the exploration of all questions and may therefore provide a more partial picture. For 
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example, characteristics discussed in one group may not be discussed in another 
group. Therefore, in the analysis stage, group conversations will not be considered 
separately However, when focus group data are considered together, summarised 
and compared with individual interview data, a more 'complete' picture of themes 
across groups will hopefully be obtained. It is intended that trustworthiness will be 
increased by this 'data convergence', enabling corroboration of views, values, 
preferences, reasoning and arguments across the methods. 
 
10.6.4 DATA COLLECTION 
 
Data collection will be undertaken in two sequential phases:  
 
10.6.4.1 PHASE ONE (PILOT STUDY) 
 
The aims of the first phase of data collection (the pilot study) will be to demonstrate 
the feasibility of data collection and analysis by i) testing the design of the interview 
and focus group processes, including participant recruitment and engagement and 
the design and functionality of the pre-prepared interview guide and focus group 
questions, and ii) subjecting data obtained to the process of analysis outlined below.  
 
One-to-one semi-structured interviews with a small sample of members of the 
general public (it is anticipated that no more than ten interviews will be conducted 
for this phase of data collection) and one focus group consisting of approximately 
eight to ten members of the public, will be conducted. Interviews and the focus 
group will be audio-recorded, transcribed and analysed. 
 
Evaluation of phase one of the study will inform the next phase of data collection. 
 
10.6.4.2 PHASE TWO 
 
Semi-structured interviews will be conducted with a larger sample of members of 
the public. Interviews will be conducted until interview data achieves 'saturation' i.e. 
a point where additional interviews would give rise to minimal new perspectives or 
concepts (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). Data analysis will be undertaken concurrent 
with the interviews and it will therefore be possible to identify a point at which 
saturation is achieved.  
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Interviewees will be asked if they are willing to take part in a subsequent focus 
group. The number of focus groups held will be determined in accordance with the 
requirement for data saturation, but it is anticipated that a least two focus groups will 
be held, each consisting of approximately eight to ten members of the public in each 
group. 
 
Interviews and focus groups will be audio-recorded, transcribed and analysed. 
 
10.6.4.3 INTERVIEWS – PROCESS 
 
Participants will be informed about the nature and purpose of the study and invited 
to discuss issues related to the distribution of healthcare, priority-setting and the 
suggestion that responsibility for healthcare need should be considered when 
healthcare priorities are identified. Terms such as 'QALY-weighting' or 'weighting 
health benefits' are not in common use and will not be used within the interviews. 
However, participants inferred views on weighting will be sought59. 
 
An interview guide comprising of open-ended questions, relevant prompts and 
probes, plus scenarios designed to explore key issues arising from the literature, will 
be used to guide the discussion rather than as a prescriptive means of eliciting 
responses (Appendix Two).  
 
The intention will be to generate an adaptable dialogue, with the interviewer 
questioning, probing, seeking clarification, offering additional information and 
summarising. Throughout the interview, additional short, open questions (probes) 
will be used to elicit reasoning and arguments; to verify their consistency and to 
encourage participants to explain and explore their responses. For example: 
 
 What are your reasons for thinking/believing that? 
 Earlier in the interview you stated that you believe 'X' but you have now 
confirmed that you also support doing 'Y', what do you think of this? 
 Can you give me an example? 
                                               
59
 To elicit responses that may indicate a view on weighting health benefits (and not simply a preference to  
     maximise efficiency) the predicted health outcome will be kept the same within questions and scenarios.  
     Weighting is only applicable in circumstances  where the potential health gain is equal. Therefore, if the health  
     gain is not kept the same, the question cannot elicit a view on weighting health benefits. Statements such as "I  
     would give priority to the most severely ill" could be about weighting benefits or  may indicate a preference for   
     straightforward efficiency, depending on how the question is framed 
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 Are there circumstances where that would not be the case? 
 Why do you think such views are held? 
 What would you recommend? 
 If another person had an opposite view to your own, how would you explain 
to them why you believe your view to be correct? 
 
To ensure that ethical reasoning may ensure, issues will be presented in terms of 
an ethical problem (or containing ethically-relevant features) (Holm, 1997: 99). 
Participants will be encouraged to explain and defend their views; to provide 
reasons or evidence to support their position and, in so doing, demonstrate morally 
reasoned preferences.  
 
It has been noted that the valuations of health increments seem to be affected by 
whether questions are framed as individual or social choices (Gyrd-Hansen, 2004). 
Therefore, in order to avoid discrepancies between individual and social valuations, 
participants will, where possible, be encouraged to adopt a social decision-making 
perspective. 
 
Self-contradictory statements or evident conflicts or inconsistencies of reasoning 
and the extent to which participants sustain logical arguments when challenged will 
be explored by encouraging participants to reflect on their responses, for example: 
 
Interviewer: Earlier, you said that you think that people responsible for their 
own ill-health should have lower priority, but you have now stated that you also 
believe that society shouldn't discriminate against smokers – how do you think 
decision-makers can resolve such opposing views? 
 
It is acknowledged that formulating and framing sound arguments demands 
considered, critical thinking, and it has been suggested that general population 
respondents do not have a readily articulated account of their views on complex 
healthcare priority-setting issues (Shah, 2009). Therefore, a conversational 
approach will be fostered throughout the interview. Participants will be  encouraged 
to 'think aloud', to verbalise their reasoning and express arguments in their own 
words.  
 
The interviewer will be particularly alert to the development (by the participant) of 
coherence-focused arguments that do not necessarily accord with the rational, 
logical process of deductive reasoning (outlined in Chapter 7). Participants will be 
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encouraged to reflect upon their initial responses to questions and to develop their 
evaluation and, ultimately, their ethical arguments. The interviewer will be attentive 
to the evaluative processes participants employ and will aim to recognise and 
respond to their use of: 
 
1. moral claims, made either via recommendations ('should', 'ought' etc.) 
2. evaluative terms ('right', 'wrong' etc.) 
3. adjectives such as 'cruel', 'inhumane', etc.  
4. components of ethical evaluation, such as analogies and parallels ("'x' is like 
'y' so you should not do 'x'")  
5. 'slippery slope' arguments ("if you do 'x' then it will eventually lead to 'y'")  
(Thomson, 1999). 
 
The interviewer will aim to use these to facilitate the discussion. 
 
Information will be presented verbally and, where necessary, via laminated card or 
computer laptop screen, and participants' understanding of written information will 
be established. Interviews will be conducted by the researcher and it is anticipated 
that each interview will last for approximately one hour. Interviews will be recorded 
using digital audio equipment and subsequently transcribed. 
 
10.6.4.4 FOCUS GROUPS – PROCESS 
 
Focus groups will be facilitated by the researcher and an experienced co-facilitator.  
Focus groups will be structured around a set of predetermined questions to examine 
issues emerging from interview data. Focus groups will commence with the 
facilitator asking one or two questions aimed at engaging participants and 
subsequent questions will seek to explore issues emerging from interview data. 
 
A key feature of focus groups is the exploitation and active encouragement of group 
interaction among participants (Webb and Kevern, 2000) and it is anticipated that 
participants' comments will stimulate and influence the thinking of others. Emphasis 
will be placed on encouraging participants to talk to one another; asking questions, 
exchanging anecdotes, and commenting on the others' experiences and points of 
view.  
 
Focus groups will be recorded using digital audio equipment and subsequently 
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transcribed. 
 
10.6.5 RECRUITMENT 
 
The study will seek to recruit English-speaking, adult60 'members of the public'. 
However, it is acknowledged that this term is indistinct and that, from a qualitative 
research perspective, the concept of a 'member of the public' may be unhelpful. 
This is obviously of concern with regard to the generalisability of qualitative findings 
and this issue is addressed in 'Data Trustworthiness' (below). 
 
In a review of public participation in healthcare priority-setting, Mitton et al (2009: 
223) defined three distinct categories of members of the public: 
 
1. the public as individual citizens speaking on their own behalf  
2. the public as organised interest groups supposedly speaking on behalf of 
their membership 
3. the public as patients or consumers of services, in those relatively few 
instances where they are asked to speak on issues broader than their own 
personal experience 
 
In recruiting participants, it is not intended that a 'member of the public' will be 
specifically defined. The expectation is that participants will be invited as 'individual 
citizens speaking on their own behalf'. However, it is acknowledged that this may 
not be possible to confirm. 
 
In accordance with a Grounded Theory approach, the initial participant sample will 
be obtained from where the phenomenon occurs (Coyne, 1997). Therefore, 
recruitment to the pilot study will recruit adult members of the general public via 
advertisements placed within prominent locations (supermarkets, libraries etc.). A 
study website will also be established to provide further information and the website 
address will be included within the advertisement. No additional inclusion/exclusion 
criteria will be applied.  
 
Subsequent recruitment will be based on theoretical sampling, a form of sampling 
that is controlled by the needs of the emerging theory, not a list of variables (Strauss 
and Corbin, 1998). It is anticipated therefore that a more focused sampling strategy 
may emerge as data is analysed. 
                                               
60
 Participants age and language abilities will be checked on recruitment to the study 
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Members of the public who express an interest in participating in the study will be 
sent an introductory letter, Participant Information Sheet and Expression of Interest 
form plus a pre-paid envelope. Upon receipt of a completed Expression of Interest 
form, the researcher will contact respondents by telephone to discuss the study 
further and, if appropriate, to arrange a convenient date and time for their interview. 
Each participant will take part in one interview and receive a small payment to cover 
any travelling expenses. 
 
10.6.6 DATA ANALYSIS 
 
Interviews and focus group data will be transcribed and then organised using the 
qualitative data analysis package NVivo (Gibbs, 2002; Bazeley, 2007). Data from 
both sources will be analysed together in fulfilment of data triangulation. This will 
enhance data trustworthiness by data convergence, enabling corroboration of 
views, values, preferences, reasoning and arguments across the methods. Focus 
group data will also be compared with individual interview data, to identify and 
interpret processes by which participants' views, values, preferences, reasoning and 
arguments emerge according to the method of data collection. There are two 
aspects of data analysis for this study, i) coding, and ii) ethical analysis which, in 
accordance with Grounded Theory, will be undertaken concurrently (Figure 10.1). 
 
10.6.6.1 CODING 
 
Coding is central to Grounded Theory; it involves three stages: open coding; axial 
coding and selective coding (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). 
 
In the open coding stage, categories of information are developed via line-by-line 
analysis of the data; examining it for concepts that appear to relate to the same 
phenomena. A coding framework is developed, both to facilitate analytical 
consistency and to reveal discursive themes and processes recurring within and 
across data.  These categories are subsequently 'labelled' using, for example, 
theoretical ideas from the literature. Sub-codes are identified which represent 
different dimensions of the categories. For example, depending upon participants' 
responses, an initial label may be 'Lower priority', this may subsequently generate 
such sub-codes as 'responsibility', 'alternatives', 'fairness', 'blame', 'punishment' etc. 
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Figure 10.1: The process of data analysis 
 
The second stage of coding is axial coding, in which relationships between 
categories and sub-codes are explored and defined. This is done by linking codes to 
contexts, to consequences, to patterns of interaction, and to causes (Bryman, 
2008). For example, as the potential health gain will have been (where possible) 
held constant within interviews and focus groups, any stated preference for 
prioritising the youngest patients, the most severely ill etc. will not be combined into 
a category with preferences for prioritising these groups when the health gain is not  
predicted to be the same, as that could result in erroneous conclusions being drawn 
about arguments for weighting benefits.  
 
A coding paradigm (theoretical model) that visually displays the interrelationships of 
these axial codings (Strauss and Corbin, 1998) is then developed (a hypothetical 
example is given in Figure 10.2). 
 
The third stage of coding is selective coding which involves selecting a core 
category – such as 'Lower priority' in the example given above – as the central 
phenomenon, systematically relating it to other categories and filling in categories 
that need further refinement (Bryman, 2008). 
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Figure. 10.2: Hypothetical example of a coding paradigm: 
 
10.6.6.2 ETHICAL ANALYSIS 
 
This stage of analysis will explore core categories and subject them to more 
detailed study of their ethical content and evidence of ethical reasoning and 
argumentation. A focused ethical analysis of the data will be undertaken; mapping 
the categories onto relevant moral theory.  
 
To establish control over the scope of analysis (the range and complexity of theories 
that data could be compared against is considerable, implying a potentially limitless 
process of scrutiny), preliminary ethical analysis will be applied from the perspective 
of key ethical theories, starting with the standard bioethical approach to ethical 
analysis - respect for autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence and justice, 
commonly referred to as the 'four principles' approach (see Chapter 5). Data will 
also be analysed from a consequentialist, deontological and virtue ethics 
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perspective. The ethical validity of arguments will be established via their adherence 
to a valid logical form (See Chapter 7). 
 
Having established a practicable ethical framework, subsequent analysis will 
examine the process of ethical reasoning and the ways in which participants have 
sought to resolve both logical and ethical conflicts, inconsistencies and 
contradictions in their responses. For example, are moral distinctions made 
between 'self-inflicted' illnesses and their influence on healthcare entitlement? Are 
preferences contradicted or rejected when participants are asked to consider 
various prioritisation strategies? Are attempts made to synthesise different ethical 
approaches? Are some moral concepts dominant? For example, do participants 
support an egalitarian account, rejecting prioritisation of healthcare on the basis of 
perceived responsibility for healthcare need? The extent to which broad moral 
concepts such as 'merit', 'responsibility' and 'social value' have been used (or 
inferred) to support arguments will be identified.  
 
In acknowledgment of the need to identify coherence-focused arguments61 – in 
addition to the rational, logical argument structure – the links between participants' 
initial responses, the components of the evaluative processes applied and the 
conclusions will be examined. 
 
The issue of commensurability will be explored. For example, some participants 
may state that their ethical priority is to ensure there is as little difference between 
what healthcare people receive as possible, and be consistent within this. While 
others might argue (or infer) that maximising health benefits is the most important 
approach and respond consistently within that view. However, there may be 
identifiable inconsistences or flaws within these arguments or there may simply be 
differences in what people regard as the primary ethical goal (e.g. ensuring equality, 
maximising benefits etc.).  
 
All identified ethical arguments will be subjected to further descriptive analysis 
highlighting, for example, issues of consensus and disagreement 
 
To assist the supplementary validation of the findings (Strauss and Corbin, 1998), a 
comparative analysis of ethical arguments advanced by participants, with those 
                                               
61 Coherence-focused arguments are discussed in Chapter 7 
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advanced in the literature regarding responsibility for ill-health as a priority-setting 
criterion, will be undertaken.  
 
10.7 ENSURING DATA TRUSTWORTHINESS 
 
Establishing criteria for assessing the quality of qualitative research – its 
'trustworthiness' – has been an important consideration in developing this research 
proposal. Qualitative research is sometimes accused of lacking the scholarly 
thoroughness of quantitative approaches because the presumed lack of 
demonstrable validity and reliability - fundamental cornerstones of the quantitative 
method – of its findings. Shenton (2004) described four criteria for ensuring 
trustworthiness, proposed by Guba (1981) that will be applied to this study. Each 
criterion's equivalent in quantitative research is shown in brackets (Bryman, 2008): 
 
a) Credibility (which parallels internal validity) 
b) Transferability (which parallels external validity) 
c) Dependability (which parallels reliability) 
d) Confirmability (which parallels objectivity) 
 
In order to demonstrate the trustworthiness of this study's findings, the following 
outlines how each of these criteria will be met: 
 
Firstly, the credibility of the study's findings will be established by the adoption of 
established research methods; the triangulation of methods (any weakness in one is 
compensated by the strengths of the other (Guba, 1981)); the use of a transparent 
and systematic approach to data analysis; reference to supporting literature to 
explain and confirm the data; the voluntariness of participation; and lastly by the 
ongoing scrutiny of the project by an experienced research supervisor. 
 
The study will be examining a relatively small number of participants. Therefore, the 
generalisability and overall relevance of its findings may give rise to concerns 
(Coast et al, 2004). However, although it will not be possible to ensure that the 
findings of this study are applicable to other situations and populations, the 
transferability of its findings will be enhanced by providing sufficient 'thick 
description' of the context in which the study has been undertaken to enable others 
to assess the possible transferability of findings to their own situations. Morse 
(1999: 5) opposed the view that qualitative findings are not generalisable providing 
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that the sampling of participants "ensures that the theory is comprehensive, 
saturated and accounts for negative cases." Monitoring progress towards data 
saturation, a key feature of Grounded Theory, will enhance the transferability of this 
study's findings. 
 
The dependability of findings is related to some of the factors cited in support of 
their credibility, particularly the use of overlapping research methods (interviews and 
focus groups), and the adoption of an 'auditing approach' (Bryman, 2008) ensuring 
that complete records are kept at all stages of the research process. 
 
Finally, with regard to confirmability, the researcher will seek to avoid allowing 
personal values or theoretical inclinations to influence the conduct of the study. 
Although it is recognised that complete objectivity is impossible in social research 
(Bryman, 2008), and Grounded Theory acknowledges the role of the researcher as 
an active participant in the research process (Corbin and Strauss, 2008), there has 
been a systematic approach to the design of this study, as there will be to its 
implementation, and the researcher will ensure that they are aware of the impact 
their role and presence will have on both participants and the data. The methods 
adopted for this study provide transparency, so that the influence of the researcher 
on the process can be identified and allowed for, and that clear connections may be 
drawn between the original data and the conclusions. The researcher will also be 
mindful of the need for reflexivity throughout the research process and will maintain 
a reflective journal; a personal narrative consisting of notes and responses to key 
events such as interviews.   
 
10.8 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
10.8.1 CONSENT 
 
Participation will be voluntary, potential participants will be advised that if they do 
not wish to participate they need only not return the Expression of Interest form. All 
potential participants will be encouraged to make contact with the researcher to ask 
questions or seek further information if required before deciding whether or not to 
take part. Prior to commencement of an interview, participants will be asked to sign 
a consent form and their written consent will be retained for the duration of the 
study. A copy will also be given to each participant.  
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10.8.2 CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
Participants will be informed that all personal information will be treated in 
confidence and that all data will be anonymised and not made available to anyone 
who is not directly involved in the study. The results of the study, or any resulting 
statistics or publication of direct quotes from participants, will not be made available 
in a form that identifies participants. Consent Forms will be stored in a locked filing 
cabinet. Raw and processed electronic data will be encrypted and stored on the 
researcher's computer which will be password protected. All data will be stored and 
accessible, by the researcher only, for a period of five years after the study has 
ended, at which point data will be destroyed. 
 
10.9 POTENTIAL BENEFITS 
 
It is hoped that this (hypothetical) study will provide a significant contribution to 
methodological and empirical knowledge, as the critical examination of ethical 
reasoning and arguments in the context of healthcare priority-setting represents an 
innovative approach to research in this area. By systematically examining ethical 
reasoning and argumentation and applying an empirical ethics methodology, it will 
help to bridge the quantitative/qualitative gap in research into the public's views 
regarding healthcare priority-setting. 
 
The methods used will enable inconsistencies in reasoning to be highlighted and 
allow participants to deliberate on how to resolve them. This is something that is not 
evident within other approaches to eliciting public views in this area. By not seeking 
participants' unsupported views or presenting a summation of views and opinions 
the study acknowledges participants as reasoning moral agents rather than simply a 
source of stated preferences and this is considered to be a particular strength of this 
study. 
 
It is recognised that there can be no certainties with regard to the outcome of this 
study, in fact 'uncertainty' – with regard to, for example, identifying how the public's 
reasoning per se (as opposed to opinion) might inform policy – is one of its key 
strengths. However, it is anticipated that it will produce empirical evidence to 
complement, enhance and assist the interpretation of existing evidence of the 
public's views.  
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It is further anticipated that the findings will have normative implications that will be 
articulated and evaluated and may therefore inform the current policy context; 
contribute to the debate on the role responsibility should play in priority-setting 
(Campbell, 2012) and effectively align with contemporaneous activities in this field 
such as the 'Social Values and Health Priority Setting' project being undertaken at 
University College, London (UCL, 2013).  
 
10.10 DISSEMINATION STRATEGY 
 
The findings of this study will be disseminated via peer-reviewed journals, such as: 
The Journal of Medical Ethics, and Health Care Analysis. All participants in the 
study will be offered the opportunity to receive a copy of its findings. 
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11  CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
The challenge faced by the National Health Service of providing a reasonable level 
of healthcare to the maximum number of people via a finite healthcare budget has 
provided the broad context for this study. A significant aspect of that challenge is 
ensuring that healthcare is distributed efficiently and that it meets the need for social 
and ethical acceptability. 
 
The recognition of a 'responsibility principle' within healthcare priority-setting would, 
as has been contended throughout this thesis, be a particularly contentious addition 
to NHS distribution strategy and would indicate a marked change to the manner in 
which NHS provision is conceived and delivered. However, as the introduction to 
the thesis made clear, financial limitations, combined with growing demand for NHS 
care, suggest that priority-setting and rationing must be regarded as pragmatic 
prerequisites for effective healthcare distribution. It is therefore essential that 
priority-setting criteria be established that enable empirically-based and ethically 
defensible resource-limiting strategies. 
 
In the second and third chapters of this thesis, the way in which healthcare is 
distributed and priorities identified via the use of QALYs was described and 
subjected to critical ethical evaluation. The QALY approach is an effective, if 
somewhat inflexible, means of quantifying health outcomes and offers a standard 
method of priority-setting against which the introduction of a different approach to 
priority-setting – as via the introduction of a 'responsibility principle' – may be 
appraised. The QALY approach has been subjected to considerable criticism, 
particularly due to its disregard for the variations in people's healthcare needs. It 
has been established that the suggestion that the QALY approach should be 
modified and that a system of weighting – that would enable more explicit priority-
setting – be introduced is gaining credibility in health economics and bioethics fields, 
and that it has (limited) evidence of public support.  
 
The concept of 'weighting' the QALY in accordance with the individual 
characteristics or attributes of its recipients was explored and the feasibility of 
incorporating a distributional bias into an otherwise egalitarian approach to 
healthcare distribution was ethically evaluated. Proposals for weighting the QALY, it 
was established, are ethically valid. However, other socio-ethical influences would 
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need to be addressed if a substantive system of weighting were to be introduced. 
Chief among these are the need to identify the specific characteristics against which 
weight could be added or subtracted, and ensuring that weighting criteria have 
public support.   
 
Responsibility for ill-health and consequent healthcare need is a particularly 
controversial potential weighting criterion. In light of its various socio-ethical 
implications, responsibility-weighting would demand a clear understanding of public 
views and, more importantly, effective involvement of the public and public opinion 
in the debate. 
 
 In chapter four, the concept of the 'responsibility principle' was investigated and 
subjected to critical ethical appraisal. A proposal that responsibility should be a 
factor in priority-setting would encounter much opposition, much of which would 
refer to the ethical difficulties that its implementation would inevitably encounter. A 
need for clear, empirically-based and ethically defensible social objectives has been 
promoted throughout this thesis and the 'responsibility principle' offers a clear 
justification for identifying such objectives. 
 
The thesis then considered the role of the public and, more particularly, the views, 
values and preferences of the public with regard to healthcare distribution, priority-
setting and the 'responsibility principle'. In chapter five, the influence of social values 
on health distribution decision-making was explored and the ways in which NICE, as 
the national source of guidance to decision-makers, has sought to integrate social 
values and social value judgements into its activities was evaluated.  
 
Effective public participation in healthcare distribution debates, it is concluded, 
demands a more thorough exposition of the public's views, values and preferences. 
This, it is contended could be achieved by examining how the public construct 
ethical arguments to support their stated preferences regarding priority-setting and 
the 'responsibility principle'. 
 
The concepts of ethical reasoning and arguments were explored in Chapter 7, and 
in Chapter 8, it was shown that there is little existing evidence of these concepts 
being systematically examined in relation to healthcare distribution. Therefore, it 
was established that an effective means of doing so should be identified. 
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The methodological approach of empirical ethics, discussed in Chapter 9, it is 
contended, would provide appropriate methodological guidance for a study seeking 
to elicit, analyse and identify the public's reasoning and arguments. In chapter 10, a 
detailed proposal was presented that would meet the need for a systematic, in-
depth approach. It is anticipated that the findings of the proposed hypothetical study 
would enhance knowledge of public views and enable public participation in the 
debates to be more effectual. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
 
The overall conclusions drawn from this study are that: 
 
i. the suggestion that responsibility for ill-health and consequent healthcare 
need should be a factor in the allocation of healthcare resources demands 
the input of 'public opinion' 
 
ii. the role and influence of public opinion in healthcare distribution policy are 
impeded by the inherent limitations of available evidence of the public's 
views values and preferences 
 
iii. the systematic examination of ethical reasoning and arguments would 
enhance public participation by adding to the existing knowledge-base on 
public opinion 
 
iv. a qualitative research study, guided by an empirical ethics methodological 
approach, would provide the means by which members of the public's 
reasoning and arguments could be systematically investigated. 
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APPENDIX TWO 
 
 
1 – EXAMPLES OF INTERVIEW GUIDE QUESTIONS 
 
 
Sample question (i) 
 
What do you think of the suggestion that, where priority for healthcare 
cannot be decided on medical grounds – who is the most ill etc. – people 
who are thought to be responsible for their own ill-health should have lower 
priority than people who require healthcare through (for want of a better 
phrase) 'no fault of their own'? 
 
 
Probes 
 
 It has been suggested that higher priority should be given to those who 
have 'looked after themselves' – what are your views on this?  
 What factors do you think influence whether a person lives a healthy 
lifestyle? 
 Would you say that what could be called a 'lifestyle disease' (e.g. 
obesity-related) is self-inflicted? 
 Do you think that there could be reasons or circumstances that may have 
led someone to pursue an 'unhealthy' lifestyle? 
 Is it important to you that people are free to make choices about their 
lifestyle – including 'unhealthy' behaviour? 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Sample question (ii) 
 
 
Imagine that the NHS is planning to introduce a policy of treating some 
patients before others – or even not treating them at all – based on some 
aspect of their 'lifestyle' such as whether they drink, smoke, take regular 
exercise etc. The justification for this policy would not be based on medical 
grounds (e.g. the risks of operating on obese patients are higher; treatment 
may be less effective etc.), but on the essential need – due to financial 
limitations – to set priorities in the allocation of healthcare resources. What 
would be your views on such a plan? 
 
Probes 
 
 Do you believe that all UK citizens have a 'right' to receive NHS 
treatment in all circumstances? If so, can anything affect this right? 
 Do you think that giving lower priority in relation to responsibility for 
illness would be a particularly controversial development? If so, why? 
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APPENDIX TWO (Continued) 
 
 
2 – EXAMPLE  OF INTERVIEW SCENARIO 
 
 
Question:  
 
Based on the information in this scenario, which of the two patients do you believe 
should receive the available treatment? 
 
 
 
'X' and 'Y', both aged 40, have advanced cirrhosis of the liver. Both have 
the same degree of liver damage and face the same risk of dying if they 
do not receive a liver transplant in the near future. 
 
'X' is a 'non-drinker' and has cirrhosis due to infection and 'Y' has cirrhosis 
due to excessive alcohol consumption (but has now stopped drinking).  
 
It is predicted that, following transplant, both 'X' and 'Y' could expect to 
live a fairly normal, healthy existence for a further 15-25 years. However, 
there is currently only one available liver for transplant that is a good 
match for both patients.  
 
A decision must be made regarding which of these patients will: 
 
a) receive the available liver 
b) remain on the transplant waiting list 
 
 
 
 
Prompts: 
 
 For the purposes of this question, both patients are the same in terms of their 
physical condition 
 A decision must be made, and both patients are expected to respond equally 
well to a transplant 
 Suppose that 'Y' has had a previous liver transplant, following which they 
continued to drink, leading to their current need for a second transplant – does 
this affect your view on who should receive the available liver? 
 Some people might claim that patient Y 'does not deserve' to receive the 
available liver – what are your thoughts on such a view? 
 Do you believe that 'Y' is 'responsible' for their need for a liver transplant? 
 
